PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

JULY-AUG
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA: AGONY OF A NATION

The Politics of Retrenchment
Jan Provaznik

The Vagaries of Law
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Doctrinal Myths and Realities
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From Budapest to Prague
Bela Kiraly
Tamas Aczel

Yugoslav Reforms

The Soviet Military

Documents

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Agony of a Nation

2 The Politics of Retrenchment, *by Jan Provaznik*
17 The Vagaries of Law, *by Otto Ulc*
The "New Socialism"
33 I. Philosophy in Search of Reality, *by Peter Ludz*
43 II. The End of an Illusion?, *by J. H. Huizinga*
Budapest: 1956—Prague: 1968
52 I. Parallels and Contrasts, *by Bela K. Kiraly*
60 II. Spokesmen of Revolution *by Tamas Aczel*

YUGOSLAVIA TODAY

67 The Evolution of a System, *by Paul Shoup*
78 From a Reporter's Notebook, *by Christopher Bird*

Books

89 The "Spring of 1968," *by Cary O. Fisher*
95 Nationalities in the USSR, *by Violet Conolly*
98 Reviews in Brief

Documents

102 Stalin and Stalinism

Notes and Views

106 Are the Generals Taking Over?, *by Thomas W. Wolfe*
111 Correspondence

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Agony of a Nation

"The [Communist] Party," said the Action Program of the Czechoslovak CP, adopted on April 5, 1968, "is a party of the working class," representing "society as a whole . . . for the benefit of all."

> ". . . we are a party," said First Secretary Gustav Husak in his address to the Central Committee plenum on May 29, 1969, "of the working class and of the working people," whose task is "the protection of socialist power, the power of the working class and the working people."

"The Communist Party enjoys the voluntary support of the people," said the Action Program. "[It] cannot enforce its authority; this must be won again and again by party activity . . . by the work of its members, by the veracity of its ideals."

> "We must separate ourselves from incorrect opinions, ideas and attitudes," said Husak, "so as to be able, in struggling against them, to unite on a new basis, on the basis of a political program and adherence to Leninist principles."

The party's "mission lies primarily in arousing socialist initiative, in showing the ways and actual possibilities of Communist perspectives, and in winning over all workers to them through systematic persuasion, as well as by the personal examples of Communists"—Action Program.

> "Our aim is to free the masses of [party] members and other working people from incorrect opinions and opportunistic trends . . . [We shall wage] a struggle leading the party to the isolation and political defeat of the rightist-opportunist forces."—Gustav Husak.

"Communists must incessantly strive for the voluntary support of the majority of the people for the party line . . . Only down-to-earth discussion and exchange of views can be the pre-condition for responsible decisions of collective bodies. Confrontation of views is an essential expression of a multilateral responsible attempt to find the best solution . . . . Each party member has not only the right, but the duty to act according to his conscience, [to display] initiative, [to voice] criticism and different views on the matter in question, [and] to oppose any functionary. This practice must become deeply rooted if the party is to avoid subjectivism in its activity. It is impermissible to restrict Communists in these rights, to create an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion of those around who voice different opinions, to persecute the minority under any pretext."—Action Program.

> "If the party is to fulfill its social mission . . . it cannot reconcile itself to the practice whereby such principles as the binding nature of party decisions, adherence to valid statutes, and the principle of the binding nature of the decisions of higher party organs on the lower party organs and individual party members are gravely weakened and frequently rejected . . . It is neither possible nor compatible with Leninist norms of party work and our party statutes for lower party organs to oppose the decisions of higher organs after important decisions have been taken; for them to criticize or reject them, to organize militant actions against them, or to interpret them arbitrarily . . . Disunity and contradictory opinions . . . have set a bad example for the entire party and in fact have legalized organizational and ideological anarchy in the party. Thus it has now become unavoidable for the Central Committee and its individual members and organs to enforce the decisions, conclusions, and resolutions [of the party]."—Gustav Husak.

The above—in lieu of an introduction.

—THE EDITORS

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The Politics of Retrenchment

By Jan Provaznik

When the Czechoslovak delegation to the conference at Cierna nad Tisou returned to Prague on August 1, 1968, its members were disappointed by the cool welcome they were given by the population. Alexander Dubcek and his associates came back believing that they had achieved the best possible results at Cierna, but the people of Czechoslovakia feared that an unacceptable compromise had been reached. Four fateful weeks later, on August 27, a similar Czechoslovak delegation returned from Moscow to its now occupied homeland. This time the battered leadership was surprised by an unexpectedly warm reception: shocked by the invasion, the people were now anxious to believe that a total capitulation had been avoided and that enough room remained for at least a partial continuation of the post-January reforms. In this they were sadly deluding themselves. Indeed, it may be argued that Czechoslovakia's tragedy began not with the invasion of August 21 by five Warsaw Pact states, but with the signing of the Moscow agreements, which in their ultimate consequences determined the fate of that little European country for the unforeseeable future.

Until August 27, 1968, it was possible to conclude that the armed intervention had been a political fiasco. From a military point of view the operation was brilliantly executed: within a matter of hours the country was occupied, and the leading reformist politicians, including Dubcek, were arrested and deported to the Soviet Union. From a political point of view, however, the occupying authorities failed to achieve any of their objectives: they were not able to form a puppet government; they did not provoke the population into hopeless armed resistance, which could have been used as a pretext for drowning the Prague Spring in blood; they could not find a sufficient number of collaborators to help carry out mass arrests of progressive officials and journalists and thus were unable to

Jan Provaznik is the pseudonym of a well-known Czech writer and former member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. He has personally observed and participated in some of the events described in his article, having left his native country to settle in Western Europe shortly after Husak's assumption of power.

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prevent the Czechoslovak communications media from keeping the population informed of developments and coordinating its resistance.

The occupation forces found themselves totally isolated. The entire Czechoslovak nation, including the people's militia, the army, the party organizations and the organs of the state, treated them as aggressors. The President of the Republic bravely resisted their demands. Even the Parliament, whose membership had been selected under the Novotny regime, unequivocally opposed the occupation. The vast majority of the members of the government joined in this opposition, and every social and professional organization in the country resolutely protested the aggression.

What is more, the occupation forces stood helplessly by as an Extraordinary 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was hurriedly convened in Prague during the first invasion week, assembling in an industrial plant under the protection of workers and people's militiamen. The Congress not only repudiated the occupation, but elected a new Central Committee whose liberal composition not even the most optimistic reformers could have hoped for before the occupation. In sum, all traces of pro-Soviet sympathy among party members and officials as well as among the population at large suddenly disappeared; the events of August 21 seemed to have cured the great majority of the nation, including many conservative Communists, of any illusions about socialist brotherhood.

This, then, was the situation in the wake of the invasion: The CPCS Presidium had rejected the occupation in its proclamation adopted on the night of August 20-21. All other constitutional organs and social organizations had categorically condemned the military intervention. The population stood united against the occupation forces. The foreign armies in Czechoslovakia had run up against a cold wall of silence and contempt.

The Moscow Agreement

On August 23, President Svoboda flew to Moscow. In addition to several members of the government whom he had selected, he was accompanied by the discredited collaborators, Vasil Bilak and Alois Indra. The President originally announced that he would return within one or two days. His journey represented an effort to find a way out of a situation that had come to an impasse: he was, in effect, trying to help the Soviets find a solution for the Czechoslovak crisis based on mutual political compromise.

Not too much is known about the negotiations that went on behind the Kremlin walls between August 23 and 26. According to some Czechoslovak sources, President Svoboda threatened suicide and refused to sign a document of total capitulation. The leaders who had been abducted — Dubcek, Premier Cernik, Parliament Chairman Smrkovsky and Central Committee Secretary Spacek — were brought to the Kremlin from their place of confinement and were said to have been in very poor physical and mental condition. They were stood in the center of the conference hall, and there the members of the Soviet Politburo kept circling around them, inspecting them like animals in a zoo. None of the Czechoslovaks knew at first what the situation was like at home and how the people of Czechoslovakia were reacting. According to the west German magazine *Der Spiegel*, it was Zdenek Mlynar, a secretary of the CPCS Central Committee and a late arrival in Moscow, who informed Dubcek and his colleagues in Moscow about the determined resistance of the population at home. According to this account, Mlynar reached Moscow with the help of the Soviet Ambassador in Prague, Chervonenko, traveling directly from the session of the Extraordinary 14th Party Congress. Chervonenko seems to have thought that Mlynar would be helpful to the Soviet side in Moscow; apparently, however, the opposite was the case.

Out of this grueling session came the Moscow Agreement, consisting of 16 articles which contained enough ambivalence to invite misunderstanding.[1] First of all, the Soviet Union expressed its agreement to the continuation of Czechoslovak policies based on the CPCS Central Committee resolutions of January and May 1968. This statement was the source of many false hopes in Czechoslovakia, for it was interpreted as Soviet approval of the post-January line shorn of some of its more "extreme" aspects. In fact, however, the reference to the January resolution signified only that the Soviets recognized the finality of Novotny's demotion from his post as First Secretary of the CPCS and were not counting on his return to public life.

As for the resolution of the May Plenum, the Soviets had good reason to approve it since it had called attention to the danger of "rightwing and anti-socialist" forces in Czechoslovakia, thereby

[1] Released by *TASS*, Aug. 27, 1968.

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buttressing Moscow's claims about the threat to socialism in Czechoslovakia. Possibly the Soviets calculated that this item of the resolution could be used as the basis for a future Czechoslovak admission that the existence of counterrevolution had justified the Soviet intervention. Significantly, the Moscow Agreement failed to mention the April Plenum of the CC-CPCS, which had formulated the basic principles of post-January policy, approved the Action Program of the party, and decided on important appointments in the party and government (including the election of Josef Smrkovsky and Frantisek Kriegel to the party Presidium and the designation of Smrkovsky as Chairman of the National Assembly, Cernik as Premier, Kriegel as Chairman of the National Front, and Ota Sik as Deputy Premier).

Other Soviet commitments in the Agreement were formulated as positive declarations: for example, Moscow promised that Soviet troops would not interfere in internal Czechoslovak affairs, and that cooperation between the USSR and Czechoslovakia would continue on the basis of "mutual respect and equality." These formulations helped give birth to illusions among some members of the party leadership, as well as among some groups of the population, that genuine compromises had been reached.

Yet there was much else in the Agreement, as well as in the communiqué that followed the negotiations,[2] to cause grave misgivings. The statement that "the discussions had proceeded in an open atmosphere of comradeliness and friendship" raised fears of hidden capitulations on the part of the Czech leaders. More important, the communiqué associated Bilak, Indra and other pro-Soviet Communists with the titles and functions which had been taken away from them at the Extraordinary 14th Party Congress, making it clear that Moscow refused to recognize the validity of the Congress. Similarly, the passages of the Agreement referring to controls over the communications media, investigation of the activities of Czechoslovak government leaders who were abroad at the time of the intervention, and the protection of party members who had been faithful to "the principles of proletarian internationalism" caused much concern in the country. Finally, the Agreement foresaw the establishment of a juridical basis for the presence of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak territory through a future treaty between the USSR and Czechoslovakia.

One may assume that certain personnel changes were also agreed upon in Moscow, since resignations followed in due course. These changes probably included the removal of Dr. Kriegel (who was present in Moscow but did not take part in the discussions and did not sign the Agreement) from the party Presidium and the chairmanship of the National Front; of Ota Sik as Deputy Premier; Josef Pavel as Minister of Interior; Jiri Hajek as Foreign Minister; Zdenek Hejzlar as Director of Czechoslovak Radio; Jiri Pelikan as Director of Czechoslovak Television; and possibly the resignations of other reformist politicians and functionaries.

Enter Husak

On August 26, one day before the return of the Czechoslovak delegation from Moscow, an extraordinary congress of the Communist Party of Slovakia was convened in Bratislava. Within twenty-four hours, Gustav Husak arrived in the Slovak capital directly from Moscow and reported to the delegates on the results of the Kremlin negotiations.[3] Two important passages stood out in his speech: first, he declared that the Moscow Agreement and the new reality which it represented were the only basis for future Czechoslovak policy, and second, he proposed that the Slovak party congress should refuse to recognize the validity of the 14th CPCS Congress held in Prague a few days earlier, on the ground that an insufficient number of Slovak delegates had been in attendance. Husak was thus the first Czechoslovak politician to come out with a *formally* acceptable argument against the legality of the 14th Congress, even though it was clear to everyone that the formal argument was nothing more than a pretext to cover submission to Moscow's will. In other words, Husak was the first prominent Czechoslovak official to go to the aid of the Soviets in their attempt to achieve and justify what was for them a crucial political objective.

The congress at Bratislava also elected Husak—who at the time was a Deputy Premier of the Czechoslovak government and held no party function—as the new First Secretary of the Slovak party. Subsequently, he filled all the leading positions in Slovakia with his followers, at the same time removing a number of competitors who earlier

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Czechoslovak Radio, Aug. 28, 1968.

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in 1968 had prevented his return to the forefront of Slovak public life and to the Slovak party leadership.

In retrospect, Husak's performance at the Slovak party congress stands out as the first successful breach in the August unity of the Czechoslovak Communists. While the demand for the annulment of the 14th CPCS Congress originated from the Soviets, it was at the request of the Communist Party of Slovakia that the congress was declared invalid. This fact was the prime cause of the subsequent deterioration of Czech-Slovak relations—hardly helped by the fact that Husak also began making invidious public comparisons between the progress of political consolidation in Slovakia and the existence of abnormal political conditions in the Czech lands.

Compromise and Illusions

On the last day of August, the CPCS Central Committee met in Prague and ironed out a compromise to resolve the issue of the 14th Congress. The Congress was annulled, but 18 of the delegates who had been in attendance were coopted into the Central Committee—among them, Gustav Husak. Several conservative politicans were removed from the Presidium, but so was the liberal Dr. Kriegel. The dismissal of the conservatives was also counterbalanced by the departure of a large number of reformists from lesser political positions. The new, enlarged Presidium and the new Secretariat were both more liberal in composition than their predecessor bodies before August, but less liberal than the organs elected at the annulled 14th Party Congress.[4]

This seemingly presentable compromise now became the main source feeding the illusion that it would be possible to maintain some semblance of political independence in Czechoslovakia. The notion took hold that Czechoslovakia might even succeed in assuming a role like Finland's within the framework of the socialist commonwealth and the Warsaw Pact. Though none of the reformist politicians ever publicly formulated such a goal, their numerous declamations of loyalty to the post-January policies, despite the change of circumstances, nurtured feelings of the sort that had been expressed by Josef Smrkovsky on his return from Moscow: "We'll get out of this somehow."[5] This hope was further strengthened by the government's statement of September 13 and by Dubcek's television address of the following day, in which he irrevocably rejected politics behind closed doors as the method of government in Czechoslovakia.[6] Premier Cernik also, conscious that popular resistance during the invasion had probably saved his own life and the lives of the other arrested politicians, declared: "We shall always be guided by the principle that what the people cannot accomplish, no other force can accomplish."[7]

While Dubcek, Smrkovsky and Cernik were extremely careful in formulating their attitude toward "anti-socialist" elements in the country, Gustav Husak showed no such caution. He began issuing statements of condemnation about "anti-socialist forces that had been let loose in Czechoslovakia" and about "elements of romanticism and romantic dreaming [that] had entered our political life." Cestmir Cisar, chairman of the Czech National Council, went even further when he declared on September 18: "I consider it historically logical, politically realistic, humanly fortunate, and mutually advantageous that the Moscow negotiations between our own and the Soviet representatives have taken place and that they reached the conclusions they reached." This unqualified endorsement of the Moscow agreements was symptomatic of the incipient differentiation of attitudes within the Czechoslovak political leadership.

At the beginning of October a delegation composed of Dubcek, Cernik and Husak left for further negotiations in Moscow. Conspicuous by his absence was Josef Smrkovsky, one of the most popular politicians in Czechoslovakia and a member of the foursome—Dubcek-Svoboda-Smrkovsky-Cernik—which for the public had become the symbol and guarantee of open democratic politics. The results of these talks were not encouraging. The communiqué contained a Czechoslovak commitment to "strengthen the party and state organs with people who stand firmly on the positions of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism"[8]—in other words, people who would support the Soviet model of socialism and loyally serve Moscow's interests. Finally, the communiqué announced that the two governments would conclude a treaty

[4] *Ibid.*, Sept. 1, 1968.

[5] *Ibid.*, Aug. 27, 1968.
[6] *Ibid.*, Sept. 14, 1968.
[7] *Ibid.*, Sept. 13, 1968.
[8] *Rude pravo* (Prague), Oct. 16, 1968.

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about the temporary stationing of allied forces in Czechoslovakia.

It is most likely that personnel and organizational issues were discussed in Moscow, with three matters taking priority: the question of cutting down the effective size of the Party Presidium by superimposing upon it an Executive Committee; the weakening of the political roles of liberals Josef Smrkovsky and Josef Spacek; and the relinquishment of party functions by party Secretary Zdenek Mlynar.

The Gathering Storm

In the meantime, the political crisis was sharpening. Several developments contributed to this situation. The first was the appearance of the newspaper *Zpravy* (News), produced in Czechoslovakia by an anonymous "editorial council attached to the Soviet forces" in direct violation of the Soviet commitment under the Moscow Agreement not to interfere in Czechoslovak internal affairs. This publication, which units of the Czechoslovak police apparatus helped to distribute, grossly attacked the progressives, gave a distorted picture of political conditions in the country, and campaigned against the policies of the Dubcek leadership. The inability of the leadership to put a stop to the publication of this newspaper gave a good indication of how little leeway was left the "sovereign" government of Czechoslovakia to pursue the post-January program.

The second most immediate cause of the developing political crisis was the stir created by a series of provocative meetings of the most conservative Czechoslovak Communists. The first, called a meeting of "old Communists from Prague VIII," was convoked in a Prague suburb on October 9, 1968, under the sponsorship of the Society for Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship. The approximately 500 people who took part denounced the Dubcek leadership, expressed their support of the August intervention, and demanded the suppression of "counterrevolutionary" organizations.[9] Speakers accused the new leadership of having made more "stupid mistakes" during its brief tenure than the old one "in 20 years"; lack of confidence was expressed in the Prague City Committee of the CPCS; and the Union of Czechoslovak Journalists was branded as a counterrevolutionary organization which would be indicted for slander of Czechoslovakia's allies. In attendance at the meeting were representatives of the Soviet occupation forces, who gave their support to the anti-Dubcek attacks. A Soviet lieutenant-colonel named Korolenko took the floor to declare: "We shall always be with you, you who are in this hall. That is why we are here. We came to help the true Communists."[10] Press reports of this rally and other similar meetings subsequently held in various parts of the country aroused bitter resentment among the population and especially among the workers. Yet the party leadership failed to call these Stalinist factionalists to order—which the party statutes empower them to do. Dubcek, in a speech to industrial workers in Prague, limited himself to a comment condemning "extremes—of an anti-social or sectarian nature."[11]

Further Concessions

On October 16, a Soviet government delegation led by Premier Kosygin arrived in Prague to sign an agreement on the "temporary" stationing of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. Immediately thereafter the treaty was presented to the Parliament for ratification. Surprisingly enough, only four deputies, among them Dr. Kriegel, voted against approval, with ten others abstaining. But even more surprising was the address of Premier Cernik, who rose to defend the text of the treaty (which stipulated neither the number of troops to be stationed in Czechoslovakia nor the length of time they were to remain) and made an attempt to defend the theory of limited sovereignty. Said Cernik: "The idea of sovereignty as a condition of independence of a given state power from any other power, internal or foreign, is a notion which cannot be practically realized in the contemporary world."[12]

At the end of October, the National Assembly passed a constitutional law on the federalization of the state, and the party began preparing for a November meeting of the Central Committee. The Dubcek leadership went to great effort to find a platform that would be acceptable to both wings of the party—that is to say, to the Stalinists demanding a return to the bureaucratic centralism of the 1950's, and to the reformers seeking a continuation of the post-January policies. In order to appease the conservatives and the Soviet Union, the

[9] Moscow Radio, Oct. 11, 1968.

[10] *Reporter* (Prague), No. 41, 1968.
[11] Czechoslovak Radio, Oct. 11, 1968.
[12] *Rude pravo*, Oct. 18, 1968.

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leadership intensified censorship of the press, temporarily prohibited political appearances on radio and television, suspended *Reporter*, the periodical of the Union of Czechoslovak Journalists, for four weeks, and indefinitely banned the publication of the reformist party weekly *Politika.* In taking these actions, the Dubcek leadership wanted to prove its loyalty to the Moscow agreements and to show that, in contrast to the pre-August period, it now was capable of applying the instruments of party and governmental power against the right-wing forces.

None of these efforts, however, brought about the desired results. The Central Committee Plenum, held November 14-17, opened with a frontal attack against the progressive members of the Central Committee and against the incumbent leadership.[13] The reformists, with a few rare exceptions, reacted to this offensive with a pitiful lack of stamina. Instead of joining battle with the conservative sectarians and defending the post-January policy as well as the post-August tactics, they either engaged in abstruse philosophical speculations or fell silent.[16] In the end, Dubcek, Smrkovsky and other reformers had to be defended by Gustav Husak, whose authority at that time rested on the fact that he could speak in the name of the whole Slovak representation.

The resolution adopted by this Plenum, which was to serve as a platform for reconsolidating the entire party, had been secretly discussed with and approved by, Leonid Brezhnev. Czechoslovak representatives had met the Soviet leader in Warsaw during the night of November 15-16 and had submitted both the draft resolution and some proposed personnel changes for his approval before these measures were referred to the Central Committee for action. The November Plenum also brought into the limelight Lubomir Strougal, who was placed in charge of the party's newly-created Bureau for the Czech Lands. (Strougal had served successively as Minister of Agriculture, Minister of the Interior, and finally as a CC secretary in the Novotny regime, although in January 1968 he had joined the forces that brought about Novotny's downfall.)

Finally, in response to Soviet pressure and contrary to party statutes, the Plenum established a new provisional party organ—the Executive Committee of the Presidium. The effect of this was to place supreme political power in the hands of eight leading officials (Lubomir Strougal among them) and to isolate the liberal majority in the larger parent body. Yet, despite the many contradictions of the November resolution, it did not depart from the general framework of the moderate post-January policies. Even the personnel changes in the CC Secretariat did not indicate a fundamental change in the political line and tactics of the leadership.

Unwanted Allies

Nevertheless, soon after the Plenum the first serious political crisis of the post-August period erupted. Alarmed by all the concessions of the Dubcek regime, the university students in Prague—soon joined by thousands from other cities—launched a strike protesting renewed violations of press freedom, the return to politics-behind-closed-doors, the publication of illegal foreign periodicals, and Soviet interference in the internal affairs of the country. The Ten Points, which had become the platform of the university students,[14] were received with much sympathy throughout the country, especially among the workers and the Communist intelligentsia. These points were drawn directly from the April Action Program, notwithstanding the fact that this document was no longer being cited as the official policy and its principles had been the object of conservative attack at the November Plenum.

The Dubcek leadership branded the student strike as an "irresponsible and adventurist" action, even though the strike was carried out with the strictest discipline and was intended merely to express support for the party leadership against the Stalinist opposition. The crisis that ensued was entirely due to the weak-willed and timid policy that characterized the Dubcek leadership throughout the post-August period and ultimately led to its downfall. On the one hand, the leadership kept on assuring people that the CPCS would continue to hold firm to its post-January policies; on the other hand, when the population—especially its politically aroused segments—took these assurances at face value and tried to act in consonance with the principles of the Action Program, the leadership (usually through Husak's rather than

[13] On the decisions of the plenum, see *Rude pravo*, Nov. 15, 16, 18, 19, 1968.

[14] For the students' "Ten Points," see *Prace* (Prague), Nov. 19, 1968.

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Dubcek's intervention) accused the public of naiveté, irresponsibility, and failure to comprehend the realities of the situation. Thus it sought to blame the public for putting faith in the leadership's own official statements. The public, however, reacted to these criticisms by voicing new assurances of support for the leadership, apparently believing that the criticisms had been made solely for tactical reasons.

All this led to a triple misunderstanding. The people were surprised that the leadership kept on reaffirming the post-January policies; yet these assurances led them to believe the possibility still existed to carry forward those policies. On the other hand, the regime was clearly surprised that the people took its words about continuing the post-January policies seriously when political realities should have convinced them otherwise. And finally, the leadership never understood that the actions of the labor leaders, the students, the intelligentsia, and the various party organizations were directed not against Dubcek, Svoboda, Smrkovsky, and Cernik, but against the regime's conservative critics. As a result of this complex misunderstanding, the leadership kept on abandoning its real allies and thus opening the path for the most reactionary Stalinists.

It is true that the government eventually admitted that the student strike had pursued honorable aims, though by "unsuitable means." The admission had little effect, however, since by that time (just before the December CC Plenum) Gustav Husak had come forward with his novel theory about two types of "deformation"—the pre-January and the post-January. The post-January deformation, in his view, sprang from the existence in Czechoslovakia of an illegal network of people organized for common action and exerting pressure on the leadership of the party and state. Husak thus placed on the same plane the post-January liberalization and the crimes of the Novotny period. With this, it became apparent that the term "post-January policies" had taken on many meanings which not only differed widely but also contradicted one another. The term had one meaning for the public, another for the Stalinists, another for the Dubcek leadership, and still another for Husak.

Thus, it was no longer sufficient to proclaim one's loyalty to the "post-January policies" in general: it was now necessary to identify more concretely what specific aspects of those policies one had in mind. As a result, an inevitable differentiation of views emerged within the party as well as outside it. Clearly, the November resolution could unite neither the party nor the people. In effect, three distinct groupings emerged within the CPCS: the conservative sectarians, the reformers, and the centrists. Dubcek's centrist leadership aimed at placating both the Czechoslovak public and the Soviet Union, the Stalinists as well as the reformists. In the end, it placed itself in a position where no one took it seriously.

A New Crisis

When it was disclosed shortly before the December Plenum that representatives of the Soviet and Czechoslovak parties had met in Kiev for talks —which for the first time since the August invasion were said to have taken place in a "cordial atmosphere" and a "spirit of comradeliness and friendship"—a new wave of outrage and disquiet gripped the country. Once again the Chairman of the National Assembly, Smrkovsky, had been excluded from the discussions, and rumors began



"We shall not permit a return to the pre-January era—if only to make sure that January doesn't come again."

—*From Dikobraz (Prague), Jan. 25, 1969.*

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circulating that his departure from the second-highest state post had been agreed upon in Kiev. The Dubcek leadership was unable to quash these rumors, and the students, creative artists' unions, trade unions, large industrial enterprises, and various social organizations issued warnings that the promised continuation of the post-January policies would be unthinkable unless people who enjoyed public trust continued to occupy the highest posts in the state. They all pledged support of Smrkovsky's candidacy for the post of Chairman of the new bicameral Federal Assembly, which was to come into being after January with the creation of a second chamber—the Chamber of Nationalities. (The old National Assembly, of which Smrkovsky had been president since April 1968, was to be renamed the People's Chamber.) The threat was also voiced that if Smrkovsky's candidacy for the new post was not accepted and acted upon, a general strike would ensue.

The crisis over who should be Chairman of the Federal Assembly was precipitated by Gustav Husak's categorical demand—voiced at a plenum of the Slovak Party Central Committee, in the presence of Alexander Dubcek—that the Assembly chairmanship must be occupied by a Slovak. From a formal point of view, this demand was justified, because the new federal structure of the republic required parity between Czechs and Slovaks in the filling of all federal posts. Since the President of the Republic and the Premier were both Czechs, it was argued that the Chairman of the federal Parliament must be a Slovak; with Dubcek, also a Slovak, as First Secretary of the CPCS, there would thus be an equal division of the top four posts in the country. But while the Czech public never denied that Husak's request was *formally* justified, it did demand that Smrkovsky, looked upon as a virtual symbol of the post-January policies, and next to Dubcek the most popular figure in the national leadership, be given a state post commensurate with his membership in the Executive Committee of the CPCS Presidium.

It was, of course, quite clear to all that Husak was again acting at the bidding of the Soviets, to whom Smrkovsky was anathema. They had tried to obtain his removal even before the August intervention and subsequently seized every opportunity to criticize him and—by deliberate slights such as omitting him in exchanges of official telegrams between Moscow and Prague on state occasions—to downgrade him as an acceptable political partner. Another apparent Soviet attempt to undermine Smrkovsky politically was the publication in the West German magazine *Der Spiegel* of the record of a confidential conversation between Smirkovsky and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov. There is reason to believe that the stenographic record of this conversation had been deliberately leaked to *Der Spiegel* by the Soviets.

The enthusiasm with which the Czechs rallied to Smrkovsky's support was unprecedented. Had Husak proceeded more tactfully than he did, he might have retained some of his former popularity, but by opposing Smrkovsky's candidacy for the chairmanship of the Federal Assembly, he put his own prestige at stake and turned the matter into a crucial political issue. He threatened the Czechs with the possibility of a constitutional crisis and indicated that in such an eventuality Slovakia would have to consider extreme countermeasures. It is true that these tactics brought him victory insofar as the Czech trade unions did not strike and Smrkovsky submitted himself to party discipline and accepted the lesser post of Chairman of the People's Chamber. But for Husak it was a Pyrrhic victory since it made him the most despised Slovak politician in the Czech lands and deprived him of all potential Czech support in his struggle to replace Dubcek as First Secretary of the CPCS. He may also have diminished his chances of holding on to that post for any protracted period now that he occupies it thanks to Soviet pressure.

A Human Pyre

No sooner had the Smrkovsky controversy blown over when the self-immolation of Jan Palach precipitated a new political crisis. This act by a young Czech student shocked the nation as well as much of the world. It was an act of such courage—and without precedent in Central Europe—that it forced many people to wonder where the Czechoslovak youth and public had found the strength to resist with such determination a bureaucratic machine brutally imposed on them by a fellow "socialist" power much as the Tatar khans and Russian tsars once treated the primitive small nations of Asia. Palach's self-sacrifice, so reminiscent of the example of Jan Hus, constituted the most potent challenge to the spirit of indifference and resignation, not to speak of treasonable capitulation, which had begun to infect some segments of the Czechoslovak population. In a very real sense, it was a direct reaction to the consequences of the Moscow agreements of August, which not only had committed the Czechoslovak leadership to a

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course of collaboration with the occupying power but had specifically barred it from informing the Czechoslovak public about the nature of those commitments.

Indeed, the persistent schizophrenia that marked the politics of the Dubcek leadership was a direct outgrowth of the Moscow accord. On the one hand, most members of the leadership wished to continue the "post-January" policies. On the other hand, none of them, with the exception of Dr. Kriegel and perhaps Zdenek Mlynar, seemed to realize that the possibility of continuing those policies no longer existed. The notion that the Soviet Union would send an army of half a million men *into Czechoslovakia to stand idly by while Dubcek* proceeded to build a democratic, pluralistic socialism was absurd. Yet, Dubcek and his associates continued to foster the illusion that this miracle could really happen, that they were still sovereign statesmen capable of standing up to the Soviets. This was quixotic politics, and the act of Jan Palach was aimed at awakening the nation to this fact.

The Czechoslovak leadership reacted to Palach's act with dignity. The day after the conclusion of the January CC Plenum, on January 18, 1969, an editorial in *Rude pravo* inquired: "Why is it that a young man of 21 tried to burn himself to death?" This answer followed:

It was an extreme but premeditated act of political protest. It evokes in every aroused heart deep emotion mixed with revulsion at the method of protest, and it brings to the fore questions which demand the most forthright answers. . . . No, one cannot agree with this act that has shaken us all. But we can and must strengthen our determination, the determination of the party, to pursue policies so honorable and open, so socialist in the true sense of the word, that even the most critical generation can approve of them, live with them, and participate in developing them.

Thus, the official party organ, in line with the romantic notions of most of the leadership and the fervent hopes of the population at large, continued to pledge allegiance to policies whose foundations had already been undermined, if not destroyed, by the fact of Soviet occupation.

President Svoboda, in a television address on the occasion of Palach's death, spoke in a similar vein:

You gave us your confidence after January and also after August. Thanks to this confidence, we have since succeeded in accomplishing more than many had hoped. Together with all of you, we want to build in this country a socialist and democratic society, a society of free and disciplined people. But in order to realize this aim, we need active support for creative work rather than ultimatums. Otherwise, we will be threatened by anarchy and economic disruption — which would surely lead someone else to take over the government from us.

Thus, even for the future, everything depends on whether you will give us—your government, Comrade Dubcek and myself—your confidence, whether you want to govern with us and share responsibility with us. Without you, comrades and friends, we cannot and will not govern.[15]

The leadership thus seemed to grasp at least part of the harsh reality, namely, that continuing crises would cause it to be swept away. But Palach's death gave fresh warning that the leadership must face up to a choice between capitulation and a rapid change of course leaning on the support of a majority of the party and the public and resolutely insisting on Soviet adherence to the letter of the Moscow Agreement. The risk of another Soviet military intervention did, of course, exist, but on the other hand, the relatively restrained Soviet reaction to the August resistance in Czechoslovakia had shown how loath the Kremlin was to resort to the most drastic means in order to subdue the recalcitrant country. Moscow also had to consider the serious destabilizing effects that a new resort to force would have on Central Europe and the world Communist movement.

While the Czech political leadership thus failed to recognize the full lesson of Palach's death, it nevertheless honored his bravery and self-sacrifice. On the other hand, the Slovak leadership, under Husak's influence, cynically repudiated Palach's act. "As a result of the tragic and lamentable act of the Prague University student, Jan Palach," a statement by the Slovak party Presidium declared, "the political situation in the country has once again reached a stage of crisis which is being exploited by various extremist groups seeking to provoke actions disturbing peace and order."[16] Husak thus demonstrated again how little attuned he was to the sensibilities and democratic traditions of the Czech people. His "bent for realities" was slowly but surely pushing him into the role of a Czechoslovak Gomulka.

Attack and Counterattack

What the real cause of the constant political tension was—namely, the progressive retreat of the leadership in the face of Soviet and internal Stalin-

[15] *Rude pravo*, Jan. 21, 1969.
[16] *Ibid.*

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ist pressures—had already become generally recognized, but the point was again underscored at the first congress of the Czech Revolutionary Trade Union Movement in late January. The unions, seeking to establish their place within the existing political framework, reaffirmed that "only the Communist Party is capable of leading our nation out of the present situation." At the same time, however, the congress explicitly associated itself with the address of Vlastimil Toman, the Chairman of the Metalworkers' Union (almost one million strong), who had stated that the tension which was threatening to erupt into a political crisis was provoked not by the workers, but by those who sought to uncover among them "right-wing and extremist forces." [17]

Throughout January, the Stalinists continued to intensify their attacks on the progressive segments of the Communist Party. On January 24, a conference of specially selected members of the people's militia organizations of Prague and the Central Bohemian Region was convened in the capital. No convention that was truly representative of the militia, which like all other Czechoslovak organizations had a progressive majority—would have adopted the resolution submitted to the conference by its organizers. The resolution viciously attacked the press and called upon the public authorities to "adopt requisite measures against those mass communications workers who refuse to examine self-critically their activity and continue to ignore repeated warnings concerning their irresponsible and demogogic behavior." It went on to demand that "the Central Committee uncompromisingly and consistently proceed to unify the party on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and to expose right-wing and opportunistic tendencies as well as their proponents, within the party." [18] This marked the first time that such a demand had been voiced in a resolution of a supposedly representative public body. Hitherto, such demands had emanated only from semi-legally convoked assemblies in the Prague suburbs and from Stalinist spokesmen in the Central Committee. The targets of the new search for "right-wing enemies," however, were not any truly anti-socialist forces, but rather the progressive opponents of bureaucratic rule and the defenders of the basic political propositions contained in the writings of the young Marx and of Antonio Gramsci, as well as in the critical commentaries of Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg on the growth of bureaucratic power in the Soviet Union in the early 1920's.

Despite the mounting signs of an offensive by the Stalinist forces, the Dubcek leadership continued to ignore its opponents and declined to defend itself and its supporters. On January 30, the Cernik government ambiguously pleaded the need to "respect the internal and external conditions of social development.[19] A few weeks later, at the beginning of March, Lubomir Strougal declared that the "right-wing" forces in Czechoslovakia constituted the greater danger because they came close to being anti-socialist, whereas the extreme Left, which demanded a return to bureaucratic centralism and use of the purge to suppress deviationists, was also dangerous, but less so because it at least stood on socialist ground. Nevertheless, Strougal maintained that the "pro-socialist forces" had continued to determine Czechoslovakia's social development after January 1968, and that these forces, headed by the CPCS, "were capable of controlling the various opportunistic and anti-socialist forces."[20] These assertions were of some significance in that they contradicted not only the Soviet rationale for the Warsaw Pact powers' intervention in Czechoslovakia but also the domestic Stalinists' rationale for a resort to political purges.

A Muddled Picture

But while the Dubcek leadership showed itself unwilling to face up to the Stalinist offensive, it at the same time kept on professing its intention to continue the pursuit of at least some of the post-January goals. Thus, speaking at Uhrovec on February 10, Dubcek declared once again that "we do not intend to surrender our aims," and he appealed for realism and discipline in order that the government might proceed with the "practical steps and necessary legislative measures . . . so that we can demonstrate further fulfillment of the Action Program." [21]

In particular, the regime indicated that it would not abandon implementation of the New Economic Model. Discussing economic reform in a government statement on January 30, Premier Cernik announced the intention to "present to the Federal

[17] *Prace*, Jan. 23, 1969.
[18] Radio Prague, Jan. 24, 1969.
[19] *Ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1969.
[20] *Ibid.*, March 3, 1969.
[21] *CETEKA*, Feb. 11, 1969.

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Assembly a bill . . . granting considerable independence to enterprises." [22] He indicated that the bill would also define the functions of the proposed workers' councils.

During the following two months there was wide discussion of whether to give preference to democratic self-management by workers' councils or to managerial control of enterprises. The debate was economic as well as political in motivation, but regardless of whether the eventual decision had favored employee control or managerial control, it would have adhered to the basic post-January principle of decentralization and would have meant the release of enterprise management from direct central control by the party and state bureaucracy. This in turn could ultimately have led to a serious undermining of the party's political monopoly.

Recurrent political crises, however, prevented the conclusion of the debate as well as the enactment of any concrete economic legislation. At present, the resurgence of the political forces which for 20 years had guided the economy and driven it into virtual bankruptcy through centralized controls all but precludes the further implementation of the economic reform program. The conservatives are once again defending the validity of their Stalinist theories and are seeking to blame the unsuccessful results, just as in the past, on sabotage, diversion, and (particularly recently) a lack of labor discipline. This last does indeed exist, as attested by the fact that a majority of the workers in one of Europe's most industrialized countries makes effective use of only a small part of its working time. But this state of affairs has been caused by incentive-destroying wage-leveling; by catastrophically inefficient organization which often results in entire enterprises being brought to a standstill by a lack of necessary materials; and, in the recent past especially, by inflation and goods shortages.

Despite the precarious political situation and the standstill in the economic reform program, however, a still somewhat favorable climate prevailed when the Seventh Trade Union Congress convened at the beginning of March. It was the first such congress in twenty years to which the delegates had been democratically elected, and the delegates in turn freely elected a new leadership and approved some important documents, including a new trade union charter which rejected the old concept of the unions as a "transmission belt" between the party and the workers and defined them instead as "voluntary, democratic and independent interest groups" representing the workers. Their function was stated to be to promote and defend "the political, economic, health, social and cultural interests of their members . . . , to proclaim their loyality to socialism and its humanitarian and democratic principles, and to help strengthen the independence and sovereignty of Czechoslovakia." The charter further declared: "The unions conduct an independent policy vis-à-vis economic bodies and state organs and function as an active political force in the National Front. They recognize and support the program of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which corresponds to the interest and needs of the working people." [23] (The reference here is, of course, to the Action Program of April 1968.) The congress also adopted a statement demanding the creation of workers' councils to function "as sovereign democratic organs of enterprise management."

Exit Dubcek

As March drew to a close, therefore, political conditions within the party and the country still seemed to nurture hope that at least some of the elements of the post-January policies might be preserved—this despite such disturbing developments as the Soviet veto of Czechoslovak attendance at the Yugoslav party congress in April and the increasing activity of the domestic Stalinist groups. Federalization was proceeding apace; discussion—if not actual implementation—of economic reforms was continuing; and some independent rights of Parliament, the trade unions, and youth organizations were being maintained.

Then came the ill-fated incidents of March 28-29 and their grim aftermath. Much has been written about the reaction of the Czechoslovak public to the second victory of the Czechoslovak ice-hockey team over its Soviet opponent in Stockholm on March 28—the jubilant demonstrations in Prague and Bratislava, the wrecking of the Soviet Aeroflot offices in Wenceslas Square, etc. Similarly, the question of whether or not these incidents were either wholly staged or at least countenanced by pro-Soviet elements in the party and government apparatus has been more than amply explored in the Western press—with no conclusive results.

[22] Radio Prague, Jan. 30, 1969.

[23] *Ibid.*, March 7, 1969.

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In a sense, however, this question, though fascinating, is irrelevant—for what is clear beyond a shadow of a doubt is that the incidents were grossly inflated and exploited by Stalinist politicians for their own factional ends. Despite the unanimous condemnation of the anti-Soviet demonstrations and acts of vandalism voiced by the party and state leadership, social organizations, and the public media, and despite the fact that the Czechoslovak government offered to pay the Soviet Union several million crowns in damages and took immediate steps to punish the offenders, the Stalinists kept harping on the alleged machinations of "enemy agents" and "right-wing opportunists." In the words of the eminent liberal political scientist Michael Lakatos, they thereby succeeded in creating an atmosphere of "political psychosis . . . clearing the way for the introduction of measures not in the interest of society as a whole." Indeed, he added ominously, with "part of the body politic . . . apathetic and frightened, the groundwork [will have] been successfully laid for practically any decision."[24]

Events soon proved Lakatos right. On March 31, Moscow's *Pravda* published a commentary accusing "the CPCS leadership and the Czechoslovak authorities" of "failing to react against these unhealthy and dangerous phenomena," and personally charging the Deputy Chairman of the Federal Assembly, Josef Smrkovsky, with having taken an active part in the "anti-Soviet outbursts" (the fact that Smrkovsky was elsewhere at the time did not seem to matter). On the same day, Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko, along with Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Semionov, arrived in Prague. Grechko reportedly issued an ultimatum demanding basic political changes in the country—a demand which met with the support of a number of Czechoslovak generals. While the details of all the subsequent negotiations are not known, there seems to be little doubt that an attempt was made to organize what has since been referred to as the "Generals' *putsch*." Faced by the determined opposition of all the constitutional organs of the republic, as well as of the increasingly powerful chiefs of the Czech and Slovak party organizations, Strougal and Husak, the *putsch* proved a fiasco. Nevertheless, it precipitated a fundamental shift in the policy and leadership of the party and government, the exact nature of which was not made public until nearly three weeks later at the April 17 Plenum of the CPCS Central Committee.

The behavior of the Dubcek leadership during these crucial days showed once again that it had learned little from the past. Instead of attempting to fight for its life, it capitulated. Once more it attacked unspecified "anti-socialist and right-wing-opportunist forces" for creating tension and sabotaging constructive work. By taking this course instead of attempting to develop public confidence in its own policies by some positive acts, it in effect condemned itself to extinction.

A good example of the leadership's defeatist attitude was its reaction to a statement issued early in April by the Journalists' Union. The Union wanted to express its support for the leadership and at the same time to emphasize the role of the press in a democratic socialist society. In effect, the journalists cautioned the leadership not to deprive itself of their support, since those working in the information media were its natural allies, and its most important link with the public. Despite this advice, the response of the eight-member Executive Committee of the party Presidium, which included Dubcek, Svoboda, Cernik and Smrkovsky, was to condemn the journalists' statement as "a defense of anti-socialist forces" and to reinstitute censorship of certain newspapers and periodicals.[25]

As on every previous occasion, however, the leadership's criticism of its own supporters did not appease the Stalinists. They simply picked up the phraseology of the criticism and accused the leadership of not acting on its own words. With the Stalinist attack daily mounting in intensity, it became apparent that a showdown was imminent. This was confirmed on April 16 by a new act of capitulation on the part of the Dubcek leadership, in the form of a resolution of the Executive Committee of the CPCS Presidium exonerating certain former party officials whom the Czechoslovak communications media had accused of supporting the Soviet intervention of August 1968.[26] Those exonerated included Vasil Bilak, Frantisek Barbirek, Drahomir Kolder, Jan Piller, Emil Rigo, Oldrich Svestka, Jozef Lenart and Antonin Kapek (all former or current members or candidate members of the Presidium); Central Committee Secretary Alois Indra; and Chairman of the Control and

[24] *Studenske listy* (Prague), April 1, 1969.

[25] *Rude pravo*, April 9, 1969.
[26] *Ibid.*, April 17, 1969.

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Audit Commission Milos Jakes. Some of these officials, such as Barbirek, had in fact been erroneously accused by the press of pro-Soviet sentiments, but the majority of them apparently did approve of the Soviet intervention, even though the precise nature of each one's collaboration with the Soviets is difficult to assess.

The April 16 resolution clearly sealed the fate of the Dubcek leadership. When the Central Committee plenum assembled the following day, Dubcek himself rose to request that he be relieved of his post and recommended Gustav Husak as his successor. Besides approving this recommendation, the plenum recalled the old 21-member Presidium and its eight-member Executive Committee and elected a new Presidium of eleven members. Apart from the replacement of the First Secretary, the most important change involved the elimination from the new leadership of Josef Smrkovsky, one of the outstanding symbols of the post-January policies.

Alexander Dubcek received official thanks for the impersonal manner in which he surrendered his post. "The name of Comrade Dubcek," said President Svoboda in his television address announcing the change in leadership, "will, in the consciousness of all of us, forever remain connected with the post-January policies of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia." Svoboda went on however, to voice at least an oblique criticism of the outgoing First Secretary in stating that "the situation in the Communist Party today requires in the office of First Secretary an energetic politician and an accomplished organizer." [27]

Thus ended the second phase of the political life of the Dubcek leadership. In the first phase, from January to August of 1968, it had developed a positive program which it sincerely believed in and which had the overwhelming support of the people at large, but it had failed to carry out this program consistently in the face of persistent Stalinist influences within the party apparatus. More resolute action against the representatives of Stalinism at this stage might have enabled the leadership to eliminate the conservative elements from influential party positions and thus to face the pressures from the Soviet Union and its allies with a united front. The second phase, which ended on April 17, 1969, reflected even more decisively the weakness of the leadership by revealing its inability to adhere to a course that could have retained the support of a majority within the party as well as among the public at large.

Victory—But for Whom?

Such is the power of wishful thinking that even the defeat of the man who had come to symbolize the spirit of the "Czechoslovak spring" was not greeted with undue alarm by the public. True, there seemed to be some justification for the assumption—widely held at the time—that the election of Husak was by no means the worst thing that could have happened to the country. Husak, after all, was known as an intelligent politician, and his record as one of the few political prisoners under Novotny who had withstood police torture and courageously refused to confess to acts he had never committed was viewed as a fairly hopeful omen for the future.

Yet it did not take long for these last remaining hopes to be brutally dashed. Wholesale dismissals of liberals from party and government positions, the imposition of new censorship laws, and the suspension of journals that had played a decisive role in the democratization of the country followed in rapid succession. The party organ *Rude pravo*, now under a new, staunchly conservative editor, opened a campaign against former First Secretary Dubcek (who had been elected Chairman of the National Assembly) as well as against other members of his entourage. The press began to bristle with allusions to foreign conspiracies and various unnamed "agents." And even though the Action Program of April 1968 nominally remained the party's guiding platform, more and more invidious references to it began appearing in print—most notably from the pen of Jiri Hajek (unrelated to the former Foreign Minister), editor of the resurrected party weekly *Tvorba*.

The next plenum of the CPCS Central Committee, which took place on May 29-30, six weeks after Husak's assumption of power, brought the logical dénouement of the April events. A number of expulsions from the Central Committee were announced, the victims including Professor Ota Sik, author of the economic reforms, and Frantisek Vodslon, one of the prime movers of Novotny's overthrow in January 1968. Frantisek Kriegel, former chairman of the National Front and a member of the CPCS Presidium under Dubcek, was expelled not only from the Central Committee but also from the party after making a speech in his

[27] Prague Television broadcast, April 17, 1969.

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own defense in which he attacked the party's capitulationist policies since the Soviet intervention. Also expelled from the Central Committee were several signatories of the "2,000 Words", while others received party reprimands, and investigations were instituted against still others.[28] The tone of the press became still more strident, at times even taking on noxious antisemitic overtones—a clear indication of the direction in which the country was heading.

Attending the Moscow Conference of Communist Parties in early June 1969, Husak did not go so far as to admit explicitly that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had been justified, but he was harshly critical of the post-January 1968 developments in his own country and rejected the views of some of the foreign delegations, including the Australian and Italian, that the August occupation of Czechoslovakia had violated principles governing relations among socialist states. Thus, the CPSC delegation did not take advantage of this last opportunity to defend the party's post-January program before an international forum in which it obviously enjoyed outside sympathy and support.

Yet, despite all the personnel changes, the tightening of the censorship, and the revival of bureaucratic centralism at home, the Husak leadership has not managed to win the support of a majority of Czechoslovak Communists, let alone a majority of the population. Morale is declining; thousands of Communists have left the party; and support for the deposed liberals is growing. Indeed, Kriegel has become a national hero, and Prague journalist Kyncl even dared to voice an open attack on Husak at the June session of the Prague CPCS Municipal Committee.

As of this writing, the signs point to a new political and economic crisis in Czechoslovakia. According to reports by Western correspondents, an undeclared general strike appears to be in progress. The party leadership, while powerful enough to carry out personnel changes, is incapable of stemming the decline in production and labor discipline. It is becoming increasingly clear that without the full support of the Czech party apparatus controlled by his rival, Strougal, Husak cannot aspire to total power either within the party or in the country at large. There are indications that Husak and Strougal are engaged in a struggle for the top position in the party apparatus; that Premier Cernik is being relegated to the background; and that President Svoboda has lost virtually all influence in the formulation of policy.

Means and Ends

What, then, are the prospects? For an answer to this question, we must first look at the three major methods that have traditionally been used by Communist regimes in dealing with their political opponents: so-called (1) "political" and (2) "administrative" means, and (3) measures of "revolutionary justice"—in other words, terror. While the first two methods overlap to some extent, "political" methods usually denote ideological campaigns of persuasion, threats, and expulsions; "administrative" measures refer to police and judicial actions—*i.e.*, arrests, detainment, trials, etc. The last category is that of unrestrained terror—mass arrests, trials by "special tribunals" (or no trial at all), executions—in other words, arbitrary "justice" of the kind practiced in the Soviet Union in the wake of the Bolshevik seizure of power and later—in a more hypocritical form—under Stalin.

Thus far, Husak has apparently tried to remain within the bounds of "political" methods—even though some of the measures he has taken, such as the banning of liberal journals and large-scale purges, are surely more of an "administrative" character. If, however, he fails to achieve the desired results—which is very likely indeed—he may well have to yield to his rival, Strougal, whose penchant for "administrative" means has become alarmingly explicit in recent months. Yet even Strougal's methods may prove unequal to the situation—in which case it is not altogether inconceivable that some other leader still more unscrupulous than Strougal may take over and impose a regime of unmitigated terror upon the restive nation.

There have been numerous indications over the past few weeks that the continued tensions in Czechoslovakia's body politic may lead to this kind of a two-stage showdown. Though he has, to all intents and purposes, abandoned the party's "post-January" policies, Husak is evidently reluctant to resort to the methods of the 1950's and, in fact, pays occasional lip-service to the ideals of 1968. This cannot sit very well with the Soviet leadership, which by instinct and practice is far more partial to the methods championed—with increasing frequency and candor—by Strougal. Perhaps the most tangible evidence of Moscow's increasing coolness

[28] For the resolution adopted by the May 29-30 plenum, see *Rude pravo*, June 3, 1969.

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towards Husak is Soviet reluctance to assist him in overcoming the country's economic crisis; and the longer this crisis goes on, the more unstable Husak's basis of power becomes.

The economic crisis has now been compounded by an even more serious ideological crisis with which neither Husak nor Strougal may be able to cope. As long as Dubcek was in power, his regime enjoyed the support, however halfhearted, of Communists and non-Communists alike, despite its frequent retreats and compromises; and the Communist Party was still regarded by most citizens as an essentially workable vehicle of progress. Now, however, faith in the party—and, indeed, in the very concept of communism (or socialism)—has been severely undermined. The hope that communism might be capable of transforming itself into a democratic, humanistic form of socialism—perhaps the most important idea engendered by the "Spring of 1968"—may now have been shattered forever.

To be sure, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime does not value terror and violence for their own sake. In dealing with its political opponents, both within the USSR and within the "socialist commonwealth" as a whole, it prefers to use the "carrot and stick" rather than naked force. At the same time, the Soviet leaders may well incline towards the latter if they become convinced that force is the only way to show the Czechoslovak people—and potential rebels in other East European countries—that "humanistic socialism" is nothing but a mirage, and that they must resign themselves to the *status quo*. As long as the present situation continues, therefore, the Soviets will be tempted to precipitate yet another crisis—one that will remove the last remaining impediments to the resuscitation of a totalitarian regime. If and when this tragic moment arrives, it will mark the dénouement of a process which began only a little less than a year ago, when a well-intentioned but naive and weak-willed Czechoslovak leadership in effect betrayed its people by compromising with a regime that regards compromises as nothing more than a means towards assuring its continued power and control.

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The Vagaries of Law

By Otto Ulc

***Another friend, an optimist, said that we must not lose courage. If we only work a little more diligently and conscientiously, he said, we have a good chance to be, twenty years hence, where we were twenty years ago.*— Jan Prochazka in *Ucitelske noviny* (Prague), March 7, 1968.**

Whatever the future outcome of Czechoslovakia's dramatic experiment in liberalization in 1968, it is clear that the experience of the eight preinvasion months had a profound impact on that nation's image of its past. A society that for twenty years had been enveloped in a miasma of lies and misinformation suddenly began to learn the true toll it had paid in the Stalinist era, and the quest for truth became a demand for the redress of past injustices and for the restoration of legal order. The willingness of the Czechoslovak Communist Party to let its past crimes be publicized is probably unprecedented, dwarfing the destalinization process in the USSR and even surpassing the Germans' postwar effort to face up to the facts of the Nazi era.

Dr. Ulc was a District Judge in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, during the 1950's and is now Associate Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York (Binghamton). He has written frequently on Czechoslovak affairs.

Though the new leadership headed by Alexander Dubcek was not the main moving force behind this purification drive, it did nothing to obstruct the mass media and certain social groups in their pursuit of the task.

The evils that required redress covered the entire period of Communist rule since 1948. As if World War II had not taken enough of a human toll, the first several years of Czechoslovak communism had produced a whole new generation of political prisoners: the number has been estimated at well over 100,000—a staggering figure for a country whose population in the early 1950's was only 13 million. The exact number who died or were executed is not known; the rest were incarcerated in some 422 jails and concentration camps.[1]

The persecutions took place in successive waves, striking hard at virtually every sector of the society, including the Communist Party itself. The first group to be hit was the military; soon after the new regime assumed power, arrests began among the "Westerners" (officers who had fought on the Western front), then among the anti-Nazi underground fighters, and finally among the "Easterners" (military leaders who had been attached to the Red Army).

[1] V. Vrabec in *Reporter* (Prague), July 24, 1968, p. 2.

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By 1950 several more targets had been singled out for simultaneous attack. The onset of collectivization swelled the prison population with Czechoslovak "kulaks"—ostensibly well-to-do peasants who resisted collectivization. Another target was the Catholic Church. Great numbers of young priests were drafted into military penal battalions, and most of the bishops and prelates were either jailed or put under house arrest. All monasteries were closed and their occupants sent into forced labor or to jail. A tally of the known facts shows that 6,174 monks and nuns spent an average of over five years (or a total of 32,016 years) in prison, but this record is far from complete.[2]

The preferred procedure of the authorities was to fabricate group conspiracies rather than to single out individuals for arrest. A number of "conspirators" were brought to trial, including industrial "spies" (*e.g.*, the Plocek case, which yielded three death penalties), writers (*e.g.*, the "Green International" affair, culminating in one execution and several life sentences) and various groups of non-Communist political figures. It might be noted that Czechoslovakia was the first country in the postwar period to execute a woman on trumped-up political charges—former Member of Parliament Jarmila Horakova, who was put to death in 1950. Another case with a touch of the macabre involved the present President of Czechoslovakia, Ludvik Svoboda; reportedly he was already under arrest when Stalin—unaware of his plight—chanced to make a favorable remark about him at a diplomatic reception in Moscow, thereby saving him from prison or a worse fate.[3]

The notorious show trials that started in Czechoslovakia in 1952, after similar spectacles had taken place in other people's democracies, rendered a toll of victims that probably exceeded the total of all neighboring countries combined.[4] The most sensational of the trials was that of Rudolf Slansky and 13 co-defendants. The accused—11 of whom were Jews—represented a kind of "shadow cabinet" selected for the gallows from all major branches of the government. When the relaxation of 1968 finally made it possible, two of the survivors provided detailed accounts of how the prisoners were "preconditioned"—through drugs, beatings, deprivation of sleep, endless standing, hunger, cold and finally appeals to their party discipline—to play the role demanded of them at the trial.[5] Their performance followed the script almost to the letter, culminating in death sentences for 11 of the men, and life imprisonment for three. None of the defendants appealed, and the executions were carried out on December 3, 1952. Their ashes were secretely scattered on an icy road south of Prague.

Within a few months, both Stalin and Czechoslovak party leader Klement Gottwald were also dead. But neither Antonin Novotny's ascendancy to the Czechoslovak leadership nor the "unmasking" of Lavrenti Beria in the Soviet Union put a stop to the trials in Czechoslovakia. High-placed Communists continued to be arrested and tried either individually (*e.g.*, Josef Smrkovsky) or in groups. The group prosecutions were neatly compartmentalized into trials of *apparatchiki* (Marie Svermova, *et al.*); economists (Josef Goldman, *et al.*); bourgeois nationalists (Gustav Husak, *et al.*); military men (General Simon Drgac, *et al.*); members of the security apparatus (Osvald Zavodsky, *et al.*); and foreign affairs specialists (Eduard Goldstücker, *et al.*). It seems certain that all the verdicts were decided beforehand by a small group within the Central Committee, Novotny included.

By 1955—after a large-scale recall of Soviet "advisors" from Czechoslovakia as part of the Soviet crackdown on Beria's old apparatus—the Czechoslovak Communist Party's exercise in self-mutilation finally came to an end. For Novotny and his cohorts, deeply implicated in the staging of the trials, any honest attempt to undo the wrongs that had been done would have been political suicide. Instead they resorted to self-saving compromises and rationalizations. Some prisoners were released but not rehabilitated, while others had their sentences reduced. Investigation commissions were set up one after the other, while the leadership came up with a succession of theories whitewashing its own past role. At one time Slansky was pilloried as the Czechoslovak Beria. Then a "theory of the mill" was invented, according to which Slansky's people had set the machinery of the Stalinist mill in motion and in the end been crushed by it. The notion of "collective responsibility" was

[2] *Literarni listy* (Prague), May 9, 1968, p. 12.
[3] *Rolnicke noviny* (Bratislava), March 26, 1968.
[4] Vrabec, *loc. cit.*, p. 6. Also Karel Kaplan, "Zamysleni nad politickymi procesy" (Thoughts about the Political Trials), *Nova mysl*, June, July and August 1968; on this point see the July issue, p. 915.
[5] See writings by the survivors Evzen Loebl, *Svedectvo o procese* (Testimony on Trial), Bratislava, 1968, pp. 198 ff.; and Arthur London, "Priznani" (Confession), *Reporter*, Jan. 23, 1969, pp. 1-12.

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also invoked—the argument that everyone in society (murderer, victim and common man alike) had paid his due to the "cult of personality," and hence nobody in particular could be held accountable for the excesses that had occurred. For several years Novotny successfully resisted reopening the Pandora's box of the Slansky case, but finally in August 1963—under pressure from various elements in the party apparatus and allegedly from Khrushchev himself—he consented to the posthumous retrial of Slansky and his fellow defendants. The Supreme Court promptly quashed the original verdict.[6]

Though conditions were thus better than in the early 1950's, the hallmarks of arbitrary rule—including political trials, intimidation of citizens, illegal police activity, and inhuman conditions in the prisons—continued to characterize Novotny's reign almost to the time of his downfall. The trials of this period were less publicized, the penalties less draconic, and intellectuals rather than party members were the target—but the Stalinist essence remained.[7]

With the toppling of Novotny and succession of Dubcek in January 1968, the search for the truth about the past began. The credit for breaking the old taboos and ferreting out the facts belongs mainly to the mass media—and also to the new leadership, in that it made no effort to interfere. Against the resistance of the police, the judiciary, and a major part of the party and state apparatuses, the editorial offices assumed the role of investigative agencies and soon gained the confidence and help of the public. Using witnesses and incriminating documents, as well as ingenuity and courage, they pieced together the awful story of the brutality of two decades.

Protestations of Innocence

The Russians have a term, "*obezlichka*," to refer to the tendency within any bureaucratic network to avoid taking decisions, to disclaim responsibility and point the finger elsewhere when something goes wrong.

When the facade of Stalinist pseudo-legality collapsed in full view of the Czechoslovak nation in 1968, *obezlichka* was employed on a grand scale. The judiciary pointed to the security apparatus, the security apparatus to the party leadership, the leadership to the former No. 1 man, and he in turn to pressures from below—and from Moscow—to condone the trials as conducted by the judiciary. Thus, the circle was neatly closed without a villain in the ring, except a few sacrificial goats who had already been offered up—the handful of STB (secret police) interrogators prosecuted in the late 1950's, who got out of jail before their victims were released.[8] The public, however, was not willing to let the matter rest.

The reactions of those pressed to account for themselves are worth examination. Turning first to the judiciary, the personification of Stalinist justice was Josef Urvalek, who had served as a judge under the Nazis, as a prosecutor in the Communists' major show trials, and later as Chief Justice of the nation. When the Slansky group was finally rehabilitated in 1963, Urvalek was relegated to an obscure post doing "scientific work in the field of juvenile deliquency," a position he may still hold at the time of this writing. In response to charges leveled at him during the 1968 disclosures, Urvalek first eluded the press by feigning physical indisposition but finally struck back against his accusers. Angry, defiant, and unrepentant, he fully exculpated himself of all charges on the grounds, first that he had acted out of unwavering faith in the party and obedience to its command, and second that he had been ignorant of the facts. According to his story, the judges and prosecutors never saw the defendants until they entered the courtroom; the files and confessions had been prepared by the STB. "Why should I have convinced the accused of their innocence, once they all claimed to be guilty," he defended himself, pointing out that the convicted defendants did not even bother to appeal their death sentences.[9]

This line of reasoning was reiterated by other members of the judiciary who consented to interviews, such as the notorious prosecutors Brozova

[6] Kaplan, *op. cit.*, August issue; Gustav Husak in *Reporter*, June 19, 1968, pp. 5-6.

[7] See *Prace* (Prague), March 16, 1968; *Lidova demokracie* (Prague), March 27, and 31; *Literarni listy*, May 30, p. 5; and V. Skutina in *Reporter*, April 17, 1968, pp. 1-8. The only significant trial of a party member held in this period involved the deposed Minister of Interior, Rudolf Barak, Novotny's former friend and challenger for power. See B. Navratil and Z. Pojcoch in *Reporter*, June 5, 1968, pp. 14-16, and J. Ondracek in *Kulturni noviny* (Prague) Nos. 12-14, 1968.

[8] On this see J. Holler's interview of Josef Pavel in *Reporter*, July 17, 1968, pp. 9-10; also *Lidova demokracie*, June 20, 1968, p. 3.

[9] *Reporter*, April 17, 1968, p. 14; see also *Rude pravo* (Prague), April 14, 1968.

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and Kepak. While some professed a degree of post-mortem shock over the facts that had come to light, the prevailing tone verged on nostalgia over the bygone days of proud and merciless revolutionary justice.[10]

Compared to the stars of the Stalinist judiciary, whose names had been household terms for the terror of the 1950's, the secret police enjoyed the advantage of relative anonymity. Thus its members were in a better position to shift the blame to others —their superiors in general, and their Soviet advisors in particular. As charges began to converge on the leadership of the Ministry of National Security, the two men who had headed it in the period in question, Ladislav Kopriva and Karol Bacilek, issued denials of guilt. Kopriva claimed that he had not even known of the existence of torture chambers. He also pleaded that he had been in fear of his staff, who had spied on him and attempted to fabricate a story of his wartime collaboration with his jailors in a Nazi concentration camp.[11]

Kopriva's successor, Bacilek, was implicated both by former prosecutors and by surviving victims as the man personally in charge of conditioning the Slansky group for its trial appearance. Unable to dodge this mutally corroborative testimony, he laid the blame squarely at the Soviets' door. According to Bacilek, Stalin had sent Mikoyan to Prague in 1951 with orders that the trials be staged; his own hands had been tied, since it was not the Czechoslovak Minister of Security but the 26 or more Soviet advisors who had been masters of the secret police.[12]

Neither Kopriva nor Bacilek attempted to point a finger at the Czechoslovak Party Politburo of the day, for the excellent reason that they had been members. Those of their Politburo colleagues who spoke up struck a pose of having been well-meaning but helpless bystanders. For instance, Alexej Cepicka—the first Minister of Justice after the 1948 takeover, and Gottwald's son-in-law—avowed that he had performed the functions of his office "with pure heart and maximum energy"; but alas, "the perilous symbiosis of the party and security machinery had borne its fruits."[13] That—from the most arrogant megalomaniac of the old political élite.

Novotny himself at first made no statements and granted no interviews, leaving it up to his son, Antonin Jr., a prominent foreign trade official, to defend the family name. This the younger Novotny did by describing his father as an unselfish, dedicated, honest man whose only weaknesses were excessive goodwill and trust in people who turned out to be unworthy, and who in the end deserted and betrayed him.[14]

Once deposed, Novotny finally delivered a defense of sorts at the May 1968 session of the party Central Committee. With uncharacteristic modesty he revealed that in the early 1950's his position within the leadership had been insignificant and that he had had no say in the preparation of the trials. If blame had to be laid somewhere—other than on the "atmosphere" of the times—it ought to fall on the Beria gang and on Gottwald and Slansky.[15] This statement reflected the tendency among all the people called to account to draw a line between the period of the trials and the latter period of delay and inadequate rehabilitations. Those implicated in the actual killings tended to maximize the guilt of the leaders who for years afterward failed to remedy the damage, while the latter emphasized that their hands were unbloodied and that if there had been no murders in the first place, there would have been no need for rehabilitations. Novotny's speech was an attempt to identify himself with the latter group and to deny that he—along with a number of others—had played a prominent role in both periods.

This defense was quickly demolished by the man who has since become top party leader—Gustav Husak. In a ringing denunciation, Husak (who had been arrested in 1950, sentenced to life imprisonment in 1954, and finally amnestied in 1960) accused Novotny of "either loss of memory, loss of conscience, or loss of political responsibility." He pointed out that Slansky could not possibly he held responsible for anything that had happened after his removal in 1951; nor could Beria, Stalin or Gottwald serve as scapegoats for the crimes committed after their deaths in 1953. Recalling that he himself had not been tried and sentenced until 1954, and that Novotny was already at the helm when security

[10] See *Svobodne slovo* (Prague), June 2 and 23, 1968.
[11] For Kopriva's story, see *Reporter*, June 12, 1968, pp. 13-16, and June 19, pp. 1-9.
[12] *Smena* (Bratislava), April 28, 1968. Bacilek's claims were aptly ridiculed in *Rohac* (Bratislava), May 15.
[13] Quoted by I. Mozny in *Literarni listy*, Aug. 15, 1968, p. 4.
[14] *Reporter*, April 17, 1968, pp. 11-12. See *ibid.*, May 15, p. 1.
[15] Novotny's defense was reviewed by Gustav Husak in *Reporter*, June 19, 1968, pp. 5-6.

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chief Osvald Zavodsky was executed, Husak charged that Novotny not only had been fully aware of what was going on but had deliberately sabotaged remedial efforts. He added that as early as 1952, Minister of Security Karol Bacilek had publicly praised Novotny for his valiant role in unmasking Slansky, whose party office Novotny had then inherited. Husak concluded that "Novotny's responsibility for the brutal repressions is absolutely beyond any doubt." [16]

Evidence of Guilt

Of the many investigations and disclosures that were made in 1968, one of the most significant was the effort of the historian Karel Kaplan.[17] The author, who was granted access to the archives of the Central Committee (though not to those of the security apparatus), amassed abundant evidence that a small group within the party leadership—notably Klement Gottwald, Antonin Zapotocky, Antonin Novotny, Vaclav Kopecky, Ladislav Kopriva, Zdenek Fierlinger, Alexej Cepicka, Karol Bacilek, and a few others—had controlled the literally life-and-death decisions of the purges, approving indictments beforehand and deciding upon penalties. Gottwald at first had balked at the terror but then had given in, a sick man and an alcoholic. Minutes of the group's meetings, as reported by Kaplan, read like the proceedings of a gang of Mafia cutthroats. Nothing could have damaged the party's image more than the revelation of the cynicism of this old guard in its deliberations over the fate of longtime comrades.

Other accounts undermined the claim that the terror was the deed of Moscow. It was pointed out that the trials of non-Communists from 1948 to 1950 had been conducted prior to the arrival of Soviet advisors sent by Beria. It was further argued that after Beria's fall in July 1953, the Czechoslovak regime had been under no obligation to retain and heed these advisors. The most important evidence of the Czechoslovak leadership's accountability was a letter unearthed in the files written by Stalin in 1951, admonishing the Prague regime to keep the Soviet advisors under firm control.[18]

The pleas of ignorance on the part of prosecutors and judges were similarly demolished. Former secret police investigators joined surviving victims in testifying that members of the judiciary branch had visited accused prisoners in their cells during the pre-trial period, had checked on their progress in memorizing confessions, and had exercised a variety of other pressures. In short, the show trials had been arranged with the STB down to the last detail.[19] When ex-judge Urvalek claimed that everything had appeared "normal" to him at the Slansky trial, he was flatly accused of being either a liar or an incredibly naive man, and as such unfitted for further engagement in "scientific research activities." The press found it hardly "normal" for a man of long court experience not to notice that the accused acted like automatons at the trial, muttered "correct" answers before questions were even finished, made no attempt to defend themselves, and in the end literally thanked their executioners for services rendered.[20] Commentators made the further point that blind obedience to the party's command was no excuse for having participated in murders—especially since nobody had been forced to participate. Many members of the judiciary had declined trial assignments with impunity; it had been the most ambitious and ruthless, as well as the most compromised individuals (*e.g.*, Nazi-era judges Urvalek and Stella) who had competed for the honors.[21]

As the press campaign proceeded, it was clear that only a part of the past had been revealed and that a number of pivotal figures—for instance, former Prosecutor-General Jan Bartuska and former Minister of Justice Vaclav Skoda—would not break their silence. Nevertheless, the mounting tide of revelations and the attempt to pinpoint responsibility set the nation to pondering about the underlying causes of the terror.

Views polarized along the lines of people's basic political orientation. A minority of Communists

[16] Husak, *ibid.*

[17] Kaplan, *op. cit.* See also J. Slanska in *Literarni listy*, Nos. 10-15, 1968; and G. Laub in *Reporter*, July 17, 1968, pp. 20-21.

[18] *Literarni listy*, June 27, p. 12. Stalin's letter, addressed to the Central Committee of the party, was dated June 24, 1951.

[19] Witnesses revealed, for example, that the prisoners' memorized confessions had been taped in advance and, during their trials, played in an antechamber while the actors recited their roles in the courtroom. Had there been any deviation from the script, a special signal apparatus installed at the presiding judge's bench would have flashed him an order to call a recess. Kaplan, *op. cit.*, July issue, p. 937; R. Slansky, *Mlada fronta* (Prague), March 20, 1968.

[20] P. Simek and J. Brod in *Reporter*, April 24, 1968, pp. 13-14; see also *Rude pravo*, April 17 and 21, 1968.

[21] See, *e.g.*, R. Dostal in *Prace*, May 23, 1968; I. Kulhanek in *Kulturni noviny*, April 26; and J. Zak in *Rude pravo*, June 16.

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and Communist sympathizers who were essentially sympathetic to the old order clung to the notion that past excesses had been due to a handful of deviants on the one hand, and to the inevitable revolutionary climate of the times on the other. Proponents of this viewpoint tried to absolve the Communist Party of blame with such arguments as the "Trojan Horse" theory, according to which the crimes of the past were engineered by former Gestapo men who had infiltrated the Stalinist security apparatus.[22]

The majority of the press—representing, it seems clear, the majority of the nation—rejected such explanations out of hand. It was pointed out that while a few individual police had records of collaboration with the Nazis, the majority of the STB force had been made up of dedicated Communists of impeccable proletarian origin, obedient to nothing but the party's will. While it was possible that in the internal struggle for power the STB had prepared incriminating files on the party leaders themselves, Novotny included, this did not alter the fact that a select group of the top party echelon had masterminded the arrests, trials, and executions, and had given rise to the years of terror and public hysteria.[23] In short, it was the Communist system of rule—with its total concentration of power in a few hands—that was to blame for the terror. It was asserted that before 1948 the Czechoslovak party leadership had itself recognized the dangers inherent in a monopoly of power. Allegedly, Gottwald had entertained the idea of establishing a political opposition, while Zapotocky had favored giving this role to the trade unions. When the Cominform Resolution of 1948 put an end to notions of a "Czechoslovak way to socialism," Gottwald had adopted the substitute solution of setting up a monitor over the party—the KSK, or Commission of Party Control—which later, ironically, became one of the main agents of the terror.[24]

Thus, with increasing candor and courage, commentators came to air the conclusion that Czechoslovakia's two decades of lawlessness were the fault of the Communist system rather than of its implementors. The implication was clear that communism was not a "basically just system that had been distorted" but rather a sick and unworkable order that had defiled the tenets of Marxist humanism in every country where it had been tried.

Rehabilitation vs. Retribution

The Dubcek regime exhibited a rather uneven attitude in coping with the issues of the unpleasant past. While it was quite willing to offer legal rehabilitation, it was much less ready to offer monetary compensation to victims, and very reluctant indeed prosecute the Stalinist perpetrators of past crimes. There were several obvious reasons for the regime's position—notably, the relative weakness of the liberal wing within the party apparatus, fear that punitive measures would solidify rather than demoralize the ranks of the Stalinists, concern over the irritation of the Soviets, and the desire to buy time to consolidate liberal gains.

The rehabilitation issue is a complex one and requires some clarification. First, a distinction has to be made between four types of rehabilitation: political (restoration of party membership), judicial (the remedying of unjust court decisions), extra-judicial (reversal of punitive admnisitrative decisions), and material (compensation for damages). These four categories, which are not mutually exclusive, are listed in order of the state's willingness to act upon them. Since little is known about the first type—except that it is easier to re-



"You are rehabilitated. Rise and face the court!"

—From Rohac (Bratislava), Nov. 13, 1968.

[22] B. Maturova in *Reporter*, July 17, 1968, pp. 11-12.
[23] See, *e.g.*, B. Hajek in *Reporter*, Aug. 14, 1968, pp. 11-12; and E. Loebl in *Kulturni tvorba* (Prague), May 16, 1968.
[24] J. Belda in *Reporter*, Oct. 16, 1968, pp. 7-8.

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cover party status than, say, an old job or a lost apartment—and since little has been done about the third and fourth types, we shall be mainly concerned here with the remaining category, *i.e.*, judicial rehabilitation. It is important to note in the latter connection that while appeals against judicial decisions were possible in the Novotny era, legal restrictions with respect to the time limit and legitimate bases for appeal made it clear that court reversals were intended to be the exception rather than the rule. As indicated earlier, the record of the pre-1968 period in redressing past wrongs was partial, lukewarm, and secretive. The directives of 1965 (which were still valid in the spring of 1968), setting forth what types of prisoners should be rehabilitated, amnestied or released, were both arbitrary and inconsistent. The result is indicated by the fact that of a total of 27,000 verdicts that had been handed down between 1948 and 1953 by the so-called State Court—the most active kangaroo tribunal in the country—only 2,000 were later set aside.[25]

With the end of Novotny's rule, the rehabilitation issue quickly came to the fore. Within a month of Dubcek's succession, on February 8, 1968, the party daily *Rude pravo* printed an editorial calling for the resumption of rehabilitations and proclaiming the urgent need to sever all links with the Stalinist past, to redress injustices suffered by non-Communists as well as party members, and to clean the slate once and for all, "no matter how inconvenient this might be for some persons."

In April 1968 the Central Committee adopted its much-proclaimed Action Program, resolving *inter alia* to establish a commission to carry out party rehabilitations and to draft a special law on judicial rehabilitation and indemnification.[26] The courts were urged not to wait for the new law but to proceed on the basis of existing legal provisions.

It was in this climate that an association of former political prisoners was organized against the opposition of the state and party bureaucracy, but with the support of the press. Called Klub-231 (in reference to Art. 231 of the 1948 Criminal Statute "On Protection of the Republic"), the association quickly gained a membership of well over 80,000 and started to function as a pressure group to obtain belated justice. Never fully legalized (and after the August invasion promptly banned), with no funds or state support, indeed without even a typewriter, the club developed into a kind of private investigation agency and valuable source of data, forwarding its findings to the mass media and through them to the nation.[27] While Klub-231 was a threat to the perpetrators of Stalinist crimes, it was hardly a danger to socialism as such. Its statements were judicious, restrained, and surprisingly conciliatory. Its key proposal was for the enactment of a "national reconciliation law" which would include a provision annulling all sentences passed under the No. 231 Act. This call for a collective disposition of past crimes was defended on both practical and legal grounds: the sponsors argued that the passage of time would make it difficult to ascertain the truth in individual cases, but that it was clear in any event that the overwhelming majority of the cases involved flagrant violations of the law (including inhumane treatment, failure to give accused persons records of the charges and verdicts against them, etc.) [28]

The proposal for a blanket settlement met with no objections from the police or the judiciary for the obvious reason that it would have left many misdeeds of the past undetected and unpublicized. However, it became clear during the late spring of 1968 that the Dubcek leadership favored an alternative course of "legal purism," entailing the individual disposition of cases under existing law (a policy formalized with the passage of the Rehabilitation Law in June, on which more shortly). On balance, the regime's approach worked to the benefit of the Stalinists, for under the terms of the statute of limitations as well as past and present presidential amnesties (of 1953, 1955, 1957, 1960 and May 1968) most STB investigators were immune from prosecution. Only in the case of accusations of murder—chargeable for twenty years after the fact under the statute of limitations—could suspects be brought to trial. As a result, no more than a handful of ex-police were arrested in the pre-invasion period.

Several noted jurists offered defenses for the

[25] J. Samek in *Zemedelske noviny* (Prague), March 14, 1968; Z. Koudela in *ibid.*, March 16; *Rude pravo*, April 7.

[26] For the English text of the Action Program of April 5, 1968, see P. Ello, *Czechoslovakia's Blueprint for "Freedom,"* Washington, DC, Acropolis Books, 1968, pp. 89-178, esp. pp. 122-23.

[27] K. Taus in *Kulturni noviny*, April 5, 1968, p. 4; A. Kliment in *Literarni listy*, June 27, p. 6, and Aug. 8, p. 5; *Lidova demokracie*, April 1 and May 14; *Svobodne slovo*, May 21.

[28] J. Veverka in *Reporter*, July 24, 1968, p. 2. Also see *Svobodne slovo*, April 9, 1968.

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regime's approach. For example, Vladimir Solnar, a professor of criminal law, stressed that any suspension of the statute of limitations would violate the principle *nullum crimen sine lege* (there can be no crime without law), and would contradict the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.[29] While this line of reasoning sounded high-minded, it lent itself to a good deal of cynical abuse—witness the attitude of the Chief Military Prosecutor who, in turning down the complaint of a former political prisoner against an ex-jailor, invoked the statute of limitations and cited the failure of the injured party to launch the complaint *while in prison.*[30]

The arguments presented by Solnar and others were persuasively challenged by another distinguished jurist, Ivan Bystrina. He started from the premise that the regime's "legal purism" actually violated the elementary sense of justice, since its effect was to whitewash the past and allow criminals to go unpunished. He went on to declare that "for at least twelve years these crimes against humanity could not be prosecuted for the precise reason that all power in the state was held primarily by the engineers and perpetrators of past injustices." Thus, since the legal procedures for seeking an appeal or obtaining redress were in a state of suspension during the Stalinist years, the statute of limitations ought to be suspended with respect to the same period. As for the Human Rights Declaration, the relevant article (XI) prohibited the punishment of acts which at the time of their commission were within the law; since the Czechoslovak terror had involved emphatically illegal acts, the suspension of the statute of limitations could not be considered retroactive punishment in violation of the Declaration.[31]

The mass media, which overwhelmingly endorsed the idea of a blanket settlement of old crimes as proposed by Klub-231, strongly criticized the regime's "legalistic" approach and supported Bystrina's line of argumentation. The regime was accused of adopting a double standard, since at the time the Czech government was supporting the demand for an extension of the statute of limitations in West Germany to prevent war criminals from escaping punishment.[32]

At the same time, the regime was given its just due with regard to the energetic pace at which rehabilitations were being processed, without reference to the political affiliation of those seeking redress. The press reported numerous cases of speedy acquittals of former prisoners once alleged to have been traitors, spies, or saboteurs, most of whom had no affiliation, past or present, with the Communist Party. Whatever the Dubcek regime's reluctance to prosecute Stalinists, in the matter of rehabilitations it clearly sought justice for all untainted by partisanship.

The Rehabilitation Law was finally passed (as Act No. 82) on June 25, 1968, with an effective date of August 1—three weeks prior to the Soviet invasion. Its purpose was stated in Article 1:

The aim of this law is to enable an accelerated review of the cases of persons illegally sentenced as a result of violations of legality in the sphere of criminal procedure; to remove from [existing] law some excessive severity in the application of penalties; to guarantee to persons [who have been] unjustly sentenced civic rehabilitation and appropriate material indemnification; and, on the basis of findings, to take measures against those who took part in such injustices.[33]

Czechoslovakia's liberals received the Act with some disappointment. Not only did it confirm the rejection of their arguments for a blanket rehabilitation and a change in the statute of limitations, but they felt its indemnification clauses were far from satisfactory. Furthermore, the preamble of the law put "acts of revolutionary legality" beyond reconsideration or sanction, a phrase vague enough to develop into a crippling escape clause.

Despite these drawbacks, the law was a remarkable document—in the words of the new Chief Justice, Otomar Bocek, it was "without precedent in judicial history."[34] By its enactment, the entire punitive record of the state over two decades was submitted to review. According to its provisions, any person, or his relatives or heirs, could challenge an original court decision, and the claim would be handled in an abbreviated procedure by

[29] *Rude pravo*, June 6, 1968.
[30] *Reporter*, April 10, 1968, p. 2.
[31] *Literarni listy*, May 30, 1968, p. 1. For the results of a public opinion survey on this question, see *Lidova demokracie*, May 4.
[32] M. Jodl, *Literarni listy*, May 30, 1968, p. 4; *Reporter*, April 17, p. 15; *Rude pravo*, May 5; *Svobodne slovo*, March 17, June 9, and 23.
[33] Text of the Rehabilitation Law was published in *Sbirka zakonu* (Prague), June 28, 1968, pp. 230-36.
[34] *Reporter*, Aug. 7, 1968, p. 8.

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a panel of three judges. Any judge who had been active in the period concerned was disqualified from participation. The court was to annul the original verdicts in the event that it found violations of substantive law (*e.g.*, false evidence), violations of procedural law (*e.g.*, the use of violence in the pre-trial phase), the presence of "provocation" (*e.g.*, the formation of an espionage ring by an imposter in the pay of the STB), or the involvement of the so-called "notorieties" (*e.g.*, the prosecution of a person caught crossing the border for espionage or high treason, on the presumption that had he succeeded in leaving the country, he would have engaged in subversive activities). Particularly significant was the provision of the law (Art. 17, para. 2) which absolved the claimant of the burden of proof and ordered the court to re-examine *ex officio* the propriety of the original trial in all its aspects.

Whereas the emphasis of the law was on the reconsideration of individual cases upon appeal, certain categories of both judicial and administrative decisions were declared null and void *in toto* —notably, prosecutions involving minor offenses on the part of tradesmen and farmers, such as nonfullfillment of delivery quotas and administrative assignments to forced labor camps.

Another part of the Act, dealing with the "responsibility of officials who in original proceedings grossly violated their duties," called for the establishment of special commissions to review individual charges and to render appropriate penalties up to and including the dismissal of such officials from their present jobs. Similarly, the records of judges of the Stalinist era were to be scrutinized by a panel of their peers elected by the National Assembly. Criminal prosecution, as stated earlier, threatened only those whose actions had resulted in death and hence could be classified as murder. But the law left room to suppose that a court official who, for example, had checked upon an accused prisoner's progress in memorizing his confession in the pretrial period, or who had pronounced a death sentence submitted by the Party Secretariat, might be adjudged a party not merely to a miscarriage of justice but to a brutal and still punishable act of murder.

The most detailed provisions of the law dealt with indemnification. Their complex specifications need not be reviewed here except to note that they amounted to a compromise gesture, offering monetary compensation and restitution of property in an amount inadequate to the losses suffered—but nonetheless generous in terms of the sad state of the Czechoslovak treasury.

Not the least important aspect of Act No. 82 was its contribution to the rehabilitation of the law itself. Conflict situations which in the past would have been settled in the political arena now began to land in the courts. Old scores and feuds found expression in libel suits. For example, a group of World War II paratroopers sought legal action against the author and publisher of a book slandering resistance fighters.[35] There was also talk of using private lawsuits to claim damages against Stalinists who were immune from criminal prosecution; among cases reported to be under consideration were a suit by veterans of the army penal battalions against ex-Minister or Defense Alexej Cepicka, and a suit by former prison laborers in uranium mines against the national enterprise which had been their "employer."[36]

Little is known about the outcome of these actions. But regardless of the result, they reflected a partial revival of public trust in the rule of law —in itself a significant change in the nation's orientation.

Restoration of the Rule of Law

The impetus toward the restoration of rule by law gathered momentum throughout the pre-invasion period. As noted earlier, there was extensive public discussion of the causes and consequences of Stalinism, and a good part of this analysis centered on what had happened to legality under the Communist system. It was argued, for example, that the judiciary had become the tool of the *apparatchiki* because the country had become the tool of the Communist Party. Another opinion noted that obedience to the law was a duty for citizens, whereas for the state it was at best an a-legal obligation which could be suspended at will. Some commentaries went so far as to declare that the main task of the law should be to curb the power of the state, and—even more blasphemous to the

[35] *Svobodne slovo*, May 19, 1968, p. 4.
[36] *Svobodne slovo*, May 26, 1968, p. 1; *Literarni listy*, May 30, p. 5.

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Communist writ—that a separation of power ought to be effected.

The Constitution of 1960 became a major target of attack as a patently political instrument that was the very embodiment of the Novotny era.[37] Critics of this document deplored it because, *inter alia*, it explicitly decreed the Communist Party to be the ruling force in the country and virtually declared Marxism-Leninism to be the state religion. It treated civil rights in cavalier fashion, defining those it listed in vague and imprecise terms and not mentioning some at all—*e.g.*, the right of assembly. In contrast to the old 1948 Constitution, which had granted the judicial branch at least nominal independence, the 1960 Constitution made the judiciary an appendage of the state apparatus; notably, it specified that judges, as elected officials, could be recalled "for losing the confidence of the toiling masses," and that they were bound not just by the laws of the land but by "other legal regulations." Nobody has been able to decipher the precise meaning of these vague clauses, but they clearly made the judiciary more dependent than ever on the will of the party leadership.

Even as this public discussion mounted, the reformist-oriented successors to the leadership demonstrated that they themselves had little understanding of constitutional niceties. Thus the Czechoslovak signatories to an international treaty of friendship with Bulgaria (concluded April 19, 1968) were Alexander Dubcek, the First Secretary of the Communist Party but technically not a member of the government, and Oldrich Cernik, the Premier—while the President of the Republic, Ludvik Svoboda, stood by watching. Twitted by the press for this illegal procedure, Dubcek neither explained nor apologized, but he did not afterward repeat the error. The longstanding incestual affair between the state and the party has created many such illegal situations, ranging from the remuneration of party personnel from the state treasury to the existence of the People's Militia, a private army under the sole command of the Party First Secretary.

Nonetheless, the Dubcek regime was in accord with Czechoslovak liberal opinion on the need to replace the Novotny Constitution—and nobody was willing to settle for the mere amendment of that specious document. The problem was that a new basic law of the land could not be produced overnight. The liberals, who were exerting pressure for the extension of civil rights, recognized that open repudiation of the old document with its anemic civil guarantees might result in a situation where citizens had no legal protection whatsoever. In this dilemma they resorted to the unique solution of invoking international law as a source of reference and support. Thus, the UN Declaration of Human Rights became a kind of *pro tempore* constitution, a Magna Carta of Czechoslovak liberalization.[38]

It should be emphasized that the impetus toward the restoration of the rule of law did *not* come from within the legal profession. While only a minority of the judiciary was personally implicated in the misdeeds of the past, the majority was certainly a product of the Stalinist system of justice. The dominant element belonged to the category of proletarian careerists whose legal training had consisted of a one-year course at the so-called PSP institution ("Law School of the Toiling Masses"); understandably, these beneficiaries of Stalinism tended to protect the system that had elevated them. With rare exceptions, then, the judiciary initially faced the prospect of reform with a noticeable lack of enthusiasm and adopted, at best, a wait-and-see-policy.

However, after the April session of the party Central Committee and the adoption of the Action Program—both viewed as a victory for the progressives—at least part of the legal bureaucracy showed another face on the matter. *Socialisticka zakonnost*, the official legal journal, published documents prepared by the Prague Law School, the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice, presenting a thorough analysis of the state of legal affairs.[39] These materials, along with writings in both lay and professional journals, were not much concerned with legal theory (an orphan discipline in any event since the demise of the star of Stalinist justice, Andrei Vyshinsky); rather, they presented a host of concrete proposals aimed at establishing

[37] V. Mrazik in *Pravnik* (Prague), July 1968, pp. 642-44; M. Kusak in *Socialisticka zakonnost* (Prague), July 1968, pp. 423-25.

[38] See *Svobodne slovo*, April 20, 1968; *Kulturni noviny*, April 26; *Literarni listy*, June 6, p. 6 and Aug. 8, p. 3.

[39] *Socialisticka zakonnost*, May 1968, pp. 261-76; June, pp. 330-41; and August, pp. 466-74.

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independence for the judiciary and legal security for the citizen. Briefly summarized, these recommendations included: explicit prohibition of party interference in the work of the courts, with violations made subject to prosecution under a new felony to be added to the Criminal Code; transfer of the party Central Committee's supervisory powers over the courts to an appropriate parliamentary committee; curtailment of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Ministry of Justice so as to ensure the integrity of the lower levels of the judiciary; abandonment of the Soviet model of the *prokuratura*, including a reduction in the prosecutor's role from "guardian of socialist justice" *and* public accuser to the latter alone; reintroduction of tenure for judges, or at least extension of their elective terms; transfer of certain areas of jurisdiction from various administrative authorities and arbitration tribunals to the civil courts; reduction of the role of the lay element in the judicial system; and abolishment of the so-called "local people's courts," a version of the "comrades' courts" in the USSR.[40] These and similar proposals contained little that amounted to genuine innovation; rather they constituted a call for the restoration of the *status quo ante*—the rule of law that had prevailed before the Stalinist era.

It was argued with particular emphasis that judges must be freed from the present deluge of laws and instructions and be provided with *permanent* basic codes. As one commentator remarked, in the pre-Communist era three generations had worked on one civil code, but the period since had produced three civil codes in one generation. "Our criminal code was changed five times in fifteen years, probably a world record," complained another. And a third critic questioned what kind of justice could be dispensed by a profession which was overburdened, subjected to production quotas, and paid salaries at a level below the average national per capita income.[41]

The prospects of a manifestly improved situation still failed to instill enthusiasm in the majority of the judiciary. Stalinists, of course, feared dismissal because of past misdeeds; the proletarian element felt threatened because of their lack of qualifications; and the rest of the profession suffered an identity crisis as a result of the general opprobrium falling upon the judicial establishment. This last symptom, according to Chief Justice Otomar Bocek, would be the hardest to cure.[42] In the meantime, some of the most reprehensible Stalinists were forced out of office—though these were purely political dismissals affecting only the top crust of the judicial pyramid[43]; other actions were expected to wait on the establishment of a disciplinary commission as called for in the Rehabilitation Law.

The Invasion and Its Impact

The tempestuous eight months of Dubcek's rule were too short to be sufficiently reflected in legislative output. Except for the Rehabilitation Law, as well as acts abolishing censorship and ending discrimination against non-proletarian applicants for university admission, little was achieved in terms of actual legislation. Whatever the obstacles that impeded the passage of other acts (such as the electoral law), they were bound to multiply after the Soviet-led invasion of August 21, 1968.

Lack of space prevents elaboration here on why the Soviet occupation did not sound the immediate death knell for Czechoslovakia's experiment in "socialism with a human face"—or why, at least at the end of 1968, not a single person was known to have been arrested, tried, or deported for political reasons. According to some reports, as early as October 1968, Soviet policy shifted away from support of the "ultras"—the group of discredited and rather inept Stalinists who had been mentioned as possible successors—toward continuance of the Dubcek regime, with substantial modifications in personnel and policy; in any event, the November Resolution of the Central Committee passed in Prague seemed to convince Moscow, at least for the time being, that the "centrist platform"—one of piecemeal accommodation but not outright surrender to the imposed "reality"—was preferable to facing the complications likely to be generated by direct Soviet rule or the imposition of a puppet regime.[44] Only in this context is it possible to under-

[40] *Rude pravo*, June 4 and 6, 1968; Z. Hrazdira in *Reporter*, July 10, 1968, pp. 6-7; and *Socialisticka zakonnost*, May 1968, pp. 259 ff., June, pp. 225-29, and July, pp. 385-94.

[41] See *Literarni listy*, May 23, p. 4; P. Zaturecky in *Socialisticka zakonnost*, August 1968, p. 455; O. Balas and F. Samalik, in *ibid.*, May 1968, pp. 282-85; and I. Kulhanek in *Kulturni noviny*, March 2, 1968, p. 4.

[42] O. Bocek, *Socialisticka zakonnost*, June 1968, pp. 342-43.

[43] See *Rude pravo*, April 10 and 19, 1968.

[44] See M. Lakatos in *Zitrek* (Prague), Dec. 28, 1968, p. 2; J. Ruml in *Reporter*, Jan. 8, 1969, pp. 1-5; V. Blazek in *Listy* (Prague), Jan. 30, p. 4.

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stand such paradoxes as the complaints publicly aired by Czechoslovak Stalinists about the "moral terror" to which they had been exposed, especially after August, and about the negligible results of the occupation.[45]

The occupiers did not, of course, call for the restoration of Stalinist justice, nor did they condemn the rehabilitation program. In fact, they even tried to exploit anti-Stalinist sentiment in *Zpravy*, the illegal newspaper of the occupying forces, by smearing the liberal Minister of Interior, Josef Pavel, with a charge of complicity in the preparation of trials in the early 1950's.[46] Significantly, the first wave of enforced dismissals of Dubcek's appointees reached into many areas of the governmental structure but not into the judiciary. And, for whatever it is worth, the association of former political prisoners (Klub-231) was condemned not on the basis of its rehabilitation activities but on the charge that it was an oppositional force and a danger to socialist order.

It was obvious from the first that the degree of the Soviets' ideological and political sensitivity in particular areas would determine which of Dubcek's legislative programs would be rescinded, delayed, or allowed to take their course. Given the meager pre-invasion legislative output toward democratization, only a little had to be undone. On September 13, three laws—Nos. 126 through 128—were passed, reimposing restrictions on the rights of assembly, free speech and association. No other anti-democratic laws were passed in 1968, though this does not preclude the possibility—indeed the likelihood—that unpublished executive orders were issued decreeing further restrictions on various types of activity.

By far the most important law of 1968 was the Constitutional Act promulgated on October 27, the eve of the 50th Anniversary of the Czechoslovak Republic. This Act transformed Czechoslovakia from a unitary state into a federation. Among other provisions, it introduced dual citizenship (making the populace citizens of the Czechoslovak Federation and of the Czech or Slovak Republics respectively), and eliminated a number of government agencies, such as the Ministry of Justice, at the federal level. It also created a Constitutional Court, charged *inter alia* with the protection of civil rights. Further constitutional acts are scheduled for the near future, but there is no prospect for a federal Constitution at the moment—in the estimate of one spokesman, that fundamental matter may come up for consideration "in perhaps two to three years." [47]

In the program of the Federal Government issued in January, strong emphasis was laid upon the need for legal guarantees to ensure the security of citizens and to prohibit further political violations of the due process of law.[48] As one of the first orders of business in the new year, the government leadership accepted for consideration the draft of a constitutional reform aimed at increasing the independence of the judiciary. Though the draft was not available at the time of this writing, on the basis of scattered inferential evidence it can be expected that a major part of the proposals made in the pre-invasion period will be adopted—notably those on tenured judgeship, reduction of the lay element on the bench, restriction of the authority of prosecutors, abolishment of *Arbitrazh* (the Soviet system of adjudicating conflicts between state enterprises), and revival of administrative courts as an avenue for citizens seeking redress against adverse decisions of the state bureaucracy. (In connection with these reforms, it might be noted that the need for competent practitioners of the law had been recognized in an earlier announcement that the law school in Brno—closed down since 1950—would be reopened in the fall of 1969.[49])

The Program of the Federal Government also called for the ratification of pending international treaties in the spheres of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. Concurrently, action on various other legislative acts was promised [50]; significantly, however, no commitment was made with respect to the politically sensitive issue of a new electoral law, which had constituted one of the key demands of liberal intellectuals in the pre-invasion period.

The rehabilitation program also proceeded apace. Annotated editions of the Rehabilitation Law were published in large numbers, special

[45] Complaints of this sort were reported by V. Gloc in *Listy*, Jan. 30, 1969, p. 4; by M. Filip in *Vecerni Praha* (Prague), Jan. 16, 1969; and by *Dejiny a Soucasnost* (Prague), No. 11, pp. 44-47.

[46] *Zpravy*, Oct. 17, 1968, pp. 1, 3. (This charge was persuasively demolished in *Reporter*, Nov. 6, 1968, p. 7.)

[47] The statement was made by Peter Colotka, who was at the time Speaker of the Federal Assembly: *Lidova democracie*, Jan. 31, 1969, p. 4.

[48] *Lidova demokracie*, Jan. 22 and 24, 1969.

[49] *Ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1968.

[50] *Prace*, Jan. 23, 1969; *Lidova demokracie*, Feb. 7, 1969.

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offices of legal advice were opened, and in October the courts started reviewing cases initiated under the law, estimating that the entire program of rehabilitations would take between two to three years.[51] The press carried the results of all cases, notorious or obscure, old or relatively recent. But while there was abundant information on individual trials, no summary data were published. This and several other factors make it difficult to assess the progress of the program in the aftermath of the invasion. For one thing, the deadline for submitting rehabilitation applications was set at July 31, 1969, so that figures are not yet available as to the overall number of cases. Moreover, for the first several months the courts were mainly engaged in the preparation of trials, prior to final hearings: thus in Prague, for instance, only eight out of 1,096 pending cases were decided by the end of 1968. Finally, progress was slowed by the courts' difficulty in obtaining certain kinds of information; while obstructionism on the part of the secret police did not materialize as was feared and the police were generally cooperative in forwarding their files, the courts had to struggle with the problem of the past anonymity of STB agents.[52]

With the law on extrajudicial rehabilitation still in the making, some agencies acted on their own initiative to remedy past wrongs within the limits of their competence. By the end of 1968 the Central Committee had received and was processing close to 1,000 applications for "party rehabilitation," while various types of institutions or factories had already offered redress to former employees.[53] A singularly energetic program of action was undertaken by the Minister of Education, Vladimir Kadlec (who has since stepped down), through whose encouragement over 4,800 persecuted teachers had applied for remedy by October 1968.[54]

In the area of retribution, since the leadership had exhibited precious little initiative in punishing guilty Stalinists before August 21, it is hardly surprising that its record did not improve afterward. During 1968 only one criminal trial was initiated, involving a charge of murder against seven former STB officers accused of having gunned down and secretly buried two innocent men "in the name of revolutionary justice." In the absence of any effort to call the former political leadership to account before the courts, this one and only trial of Stalinists developed, at least in the eyes of the nation, into a trial of Stalinism itself—a kind of little Nuremberg. In the course of heavy coverage of the trial, great soul-searching issues were raised—ranging from the allowable limits of revolutionary arbitrariness and the extent of criminal responsibility involved in obeying a criminal order to the conflict between Bolshevik morality and universal ethical principles, and the import of the qualities manifested not just by the leaders but by the entire regime in the Stalinist past. The accused revealed

[51] See Z. Stastna in *Reporter*, Oct. 23, 1968, p. 14; *Svobodne slovo*, Oct. 5 and Dec. 14, 1968; *Zemedelske noviny*, October 9, 1968; *Rolnicke noviny*, Jan. 10, 1969.

"You have been partially rehabilitated. Here is a saw."

—From Hospodarske Noviny (Prague), March 8, 1968.

[52] See S. Groszova in *Politika* (Prague), Oct. 17, 1968, p. 44; *Lidova demokracie*, Nov. 6; *Rude pravo*, Dec. 14; *Lud* (Bratislava), Nov. 6 and 20, Dec. 29; *Vecerni Praha*, Dec. 20; *Svobodne slovo*, Jan. 11, 1969.

[53] *Svobodne slovo*, Dec. 7, 1968; *Prace*, Jan. 9, 1969.

[54] *Ucitelske noviny*, Oct. 31, 1968, and Jan. 4, 1969.

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Stalinism in depth before the court. Not denying the indeniable—their wanton killings—they nonetheless displayed an utter incomprehension of their guilt. They rejected the jurisdiction of the Czechoslovak courts and the validity of Czechoslovak laws, called the entire proceedings a conspiracy of the class enemy, and insisted that the only law they had ever known or honored was "the law of class struggle." As faithful executors of the party's will (including murder) in the past, they felt betrayed and abandoned in their moment of need, and therefore demanded that the notables of the old hierarchy, Novotny included, be called on the witness stand to testify on their behalf. This did not take place—for the simple reason that the trial was suddenly postponed for an indefinite period, without any explanation.[55]

The degree of Soviet pressure in these developments is not known. Bearing in mind some precedents, one would presume that the Soviets played a vital role in any affairs involving the police apparatus. In the months after the invasion, a number of police officers were dismissed and some all-too-familiar practices of the past were revived. The identification badges worn by uniformed police —a practice introduced by Dubcek—disappeared, and it was widely reported that the apartments of prominent liberals were being wiretapped; there were also reports that underground activities of the Stalinists were on the increase.[56] This aspect of the "normalization" demanded by Moscow was indeed ominous, particularly in the abnormal circumstances of an occupation which made public restiveness inevitable and led to local clashes between citizens and units of the police or the occupying forces.

* * *

When all of the foregoing is weighed in the balance, it is fair to describe the situation in Czechoslovakia—at least at the end of 1968—as one of "fluid stalemate," representing neither victory for the strong nor defeat for the weak. Perhaps the most remarkable thing about this most turbulent year in Czechoslovakia's history since 1948—if not since the founding of the state in 1918—was that it did not produce still another generation of political prisoners.[57] While the invasion put a decisive freeze on the democratization program, it did not drag the country back into the 1950's. If it proves possible to salvage at least some of the measures conceived in the Czechoslovak "spring," the country may still evolve into a kind of socialist *Rechtsstaat* guaranteeing its citizens legal security—though not political freedom.

EPILOGUE

The bulk of this article was written in the early spring of 1969, when the situation in Czechoslovakia still did not seem to warrant unduly bleak prognostications about the fate of the reforms launched a little more than one year ago. But developments since make it imperative to append a further commentary.

The fall of Dubcek in April and the rise of "Iron Gustav" (as Husak became known throughout the land) came as a long-dreaded blow to the Czechoslovak nation. Doubt as to what the turnover in the leadership presaged for the future was compounded by Husak's inaugural speech of April 19. On the one hand, he disclaimed any intention of "changing the political line" or of "abandoning the post-January [1968] policy." He also assured his listeners that the party would "observe legality very strictly" and "guard the rights of the people." Referring to "all the rumors about political trials," he declared: "We will not and could not tolerate any fabrication of such cases. Nothing good can be built on falsehood; quite the contrary. . . ."

At the same time Husak made a number of statements that were far more consonant with the "Novotny ethos" than with Dubcek's "Action Program" (which, significantly enough, the new party leader did not mention even once). There were the familiar references to "right-wing" and "anti-socialist" forces against whom "a merciless struggle must be waged." The principal goals of the party, said Husak, were "consolidation" and "unity"—and those could be achieved only by "securing decisive ideological influence in television, radio and the press," by supressing any manifestations of "anti-Sovietism," by "calling to political responsibility"

[55] *Listy*, Jan. 30, 1969, pp. 6-7.
[56] *Moravsky vecernik* (Brno), Nov. 11, 1968; V. Havel in *Listy*, Jan. 30, 1969, p. 5; *Svobodne slovo*, Feb. 22, 1969.

[57] According to *Vecerni Praha* (Jan. 10, 1969, p. 2), there were only 82 political prisoners left in the country. On the impact of the presidential amnesty of May 1968, affecting some 100,000 people, see *Reporter*, May 22, 1968, pp. 9-10.

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those party members who had "infringed" the principle of "democratic centralism" (that is, who had persisted in their critical views after "decisions had been reached"), and generally by showing no "tolerance" towards anyone who in any way challenged the "leading role of the party." With icy sarcasm, Husak spoke of "comrades [who] are . . . terribly committed to freedom." The "problem of freedom and democracy," he observed, "is for us a class problem. There can be no freedom for people who in crisis situations such as today's . . . abuse freedom and democracy against the interests of the state and of socialism." He added that it was not his "intention to start throwing people out"—so long, that is, as they took advantage of the "opportunity to support the party." [58]

Even as the nation pondered the implications of this address, ominous developments were taking place. The day before the Central Committee plenum at which the succession was announced, it was reported that hundreds of suspects had been subjected to a mass search-and-arrest operation —though allegedly only a few political offenders (*e.g.*, operators of illegal transmitters) were detained.[59] Less than a week later, the press reported the criminal prosecution of a number of Czechoslovaks who had staged a protest against a gathering of pro-Soviet Communists; the accused were charged with "an attack against a group of citizens" (*i.e.*, the Communists) and "slander of a socialist ally" (*i.e.*, the USSR).[60] On April 23, in what was to become a characteristic comment, *Rude pravo* accused "right-wing strategists" (*i.e.*, the liberal Communists) of having launched an attack on the country's "security forces" under the guise of "a demand for the strict adherence to legal norms," thus in effect equating the emphasis on legality with "anti-socialism."

If at the end of April there were still any lingering doubts as to where the new leadership was heading, they have since been dispelled. Indeed, the course of events has been so rapid, and so chilling in its implications, that by the time this article appears in print, some of its earlier conclusions may well turn out to have been distressingly naive. The reintroduction of censorship was quickly followed by a ban on all liberal journals. Then an extensive purge began throughout the communications media and in the state and party apparatuses. On May 29, the party convened another Central Committee plenum, at which Husak announced that there had been "a clearly noticeable shift in the correlation of forces" and that "after a lapse of six weeks, we can state with certainty that the majority of the party and society has understood the purpose and accepted the line of the April session with approval." As for "socialist legality," he again pledged to "respect consistently and firmly the laws regarding the protection of citizens' rights and freedoms"; but at the same time he issued a warning to "all the various provocative elements among the antisocialist and opportunist circles that we will not look on passively while they pursue activities which in some instances transgress the limits of law."[61]

The purge of Dubcek supporters—still in process —has been accomplished by the "salami tactic" of a steady succession of cuts, rather than by massive dismissals; slowly but surely, increasing numbers of liberal Communists are being replaced by members of the old discredited Novotnyite guard—"political corpses," as they are called in Prague. As of latest report, over 2,000 purging commissions have been set up throughout the land to proceed with this task.[62]

Within the judiciary, the only casualty so far reported is the liberal Prosecutor General, Milos Cerovsky. While it is not clear whether Cerovsky resigned or was forcibly dismissed, the regime's choice of a successor—Jan Fejes, a prosecutor with a record of involvement in the Stalinist show trials of the 1950's—leaves no room for optimism.[63]

The substantial turnover within the political elite has been reflected in a commensurate change in their policies affecting—in different degree—the "three R's" of this article: revelation (of the Stalinist past); rehabilitation (of Stalinist victims); and retribution (against Stalinist criminals). Little could be done to "un-make" the disclosures about the criminal past, and no effort was necessary to stop the retribution drive, since it has never been seriously pursued; therefore, the post-Dubcek ruling group has concentrated on the issue of rehabil-

[58] *Rude pravo*, April 19, 1969, pp. 1, 3.
[59] *Lidova demokracie*, April 18, 1969, p. 3.
[60] *Ibid.*, April 24, 1969, p. 4.
[61] Supplement to *Pravda* (Bratislava), June 2, 1969, pp. 1-15.
[62] *Rude pravo*, June 13 and 17, 1969; *Svobodne slovo*, June 7.
[63] *Rude pravo*, May 24, 1969. According to this source, Fejes, a member of the Communist Party since 1929, had been persecuted during the 1950's because of his principled stand.

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itations. This emphasis has served a twofold purpose: First, since the most prominent victims of Czechoslovak Stalinism have already been rehabilitated, Husak has lost nothing and has probably hoped to gain in the public eye by allowing the continuation of rehabilitation proceedings. Second and more important, the whole concept of rehabilitation has been exploited and turned about to benefit the old guard.

Paradoxically, rehabilitation has become an incantation word for any unrepentant "conservative." He invokes it to demand that his virtue be recognized and to seek acquittal of any charges against him. For example, the notorious Alois Indra has recently defined comrades like himself as those "who stood on party positions in times which were difficult for the party, and who defended the principles of Marxism-Leninism." [64] In the same vein, representatives of the STB have been seeking rehabilitation for themselves and for the secret police as an institution, coupling their defense with strong condemnations of all those—and in particular former Minister of Interior Josef Pavel—who in the "Spring" days attempted to revamp the STB and purge it of its Novotnyite *apparatchiki*.[65]

Perhaps the most ominous trend of the Husak era is the fact that the voices of the Stalinist underground of 1968 and early 1969 have begun to be echoed in the language of the Establishment. In the Dubcek era the vicious, primitive, and often antisemitic attacks printed and circulated by the Stalinists were consigned to the gutter of Czechoslovak political pornography. Now attacks of this sort are being launched by and through the Ministry of Interior and its branches. The federal minister Jan Pelnar, the respective Czech and Slovak national ministers Josef Grosser and Egyd Pepich, and the STB chief Frantisek Vasek have all sounded the old themes in recent weeks concerning imperialist plots and counterplots, Zionist machinations, infiltrations by Wall Street, and plans by Israel or the Vatican or Bonn to overthrow the socialist order with the assistance of Czech émigrés and internal traitors. The tenor of these attacks has been so shrill as to suggest that political trials with scapegoats of some sort may be inevitable; at least they are frighteningly reminiscent of the type of hate propaganda that has been used in the past to prepare the public for a new round of political recriminations.[66]

Thus the possibility must be faced that—along with most of their hopes for political and economic liberalization—the Czechoslovak reformers' dream of a restoration of the rule of law may go down the drain. Due process of law, the rights of citizens to legal protection against political retaliation, and all other aspects of legality hang by the hair-thin thread of the qualified assurances of a leader who seems increasingly unwilling—or unable—to curb reactionary and repressive tendencies.

The present Czechoslovak scene is thus fraught with grave uncertainties. One thing alone seems sure: both the present regime and the occupiers of Czechoslovakia know that they must reckon with a public that has been informed and aroused as never before over the injustices of the Stalinist past. On this issue, there can be no doubt where the great majority of Czechoslovaks stand; as one ordinary citizen has expressed it:

Today we know [the truth]. A prosecutor who ever again lent himself to such [political] trials would not be able to pose as a victim of party duress; legally he would be a murderer. A functionary who would like to feather his own nest would be no naive zealot but a false witness. An acquiescent party member would be no poor, deceived wretch but a guilty accomplice. And guilty, too, would be all the silent and the timid.[67]

If nothing else, this public attitude is the great achievement of the Czechoslovak nation's catharsis of 1968. Whether it proves sturdy enough to withstand and survive the resurgence of neo-Stalinism is, unfortunately, an open question.

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[64] *Rude pravo*, June 10, 1969, p. 2.
[65] *Lidova demokracie*, May 14, 1969; *Rude pravo*, May 30.

[66] The speech by Major General E. Pepich, Slovak Minister of Interior, as carried in *Pravda* (Bratislava) on June 10, 1969, is characteristic of this new trend. To quote one passage: "In Vienna there are branches of the nationalist-Zionist organizations JOINT and HIAS. They gather information from all areas of our life and organize the emigration of persons from Czechoslovakia; and it has been proved that they are carrying on these activities according to instructions from Israeli intelligence." One need only recall the role assigned to JOINT—a charitable relief agency—during the Slansky trial, as well as at the height of Stalin's antisemitic campaign in late 1952 and early 1953, to realize the potentially ominous significance of Pepich's remarks.
[67] V. Jurankova, *Listy*, Nov. 28, 1968, p. 2.

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The "New Socialism"

I. Philosophy in Search of Reality

By Peter Ludz

Much has been written in both East and West regarding the developments in Czechoslovakia since early last year; yet, more questions have perhaps been left open than have been answered. One of the reasons for this may be that there has been very little, if any, real analysis of the currents of Marxist revisionism which provided the philosophical and ideological background of the mass revolutionary mood that emerged in Czechoslovakia during 1968.[1] Not only have the manifold aspects and manifestations of Marxist philosophical and ethical revisionism been largely neglected, but the more crucial question of why the cause of "humanistic socialism" foundered in Czechoslovakia has barely been asked, much less answered.

Yet, this and other basic questions posed by the Czechoslovak experience are of major importance for three particular reasons. The first is that inquiry into these questions may clarify whether and to what extent the first moral uprising of an entire people (or, at least, of all its politically conscious citizens) in three decades was genuinely related to the revisionism of the Marxist intelligentsia, and whether and to what extent the rediscovered sense of national and moral identity found effective expression through the protagonists of Marxist revisionism. (It must be remembered that a process of "moral erosion" took place in Czechoslovakia after 1939, and that there was a further deterioration of the sense of moral identity after 1945.) Secondly, a historical analysis of the Czechoslovak experience is important from the standpoint of assessing whether, in the setting of the diversified

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[1] An exception is Roger Garaudy's introduction to *La liberté en sursis—Prague 1968* (Freedom Deferred—Prague 1968), Paris, Fayard, 1968.

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socialist industrial societies of Eastern Europe, the ideology of a "universal humanistic socialism" can hope to evoke, and provide the basis for, anything more than the sort of protest and critique of regime and society—and perhaps of rebellion—that has long been characteristic of Marxist movements. Finally, it is vital to inquire whether certain other forms of modern Marxist revisionism—such as those involving acceptance of the philosophy of science, of cybernetics, or of behavioristically-oriented sociology—might not hold more adequate and up-to-date answers to the manifold social and political problems of the highly-industrialized East-bloc countries.

The emergence in Czechoslovakia of a comprehensive ideology of protest defining itself as a philosophy of "universal humanistic socialism" provides an interesting case study of the interaction between utopian vision and politics. This interaction becomes even clearer when one looks at the personal attitudes of some of the leading Czechoslovak revisionists. These attitudes were often quite inconsistent. Some of the revisionist spokesmen—such as the philosopher Karel Kosik—were outspoken in their theoretical critique of the regime, yet remained personally loyal to the party. Others, especially among the writers, artists and journalists, were less consistent in their criticism of the system but more uncompromising in their stand vis-à-vis the party.

The Fourth Writers' Congress in June 1967 was not the first time that Czechoslovak literary spokesmen asserted their right to act as the "critical conscience of the nation." This attitude, which was to manifest itself in so many ways throughout 1968, had actually been in evidence for several years. Thus, at the Slovak Writers' Congress in 1963, Peter Karvas declared that "dogmatism is today disloyalty to Marxism-Leninism," [2] and the novelist Vladimir Minac asserted that "the Stalin era in our country has done tremendous damage in the moral-political sphere." [3] Already then, debate on these issues intensified and came to focus on a question of grave import for the party: Who today has the moral right to criticize? Indeed, even as early as 1957, in connection with the debate on the Stalinist cult of personality, Karel Kosik had called upon Marxist philosophers to engage in genuine self-criticism and self-reappraisal.[4]

[2] *Pravda* (Bratislava), May 24, 1963.
[3] *Kulturny zivot* (Bratislava), May 25, 1963.
[4] *Literarni noviny* (Prague), March 9, 1957.

In any event, there is no doubt that by 1968 there had taken shape in the minds of Czechoslvakia's ideological and political reformers a "new model of socialism" which was to underlie developments throughout all three stages of the process of political democratization in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR)—from January to March, from April to June, and from July to September, of 1968.[5] Today, for the most part, this model unfortunately retains only historical value, but it is nontheless important to inquire what it was like, what were its essential elements, and who among the Czechoslovak philosophers, scholars, writers and journalists especially identified themselves with it, or with some of its aspects.

The New Model of Socialism

From the start, three elements appeared to be intrinsic to the Czechoslovak revisionists' model of socialism: first, a new philosophy and ethic, both visionary and rigoristic, and influenced especially by the existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre and Emmanuel Mounier; second, a sweeping and radical critique of the bureaucratization of party, state, economy and culture; and third, the aspiration to realize—with the help of the West European intelligentsia—the vision of a democratic socialism, an "open" Marxism, in all of Europe. The Czech philospher and writer Ivan Svitak, who fled to the United States in August 1968, graphically summed up the platform of the Czechoslovak Marxist revisionists in these terms:

Yes to internationalism, Europe, sovereign Czechoslovakia, socialism, direct democracy, parliamentarianism, culture, humanism, critical attitude, the people, the individual, freedom. No to nationalism, Asia and America, neo-colonialism, state, capitalism, dictatorship, monopoly of power, apparatuses, manipulation, authorities, the masses, the élite, anarchy.[6]

The revisionist program thus embraced demands for government under law, for the free expression of opinion (not only in politics, but in the religious-ecclesiastical sphere as well), and for a number of

[5] The Czechoslovak revisionist philosopher Ivan Svitak views the events culminating in the Soviet occupation in terms of these three stages.
[6] Ivan Svitak, "The Genius and the Apparatus," in *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, Calif.) July-Oct., 1968, pp. 194-98. Long connected with the Philosophical Institute of the Academy of Sciences, Prague, Svitak was compelled to leave the Institute in 1964 because of ideological deviations and was subsequently expelled from the CPCS.

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other basic rights associated with parliamentary democracy. The political aspects of the model were backed up by economic concepts evolved primarily by Ota Sik and his coworkers at the Economic Institute of the Academy of Sciences in Prague,[7] by Evzen Loebl, and others. More fundamentally, both the political and economic aspects of the model can be traced back to certain philosophical premises—in particular, to the concept of man as a free individual having the right to make his own choice between ideologies (*e.g.*, Christianity, Marxism, humanism). This concept was embodied politically in the idea of a new kind of socialist democracy combining "spontaneity of the masses" with "consciousness" of the goals and needs of society. An illustration is the CPCS Action Program of April 1968, which renounced Lenin's and Stalin's élite conception of the party in favor of the principle of "participation by the masses" in the decision-making process and direct control of the party by the working class.[8] Similarly, the revisionists' economic program combining elements of a market and a planned economy, as well as their attitude on consumption, was based on these same premises because the consumer was conceived as enjoying freedom of choice.

The New Philosophy of Man

The principal representatives of the new philosophy and ethic, notwithstanding considerable differences among them, are Karel Kosik, Ivan Svitak, Milan Prucha, and Ivan Dubsky. Their thinking, as Kosik put it in his *Dialektika konkretniho* published in Prague in 1963, revolves around the idea of the free individual: "Each individual must absorb the culture and live his life himself, without intermediary."[9] He is *homo creator*—the creator of himself—and his concrete life should be lived both "creatively" and "critically."

To understand what the revisionist philosophers mean by this, one must note that they take the romantic artist of the 19th century as the model for their concept of man. The activity of the poet, the painter, and the sculptor is, for them, the prototype of free and creative work, in contrast to merely receptive and administrative forms of activity. At the same time, the true artist confronts his work critically—that is to say, with contemplative aloofness.

This philosophy is not only romanticist; it is also conservative.[10] Indicative of this is a conception of intellectual creativity reflecting the spiritual climate of the early 19th century, as well as the concept of an intellectual élite. Artists, who alone know true creative freedom, are to be accepted in society as an élite. This concept harks back to the prototype of all élitist theories—the Platonic idea that philosophers should rule as kings. But while the new philosophy is up to this point not innovative or unique, it does contain some elements that are new. The interpretations placed upon the categories of "work" and "alienation," for example, are to some extent original. Through work, according to Kosik, man transforms "nature" into a product for human beings and acquires "practice" (*Praxis*) in the sense of a relationship to everyday life. And by so doing, the single, free individual breaks through the bonds constricting him—for example, the bonds imposed by party and state bureaucracies. It must be emphasized that Kosik thinks always in terms of the subject, the individual—never in terms of a group or a collectivity. The bureaucracy of officialdom becomes the very symbol of alienation.

This view is hardly surprising. In other Communist countries, too—in Yugoslavia, Hungary, and East Germany—rebellious intellectuals pillory the party bureaucracy as an expression of alienation. What is much more interesting is that some of the Czechoslovak revisionist philosophers view alienation as an intrinsic aspect of human life regardless of the social order in which men live. Both Kosik and Ivan Dubsky see alienation in this light. Thus, Dubsky holds that "loss of home" (*utraty doma*) and "homelessness" (*bezdomnose*) are as much a part of modern man as is a specific "openness" with respect to the problems of a rapidly changing industrial society.[11]

The revisionist philosophers' concepts of creative

[7] Ota Sik was the chief architect of Czechoslovakia's "New Economic Model" and served for a time as Deputy Premier under Dubcek, resigning this post in September 1968 following the Soviet intervention. His principal coworkers were Josef Goldmann, Ladislav Juengling, Vladimir Nachtigall, and Bedrich Lercik.

[8] See "Le programme d'action du Parti communiste de Tchécoslovaquie" (The Action Program of the CPCS), April 1968, and Alexander Dubcek, "Ce que nous voulons" (What We Want), both in *La liberté en sursis, op. cit.*

[9] See German translation, *Die Dialektik des Konkreten* (The Dialectic of the Concrete), Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1967, p. 19.

[10] It is thus not surprising that Kosik, bearing in mind Czechoslovakia's own romanticist tradition (K. M. Macha), reflected the influence of W. J. Schelling, one of the most important German idealistic philosophers.

[11] Ivan Dubsky, "Domov a bezdeomovi," in *Filosoficky casopis*, Vol. XIV, No. 2, 1966, pp. 181-197.

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freedom, work, and alienation are also original in that they represent an effort to achieve a synthesis between Western existentialism and Marxism. By seeking such a synthesis, Kosik, Dubsky, and Prucha have infused new life into ideological discussion in their country, hitherto isolated from present-day philosophical thought. But more than that, the synthesis they are striving for has far-reaching political implications which become clear only in the light of its key concept of "practice." For the revisionists' new interpretation of "practice" (further discussed below) opens the door to a dialogue with Christians and philosophical idealists and is the ideological precondition for progress in the direction of political pluralism.

Influenced by the ideas of the 19th-century German idealist philosophers Schelling and Feuerbach, Kosik and Svitak see the free activity of the individual as the necessary basis for a humanistic socialism which can play a continuing role in history. In their view, historical perspective completes the activity of the individual human being and makes him a "whole" man: that is to say, in the course of historical development, man, by his creative activity, will make himself ever more free and thus attain self-fulfillment. It is the free, self-responsible conduct of the individual, motivated by the conviction that historical development is leading towards a humanistic socialism, that the revisionist philosophers understand as "practice." In Kosik's words, "Practice pervades the whole man and determines him in his totality." [12]

This signifies a radical departure from the established Marxist-Leninist concept of "practice." Lenin understood it solely in the context of the class struggle and of its relation to a "revolutionary theory." The Stalinist ideologues equated it simply with the decisions of the Communist Party leadership and the carrying out of these decisions by the party apparatus. Nothing of this sort remains in the thinking of the revisionist philosophers, who now define "practice" in terms that lean heavily upon Sartrian existentialism. Thus, Kosik writes:

In addition to the element of work, practice also comprehends an existential element. It manifests itself not only in man's objective activity whereby he transforms nature and imparts human value to natural materials, but also in the formation of the human personality, the molding of the human subject wherein existential elements such as dread, disgust, joy, laughter, hope, etc. enter into play, not as passive "experience," but as ingredients in the struggle for recognition—*i.e.*, the process of realizing human freedom.[13]

Toward a New Morality

Closely related to this new philosophical vision of man is a rigoristic moralism that has become evident in the writings of many Marxists in both East and West. It is markedly influenced by the discussions now going on in the Catholic-Christian sphere. An indication of this was Milan Prucha's participation in the Marienbad meeting of the Paulus Society in April 1967, when he called upon Christians to show "greater radicalism in their striving for transcendent goals." [14] The essence of Prucha's message was that Christians ought not to adopt the bad aspects of contemporary Marxism and attempt to explain man solely on the basis of his social relationships; that man's being could only be defined in its relationship to transcendence —or, as Christians would say, to God.

There is no doubt that Prucha, in advancing such a formulation, was aiming toward a kind of Marxist doctrine of transcendence. This effort is significant, for it marks the first time in the postwar history of Communist East Europe that there has been an attempt by Marxist philosophers to redefine moral values independently of established Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Had such a reformulation been successful, it could have provided a new feeling of self-assurance and served as a guide for the individual to follow in the decisions of everyday life. That it misfired after having had great initial success among the masses was because it did not define moral values concretely enough and thus failed to generate confidence in the future.

No less than Kolakowski and Schaff in Poland, Milan Kangrga, Mihailo Markovic, Rudi Supek, Danko Grlic and Pedrag Vranicki in Yugoslavia, Agnes Heller in Hungary, Cesare Luporini in Italy, and Roger Garaudy in France, the Czechoslovak revisionist philosophers—Kosik, Svitak, and Prucha —have searched for new approaches to the formulation of basic ethical problems.[15] The official ideology had far too long combined a mechanistically-

[12] Kosik, *op.cit.* p. 219.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 221.

[14] Milan Prucha, "Mensch sein. Das gesellschaftliche Engagement der Philosophie" (To be a human person. The social engagement of philosophy), in *Ost-Probleme* (Bonn), July 1967, p. 429.

[15] *Cf.* contributions in *Moral and Gesellschaft* (Morality and society), Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1968.

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conceived Marxist dialectic with a purely pragmatic concept of truth and a utilitarian morality. Naturally enough, during last year's East European crisis, the Czechoslovak philosophers were especially sharp in their criticism of this type of "party morality." In opposition to it, they demanded that man be regarded as a "responsible being," and that the "living ethos" be differentiated from the doctrinaire moral systems of both past and present. Virtually all the philosophers and writers named above reject the dogmatic Marxist notion that a political system can function independently of the concrete behavior and sense of responsibility of the individual citizen. This is why they define the problem of human freedom, or of "morality," as "the problem of the relationship of the individual to the system." [16]

Thus it is not the party, society, or "the system," but always the individual, who takes first place. Accordingly, the revisionist philosophers hold that the individual in socialist society must first of all ponder the spiritual bases of his existence and conduct himself responsibly. Hence they take a critical attitude towards the view of man primarily as a consumer. Man should not strive for material rewards and comfort because by so doing he falls into ever deeper dependence on "the system." Rather he should strive after liberation from *all* forms of domination, including that of consumption. The influence of this school of thought is evident in all the East European Communist countries, but particularly in Poland, East Germany, and Yugoslavia. In East Germany, for example, the philosopher Robert Havemann several years ago called for the "moral cleansing" of communism, climaxing his appeals to youth with a repudiation of Khrushchev's brand of "goulash communism." Instead, he painted an idealized picture of asceticism and frugality.[17]

The Yugoslav journal *Praxis* has also been an active and influential participant in the discussions among Marxists on moral issues. In recent years the columns of this journal have carried many articles focusing on ethical questions, especially the problem of how social norms and values, in the meaning of "morality," can be preserved and strengthened in a socialist society after the initial moral idealism of the revolutionary period and the first postrevolutionary years has waned. The experience of workers' self-management in Yugoslavia and its ethical implications have figured importantly in these discussions.[18]

Critique of the Bureaucracy

The political relevance of the new currents of thought outlined above is brought into sharp relief by the Czechoslovak revisionists' critique of existing institutions—the party, state, education, the military, and the economy. This critique drew together a wide range of rebels from diverse sectors of the intelligentsia—economic reformer Dr. Ota Sik and his group; the former president of the State Bank in Bratislava, Evzen Loebl; the president of the Czechoslovak Writers' Association and Kafka expert, Dr. Eduard Goldstücker; the former chief editor of the organ of the Czechoslovak Writers' Association, Antonin J. Liehm; the author of the "2000 words" manifesto, Ludvik Vaculik [19]; the philosophers mentioned above, and many others.

The Czechoslovak revisionists' assault on bureaucratic structures had much in common with revisionist thinking elsewhere. To cite just one example, the Yugoslav intellectual Mihailo Markovic had written as early as 1964 that "the tendency towards bureaucratization is the paramount factor that undermines the integrity of the social consciousness of a community and directly threatens the moral integrity of each and every individual." [20] Indeed, virtually all critics of socialist-communist systems are agreed that the ruling bureaucracies in the socialist countries are scarcely capable of solving the developmental and modernization problems of their changing societies; that these bureaucracies hinder the development of the individual to his full potentialities; and that the professed new norms of individual freedom and democratic participation cannot be realized so long as the bureaucratic structures themselves remain unchanged.

But while there has been a broad consensus

[16] Kosik, "Die Dialektik der Moral und die Moral der Dialektik), (The Dialectic of Morality and the Morality of the Dialectic), in *Moral und Gesellschaft, op. cit.*, p. 13.

[17] Robert Havemann, *Dialektik ohne Dogma?* (Dialectic Without Dogma?), Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1964, pp. 149 ff.

[18] See, for example, Mihailo Markovic, "*Personal Integrity in Socialist Society*," in *Praxis* (Belgrade), No. 4. 1966, p. 412.

[19] The "*2000 Words*" manifesto appeared simultaneously on June 27, 1968, in *Literarni listy, Mlada fronta Prace* and *Zemedelske noviny*; English translation in *Studies in Comparative Communism*, July-October 1968.

[20] Mihailo Markovic, "*Die moralische Integrität der Persönlichkeit*" (The Moral Integrity of the Personality), in *Moral und Gesellschaft, op. cit.*, p. 124.

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among revisionist critics in different countries, it is curious to note that some politically and intellectually influential Western Marxists, such as Garaudy in France, have been much more restrained in their critique of the Communist Party than were, for instance, Svitak and Vaculik in Czechoslovakia. Kosik, on the other hand, has been as circumspect in his attitude toward the Czechoslovak party as Garaudy (a Politbureau member) has been toward the French CP. Neither has ever attacked the leading members of his own party personally, and both invariably couched their criticisms in general terms.[21] Thus, in this area, too. there has existed a diversity of views and proposals within the framework of a basic consensus on the need for a thorough revitalization of the Communist system.

The Czechoslovak revisionist philosophers, writers, and journalists directed the brunt of their criticism at the "élitist" principle in Communist party organization, the uncontrolled rule of inefficient bureaucracies in party, state and culture, and the wholesale suppression of nonconformist opinions in press, public discussion, and religion. In their view, mere "democratization" of the party and state apparatuses as promised by the Dubcek regime in the April 1968 Action Program [22] was not sufficient, and they drew a clear distinction between this and genuine "democracy." Svitak, an intransigent critic of both Novotny's communism and the liberal communism of Dubcek, underscored this distinction quite succinctly when he wrote in April 1968: "We want democracy, not democratization. Democratization is merely a minimal program on the road toward democracy." [23]

By the same token, the revisionists flatly rejected the "totalitarian dictatorship" of "Stalinist Marxism" and called for a "democratic" socialism in which control of the power élite by the masses would be assured. The role of the connecting link with the masses was to be played by the intellectuals as representatives of the conscience of the nation. Svitak and Vaculik were especially outspoken in their denunciations of the arbitrariness of the party apparatus and the incompetence of the party leadership. In his "2000 Words," Vaculik scored the self-righteousness and opinionatedness of the party élite, calling them "a self-willed band of men" whose power spread out through the party apparatus into every district and community.[24] Svitak and Vaculik both demanded that the existing élite be replaced by an entirely different sort of leadership corps recruited from among three social strata: the workers (excluding current union officials), the middle classes (excluding those who then were willing collaborators with the party), and—most important of all—the intelligentsia.[25]

Linked with this political critique was an attempt to rethink the entire problem of industrialized society. The proposition was developed, principally by social philosophers at the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences in Prague, that the only system consistent with industrialism was one based on the equality of free individuals and universal justice. Any form of élitism was thus ruled out. Radovan Richta, temporarily director of the Institute of Philosophy of the Prague Academy of Sciences, and a member of the Central Committee (elected at the September 1968 plenum), sees it as the primary task of modern Marxist sociology to "humanize" industrial civilization and to reshape the system in such a way as to enable every individual to participate in some way in the central decision-making process.[26] This would involve, *inter alia*, a reform of the entire system of education and training, placing special emphasis on the provision of facilities for the continued education of adults, in order that their training may keep pace with the needs of a rapidly developing industrial society.

The Recourse to Tradition

Like all Marxist revisionists of whatever stripe, the Czechoslovak intellectuals could not dispense with invoking what they believed to be the "true" tradition of Marxism, the authentic Marxism, in support of their new doctrines. This search into the Marxist past must not be looked upon as a mere academic exercise without political relevance, for the impulses generated by a "purification" of the Marxist tradition can deeply influence the direction of actual political development.

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[21] See Roger Garaudy, *Peut-on être communiste aujourd'-hui?* (Can One be a Communist Today?) Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1968, pp. 325 ff.

[22] *Loc cit. supra*, pp. 45-63. See also Deryck Viney, "Alexander Dubcek" in *Studies in Comparative Communism*, July-October 1968, pp. 27-28.

[23] With the Head Through the Wall," in *Student*, April 1968. *Cf. Studies in Comparative Communism*, July-October, 1968, p. 182.

[24] *Loc. cit. supra*, p. 238.

[25] Svitak, in *ibid.*, p. 187.

[26] Radovan Richta, in *La liberté en sursis, op. cit.*, pp. 79-99.

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Svitak invokes the "true" humanistic Marx against the distorters of Marxism.[27] He sets Marx clearly apart from Lenin, Stalin, and Mao, taking exception, above all, to Lenin's theory of an élite party and to the bureaucratic party apparatus built by Stalin. But Svitak also attacks the hallowed concept of "the working class." His "new humanism" is based on an existentialist and personalistic interpretation of Feuerbach and Sartre. He adopts Feuerbach's concept of man as the dominating and constantly changing being, setting up this concept in opposition to the abstract quantity of the "working class" and projecting it into the framework of Marx's thinking. For Svitak, Marx retains central significance because he was the first to develop an "anti-ideological," "anti-illusionary" philosophy of man—a philosophy that provides the basis for a more comprehensive "science of man" and which distrusts every orthodoxy and every form of institutionalization of the truth.[28]

A return to Marx's philosophical thinking is a key element in the ideas of Kosik as well. Yet Kosik also reflects the influences of a variety of other idealistic schools of philosophical thought, both past and present—of German philosophical idealism (Hegel, Schelling); of phenomenology and existential philosophy (Husserl, Heidegger); and of Neo-Kantianism and Neo-Kantian Marxism (Lask, Lukacs). All these approaches, however different they may be when examined in detail, have one common characteristic: the individual takes precedence over the social group, the subject over the object.

It is therefore understandable that both Svitak and Kosik were greatly stimulated—perhaps even launched on their course—by Franz Kafka and his interpretations of man's being. As Eduard Goldstücker has rightly observed, from the time of the Kafka conference in Lidice in 1963, the Prague-born German writer virtually became, for the Czechoslovak intelligentsia, the symbol of a breakout from the political and intellectual isolation imposed on them by Stalinism and the Cold War.[29] Kafka's world is at the same time the world of the anonymous and hierarchically ordered society in which man stands alone and lost. His unglamorous, yet graphic portrayals, rich in symbols and metaphors, supplied the language in which the revisionists formulated their critique of party and state. In any event, Kafka's name stands for the radical discovery of the individual—at once defenseless and "free"—as the true core of modern society. This view is shared by Goldstücker, Kosik, Svitak, Prucha and Dubsky, as well as by Western Marxists such as Roger Garaudy.[30]

Failure of the New Socialism

Looking back upon the unquestionably stimulating and exciting program of the Czechoslovak Marxist revisionists, one cannot help asking: Why was it politically ineffectual? Why in the end did it remain isolated and confined to relatively small groups? Why did the conception of a humanistic socialism come to naught? These questions are complex, and the answers must be found in several factors.

The first of these factors was the abstract and basically utopian-idealistic nature of the revisionists' view of man. Man was conceived philosophically, with only slight relation to the surrounding society in its concreteness. The difficult philosophical and literary terminology employed by the revisionists was itself simply beyond the comprehension of many party functionaries, even the liberals. Kosik's philosophy is a prime example. In his *Dialektika Konkretniho*, he writes: "The human consciousness is the activity of the subject, which organizes the socio-human reality into the unity of being and meaning, reality and reason."[31] The book is replete with such sentences, the meaning of which is as obscure as it seems unrelated to pressing practical problems. The fact is that Kosik's philosophy was far from a concrete analysis of existing political and social reality. It should be noted in this connection that even though Kosik was among the 70 signers of the "2000 Words" manifesto, he himself never directly attacked the power base or the fundamental principles of the party. His philosophy possessed no agitational force, nor was it conceived as a weapon of direct political struggle.

Ivan Svitak, it is true, was patently more politi-

[27] See especially his lecture, "The Genius and the Apparatus" (delivered at Charles University, Prague, May 3, 1968), *loc. cit. supra*, pp. 194-95.

[28] Svitak, "The Sources of Socialist Humanism", in Erich Fromm (ed.), *Socialist Humanism: An International Symposium*, New York, Doubleday-Anchor Books, 1966, p. 22.

[29] Eduard Goldstücker, "La culture, les écrivains et la démocratie socialiste" (Culture, the Writers, and Socialist Democracy), in *La liberté en sursis*, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

[30] Roger Garaudy, *D'un réalisme sans rivages* (Realism Out of Control), Paris, Plon, 1963, p. 153 ff.

[31] Kosik, *Die Dialektik des Konkreten*, *op. cit.* p. 239.

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cal in his thinking than Kosik. He consistently attempted to combine concrete analyses of events with the elaboration of a practical political strategy grounded in his philosophy,[32] as evidenced by the many lectures he gave at Charles University and at workers' meetings between January and July 1968. In these lectures he addressed himself directly to the evolution of Communist party rule in both the USSR and Czechoslovakia, concentrating on the theme that both parties had become apparatuses of totalitarian power, and combining this historical and political analysis with his own vision of a democratic socialist society based on free, self-determining individuals.[33] Yet in the end, notwithstanding his more political orientation, Svitak, too, failed to translate his philosophical concepts into a practical program of political action.

The second factor which contributed to the political ineffectuality of the humanistic-socialist ideology was the revisionist philosophers' mistaken conception of the role of the intelligentsia in general, and of the "clubs" in particular, in the revolutionary process. It was unrealistic, in the first instance, to expect the Czechoslovak intelligentsia at large to become not only active and effective proselytizers but also political executors of the spontaneous revolutionary will of the masses. Actually, despite a certain uniformity in their reactions to the Soviet challenge, the intellectuals were split many ways—into Czechs and Slovaks, into Communists and non-Communists, into different generation groups, into groups which differed not only in their interpretations of Hegel, Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, but also in their assessments of the actual political situation. All these intellectuals, to be sure, were unanimous in their desire for greater personal freedom, for the abolition of terror, for democratization of the party apparatus and of the political process as a whole, but they differed widely as to how these objectives could best be achieved. Some, such as Svitak, were completely opposed to cooperating with the party functionaries; they aimed at a total revolutionization of society and a revolt of the masses spearheaded by the intellectuals. Others, such as Kosik, sought to cooperate with the left wing of the CPCS and aimed at reform rather than revolution.

The organizational concept of the "clubs" was equally unrealistic. In the "second phase of the democratization process," as envisaged by Svitak, political candidates independent of the CPCS were to be nominated by non-political and in part newly-created organizations or "clubs". Examples of these were the *Junak* youth movement, established in late March 1968, the vocational and regional associations within the trade unions, established in March and April, 1968, and the Club 231. They were intended to become organizational platforms for the youth and the trade unions in particular, and their right to put forward their own candidates for public office was to be embodied in a new electoral law so as to provide a genuine alternative to exclusive party rule. The revisionists urged the organization of such clubs within all established institutions, including the mass organizations, the unions of artists, the women's organizations, etc. However, this concept of an outright alternative to the "police-bureaucratic" regime of communism completely overlooked the greater political practicality of a more gradual process of democratization. On the one hand, the ruling power of the party appratus was still intact, and on the other, the clubs did not provide an adequately efficient organizational framework for mobilizing the masses.

Once again, as so many times before in the history of Marxist socialism, the realization of philosophical concepts appears to have foundered on the reef of the "organizational question," namely, how the requirements of the "new humanism" can be woven into the fabric of established politico-social structures and forces. What tipped the scales against the Czechoslovak visionaries of a humanistic socialism may have been the fact that they put forward the radical "club" idea prematurely. Still another serious blunder was the tendency of many representatives of the radical-democratic intelligentsia to indulge in black-and-white judgments with as much abandon as had the dogmatic Communists of the old school. To Svitak, even Dubcek appeared little better than Novotny.

These facts glaringly illuminate both the potentialities and the failings of the philosophical revisionists. Certainly, the latter played a major part in forging the mass character of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia. They were from the beginning more in tune with the mood of the masses than were the Polish revisionists and the Harich group in East Germany in 1956-57. (In this respect the Czechoslovak "spring" of 1968 stands in sharp contrast to the Polish October of 1956. Some of the statements of the philosophical revisionists,

[32] See his "The Current Crisis", in *Czechoslovakia: Revolution and Counterrevolution*, published by the News and Letters Committee, Detroit, and the Marxist Humanist Group, Glasgow, in October 1968, pp. 12 ff.

[33] Especially his lecture, "The Genius and the Apparatus," *loc. cit. supra.*

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especially those relating to the freedom and self-determination of the individual, undoubtedly had enormous agitational force in the concrete situation of the spring and summer of 1968. Still, in the end, the revisionists were unable to translate their own success in appealing to the masses into political and administrative power, and the decisive reason for this inability lay in their general hostility to all forms of bureaucratic organization. Most of the philosophical and literary critics of the regime had never played any significant role in the bureaucracy—indeed they despised it as such—and therefore had no experience whatever in organizational matters. This sociological fact reflects an astonishing lack of knowledge of the modern philosophy of science, of cybernetics and empirical sociological research, as well as of the organizational and administrative instruments that are needed to deal with problems in industrial societies.

One more thing that need be mentioned only in passing is the futile trust which the Czechoslovak revisionists placed in a politically effectual solidarity of European leftist intellectuals. This came through in a speech delivered by Svitak before the Association of Motion Picture and Television Artists on May 17, 1968, when he asked where were the allies for the still isolated liberalization and democratization process in Czechoslovakia. The allies, he answered, were the European leftist intellectuals in both East and West.[34] Certainly, there were such allies, especially among the Polish and Yugoslav intellectuals, as well as among the Marxist intellectuals of France and Italy. There is no doubt that sympathy for the liberal cause in Czechoslovakia penetrated deeply into the Communist Parties of those countries. Nevertheless, it was a perilous illusion for the Czechoslovak revisionists to believe that the moral support of a few tens of thousands of European leftist intellectuals would suffice to force a world power like the Soviet Union into retreat—or that it would enable them to offer any serious competition to an entrenched, albeit divided, Communist party such as the CPCS.

The Fate of the Critics

When the Czechoslovak model of democratization went down to defeat in the face of Soviet arms and pressure, many representatives of the critical intelligentsia in all walks of life had to suffer the consequences. Svitak emigrated to the United States in the summer of 1968, and Evzen Loebl followed him soon after. Ota Sik, the father of Czechoslovakia's "New Economic Model" and Deputy Premier under Dubcek, now works at the Economic Institute of the University of Basel, in Switzerland; he has made brief visits back to the CSSR, in February 1969 and again in May to attend a session of CPCS Central Committee, of which he is still a member. Antonin J. Liehm, one of the former leading editors of the weekly *Literarni listy* (now suspended) is currently working abroad as a representative of the Czechoslovak film industry and as a correspondent, mostly in Paris. Others who have gone to the West include Alexander Kusak, former chief editor of the periodical *Student* (also suspended) and the writers Josef Jedlicka and Ladislav Mnacko. Eduard Goldstücker, who is nominally still president of the Czechoslovak Writers' Association and prorector of Charles University, has been lecturing at the University of Sussex in Brighton (England); however it was recently revealed that he intends to return to Prague after concluding his one-year academic stay in England.

A number of other prominent critics of the regime have remained in Czechoslovakia, and some have even been able to enhance their positions. Perhaps the most remarkable example of the latter is Karel Kosik, who previously had worked for many years in the Philosophical Institute of the Academy of Sciences, finally as head of its Department for Dialectical Materialism. At the secret plenum of the CPCS Central Committee in September 1968, he was elected a member of that body and still more recently has been appointed professor of philosophy at Charles University. This, however, has not come altogether as a surprise to some observers, who say that Kosik always kept one foot in the camp of the party apparatchiks. The situation of other revisionist philosophers appears less bright. Ivan Dubsky, though still directing the History of Philosophy Department at the Philosophical Institute, is now working in seclusion at the Institute, as is also the younger philosopher Milan Prucha, a graduate of Moscow University, who since 1956 has repeatedly been criticized by party spokesmen for his harmful ideological views. The writer Ludvik Vaculik also remains in Prague.

Already before Dubcek's replacement by Gustav Husak as leader of the CPCS, a gradual hardening of the internal political situation was evident. There was an attempt to stabilize the situation by exacting renewed pledges of party loyalty from the mass

[34] *Filmovi a televisni noviny*, May 29, 1968.

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organizations—the youth union, the trade unions, the women's organization, etc. There was also the restoration of rigid censorship controls over all mass communications media whose editorial policies were regarded as not in keeping with "the internal and external interests of the country." The protests of individual scholars—such as that of Michael Lakatos, a member of the Political Science Institute of the Academy of Sciences in Prague—were powerless to check the step-by-step stiffening of official policy. Lakatos bitterly complained in March 1969 that all who dared criticize the regime's authoritarian style of rule were being labeled "anti-socialist elements." [35]

Immediately upon Husak's assumption of power on April 17, 1969, there was a further stiffening of internal policy, above all in the cultural sphere. On the very same day, *Literarny zivot*, the successor to the progressive Slovak weekly *Kulturny zivot*, was closed down, and Miroslav Moc was named chief editor of the party organ *Rude pravo*, transforming it overnight from a moderately progressive paper back into a mouthpiece of dogmatic party orthodoxy. During the latter half of April, the censorship authorities banned a series of trade union and youth newspapers—*Prace, Praca, Mlada fronta*, and *Smena*. The formerly radical student publication *Studenske listy* was forced to stop publishing articles by its columnist, Michael Lakatos, and at the beginning of May was shut down altogether. In the middle of May, the two most important weeklies, *Reporter* and *Listy*, were also proscribed. The organ of the Czechoslovak Writers' Association, *Plamen*, and that of the Journalists' Association, *Svet v obrazech*, were ordered to suspend publication for six months.[36] The abrogation of press freedom was accompanied by the opening of a series of party disciplinary proceedings against reform-oriented journalists—among them, Alois Svoboda, editor of the suspended journal *Politika;* Ladislaus Kelensky and Jan Stern, chief editor and editor of *Prace;* Josef Holler, chief editor of *Svet v obrazech;* and Jaromir Horec, chief editor of *Universita Karlova*.[37]

* * *

If the concept of a humanistic socialism has suffered at least a temporary defeat in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet occupation of the CSSR is not the only reason for it. As the preceding analysis has shown, the abstractness and inner weakness of the concept itself, as well as the intellectuals' own disunity, lack of political instinct and organizational experience, and conservative intellectual background, all contributed to that defeat. Although some of the philosophical revisionists, such as Svitak, momentarily succeeded in inspiring substantial numbers of students, writers, and artists, as well as some groups of workers, they were unable in the end to translate their ideas effectively into political reality. Perhaps the biggest reason for their failure was their vehement detestation of all kinds of bureaucratic formations, which made it impossible for them to cooperate successfully with the liberals in the party, while the latter in turn responded by distrusting the intellectuals. Thus there often developed something of a competitive situation between the revisionist intellectuals and the liberal party leaders which ultimately weakened both.

In groping toward a humanistic socialism, the philosophical revisionists remained fundamentally within the framework of existing Marxist revisionism, engaging for the most part in abstruse reinterpretations of the "true" Marx which made little impression on the masses at large. Modern positivistic and behavioristic thinking—particularly cybernetics and information and communications theory—had practically no influence on their outlook. The end result was that their critique of the existing order, grounded in philosophical speculation, was unable to formulate a viable alternative social system affording scope for the realization of their principles of individuality, freedom and humanity.

[35] *Zitrek*, March 5, 1969.
[36] Radio Prague, May 15, 1969.
[37] See the Soviet occupation forces' tabloid *Zpravy*, April 26, 1969.

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II. The End of an Illusion?

By J. H. Huizinga

De mortuis nil nisi bonum. The same ought to hold for the comatose. Nothing is more natural, therefore, than that Czechoslovakia's erstwhile "democratic socialism" should be widely idealized. In fact, some in the West already did so before the invasion of August 20, 1968. "What a response this new revolution will find in a capitalist world which has shown in May how doubtful it feels about the kind of 'civilization' it has to make do with!"—so wrote André Fontaine of *Le Monde* (who, incidentally, seemed to believe that M. Cohn-Bendit and his friends spoke for the "capitalist world") in the summer of 1968. In the same spirit, another prominent journalist, Countess Dönhoff of *Die Zeit* opined that "if the Czechs were to succeed in combining socialism with freedom, many in the West as well as the East would look to Prague with envy." [1] Both writers seemed to take their cue from the Communist intellectuals in Prague, who saw visions of their new "democratic socialism" proving the pathway to a New Jerusalem and—in the view of Professor Robert Havemann, Ulbricht's *enfant terrible*—eventually even conquering the whole of the West. It is perhaps sobering to recall that these proud hopes, now seemingly dashed to the ground, did not appear to be shared by many outside the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Most non-party members tempered their delight at liberation from the old repressive regime with considerable reserve about the new one. Dubcek and his friends might be a vast improvement on their predecessors. But they were, after all, still the leaders of a party that had the nerve to claim the right to rule on the strength of having confessed to the following record:

Supression of the democratic rights and freedoms of the people, violation of laws, licentiousness and misuse of power which gravely and unjustly afflicted many citizens . . . A precipitous expansion of heavy industry . . . an economic policy which no longer corresponded to the economic requirements of the country and led to the exhaustion of its material and human resources. . . . Illusory promises made to the workers. . . . Considerable technical retardation which put a brake on the development of public services, upset the equilibrium of the market, worsened the international status of the Czechoslovak economy . . . and had to end in stagnation and, in certain cases, even the reduction of the living standard of the people. . . . Independence, diligence, expertise, and the initiative of people were not appreciated, but subserviance, obedience and even kowtowing to higher-ups were. . . . Catastrophic conditions in the field of housing, precarious state of the transport system, poor quality of goods and public services. . . . Lack

[1] April 5, 1968.

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of frankness, bureaucratic phrasemongering. . . . People unlawfully condemned and persecuted . . . their families and relatives subjected to mistrust and humiliation. . . . Trade unions taking inadequate care of the interests of the workers. . . . Low standard and shortage of services of all sorts, which reduced the standard of living and aroused justified discontent. . . . Quantitative development of education frequently achieved at the expense of the quality of teaching. A narrowed understanding of the social and human function of culture and art, overestimation of their ideological and political role. . . . Catastrophic shortcoming of cultural and esthetic education.[2]

Add the fact that the party also admitted responsibility for between 60,000 and 70,000 political trials (to say nothing of quite a few judicial murders like that of Slansky) and it should be no great cause for wonder that the party raised a few eyebrows with its claim that by having made a clean breast of its sins, by having sacked a few of its leaders and promised to turn over a new leaf, it had "proved its moral and political right to lead our society." "The party had no cause," wrote the authors of the famous "Two Thousand Words," "to congratulate itself on having taken the initiative to democratize. The process could not have started anywhere else. Only the Communists were allowed to be politically active, only they were in a position to criticize." [3]

None of this is to minimize the extraordinary courage of men like Dubcek in performing their unique act of self-accusation and thereby putting the first of many nails into what was only too likely to prove their coffin. It was unique not only in that, unlike Khrushchev at the 20th CPSU Congress, they spread all their dirty linen in full view of the public both at home and abroad. It was unique also in that it was the party itself which was put into the dock, and not a dead scapegoat such as Stalin became for his accomplices. The displaced leader Novotny was only mentioned once in the 90-page document officially known as the "Action Program" but which might more appropriately have carried the title "Je m'accuse." And even then he was not directly made responsible for all that went wrong; rather the responsibility was placed squarely on "bureaucratic centralization, dogmatic approaches, subjective conceptions, insufficient development of socialist democracy, obsolete ideas"—in short, on the party as a whole.

If, in spite of this self-confessed record of utter failure, the party's claim to remain on the throne was not seriously challenged, it was, of course, not only because Moscow would not have allowed it, but also because there was no power-grouping capable of doing so. The realistic Czechs could not but admit that Dubcek spoke the literal truth when, in addressing the Central Committee on May 29, he said that "the leading political position of the Communist Party of Czechslovakia is a historical fact." They felt about him rather like Mr. "Rab" Butler did about Sir Anthony Eden when he called him "the best Prime Minister we have." They backed him because they had no one else to back against the common enemy represented by the Old Guard and its powerful friends in Moscow, not because they were carried away by his vision of "democratic socialism." For unlike some admirers in the West, they had plenty of reasons not to feel quite so confident that the new order would prove truly and durably democratic, or even to think that socialism in any form was all that much of a blessing.

True, for some six months the citizens of Czechoslovakia had enjoyed a degree of freedom of expression that seemed to justify the wildest hopes. Thus the signatories of the "Two Thousand Words," not all of whom were Communists, got away with calling the party "a clique that attracts power-hungry egotists, cowardly opportunists and people with a bad conscience." Others were free to write that "far too long we have had to listen to tales about the inhumanity of capitalist society, we who know from experience that our own was a good deal more inhuman." [4] All this was allowed because the new leaders had insisted in the Action Program "that bourgeois-ideology can be challenged only in open ideological struggle before all the people."

However, even before the Russians had openly put the heat on Dubcek, he had already shown some signs of having second thoughts. He complained of

[2] Action Program adopted at Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on April 5, 1968; in *Documents on Today's CSSR*, Prague, Svoboda Publishing House, July 1968.

[3] This document appeared in *Literarny listi* (Prague) and other Czechoslovak journals on June 27, 1968.

[4] Statement by Zdenek Mlynar, as reported by Michel Tatu in *Le Monde* (Paris), June 21, 1968.

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"the onesided onslaught which is constantly developing and intensifying, with the aim of discrediting the party as a whole . . . efforts to create the view that the party has no right to play the leading role in our society . . . this stream of unobjective criticism." While repeating that "we have no reason to let ourselves be provoked into changing the political course adopted in January," he warned against "confusing freedom of speech with the right to express subjective views before millions of spectators, listeners, or readers without sufficiently considering their social influence." And while rejecting "the conception which degraded journalists to passive interpreters of the policy of the party," he added that it would be equally "extreme if individual Communists in the newspapers considered themselves autonomous makers of party policy." [5] After he had finished speaking, the Central Committee summed it all up in the statement that "The criticism of past shortcomings has hitherto been the center of attention; the time has now come to concentrate attention and strength on active work." [6]

Though these warnings were not translated into restrictive action in the spring and summer of 1968, their general character had already been adumbrated in the Action Program, which spoke of the necessity "to define in the shortest possible time by a press law when a state body can forbid the propagation of certain information." It still remained to be seen, therefore, whether abolition of the censorship would serve the press better than it had done in Spain, where Franco had taken back with one hand, in the form of such a press law, much of what he had given with the other. Likewise, the other measure announced in the Action Program, an act regulating the right of assembly, promised to guarantee this right only by restricting it. That was clear from what Dubcek had said about it in his May 29 statement (and later reiterated in his reply to the Warsaw Pact countries):

We need as quickly as possible the act on assembly in order that the present period of activities of various organizations without a legal basis, without duties towards the state and the National Front, may rapidly end. . . . This will give the opportunity effectively to face attempts of the anti-Communist forces to gain an organizational basis for public activity.[7]

In addition, there were deeper reasons for doubting whether the new "democratic socialism" would prove worthy of the name. The thinking of its protagonists was marked by a profound contradiction. On the face of it, they seemed to accept the principle of government by consent and to renounce the divine right to rule which the party, in the orthodox view, owes to the "scientifically" ascertained "Will of History" whose executant it is and which justifies its claim to supreme power. This fundamental article of faith the reformers appeared to have abandoned, thus handing the Warsaw Pact powers another nail to drive into the coffin. They insisted that the party had to *earn* its right to rule. "The party," the Action Program declared, "cannot impose its authority; it must win it again and again . . . by the work of its members, by the veracity of its ideals." "We know very well," Dubcek said in his May 29 statement, "that authority was not given to us once and for all . . . By their initiative and honest work in solving problems, the Communists want to persuade all citizens that they are capable and entitled to lead society." And the party organ *Rude pravo* went even further in saying: "Either we can do something to improve the lot of the workers and they recognize it, or we fail, in which case it would be dishonorable to claim political power." [8] No wonder the orthodox in Moscow and elsewhere shuddered at such a betrayal of the sacred doctrine.

Yet they might have comforted themselves with the hope (not entirely baseless) that the official perpetrators of this betrayal, unlike the editorial writers of *Rude pravo*, did not really seem to be in earnest. While claiming that henceforward the party had to *earn* its right to rule, Dubcek and his associates were not prepared to allow it to be sacked for failure to do so. It is true that Dubcek did not wholly exclude the possibility that at some future date the party might make the electorate the arbiter of its fate by allowing it a choice of rulers. He only said that this was not possible "at the present time" and "under existing conditions",[9] which again must have horrified the orthodox. For, in the latter's view, there is and never can be need or scope for power groups competing with a party that has carried through the revolution and sees

[5] *Rude pravo* (Prague), May 30, 1968.
[6] *Ibid.*
[7] *Ibid.*
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] *Ibid.*

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itself as the embodiment of the whole of the classless society resulting therefrom. To the orthodox, opposition is tantamount to counterrevolution, and counterrevolution to high treason.

But though Dubcek did not seem irrevocably wedded even to this cardinal part of the doctrine and may just possibly have toyed with the idea of allowing an opposition party—as a sort of democratic beauty-spot—once he felt strong enough to do so, he made it quite clear that for the foreseeable future there could be no question of risking the party's "leading role" in open competition. All the backing he received from his newfound allies, the non-Communist Czechs, did not make him blind to the fact that the party was far from popular. While "there is no reason for nervousness and panic," he told the Central Committee on May 29, "the anti-Communist forces could gain major political influence if they succeeded in taking advantage of dissatisfaction." And as the Action Program itself had admitted, after twenty years of gross misrule there was certainly no lack of such dissatisfaction. Prudence alone—indeed, elementary self-preservation—ruled out any idea of submitting the party's claim to govern to the verdict of the governed.

Dubcek and his colleagues, then, were aware of the threat posed to the party's "leading role" by the new "democratic socialism", although they apparently felt strong enough to combat it. But the Soviet Union and its faithful Warsaw Pact allies knew better. They realized more acutely than Dubcek that if no competition for the favor of the electorate was going to be allowed, and even if—as was clearly in the cards—the new civil liberties were going to be restricted within the framework of a constitution declaring the socialist order inviolate, the party still faced grave danger. In the final analysis, all depended on whether the new leaders in Prague were in earnest about democratizing the party's structure and reversing the chain of command so that it no longer led from the top to the bottom but the other way around. For that, combined with the new freedom of expression, could well prove the beginning of the end of the party's monopoly of power. Organized on a truly democratic basis and allowing its different wings full scope for public debate, the party might only too easily split in two.

Perhaps it was the publication of the new draft party statutes in *Rude pravo* on Augutst 10 that confirmed Moscow's worst fears and led to the final decision to invade the hapless country. The statutes may well have been the straw that broke the camel's back, already loaded to the breaking point by Dubcek's earlier challenge to the sacred principle of "democratic centralism" which the "Five," in their letter from Warsaw, had adjured him "to defend as the apple of your eye." [10] According to this principle, majority decisions in the party's councils not only are binding upon the minority but condemn it to total and permanent silence. Dubcek, however, had recognized the minority's right to continue to plead its case after a decision had been taken, and had scornfully rejected the "false unity" represented by "blind obedience to orders from above." [11] Much worse, he had even agreed that "clashes of view" should be fought out in public. He had allowed every deviation from the party line, including even challenges to the party's right to the "leading role," to be argued in the press and on the

[10] *TASS*, July 18, 1968.
[11] *Rude pravo*, May 30, 1968.

"I, too, am for socialism with a human face."

—From Rohac (Bratislava), March 26, 1969.

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radio. He had torn off the party's mask of monolithic unity. He had shown himself incapable or unwilling—or both—to enforce the practice of the first Communist virtue, party discipline. He had thus given free rein to the "splitters" and the "anti-party groups."

No wonder the orthodox leaders both within and outside the country felt profoundly shocked. It was, after all, thanks to iron discipline and strict secrecy surrounding all intraparty disputes, to the relentless suppression of opponents of the party line and the rigging of "elections" at all party levels so as to ensure a chain of command leading from top to bottom, that Stalin had been able to raise the "Fatherland of Socialism" to the status of the second mightiest power on earth. That the new Czech leaders now wanted to undo Stalin's greatest achievement (in itself, of course, a betrayal of Marx's democratic ideal) could not but seem to Stalin's disciples the greatest betrayal of all. How could a party which allowed complete freedom of public debate—not to mention genuine and secret elections of leaders holding office only for a limited term—hope to maintain the monolithic unity needed to maintain its "leading role"? How could the "clashes of view" which Dubcek welcomed fail to lead to clashes of factions, no matter how categorically the new statutes forbade the organization of such groups?

It was because the course Dubcek and his friends had decided to follow appeared to carry such grave risks to the unity and hence to the supremacy of the party that many outside its ranks suspected that the new leaders would soon be obliged to retrace their steps and again clamp down on the freedom of public intraparty debate. The party ideologues, however, either avoided the issue or (as some did in talking with this author in the spring of 1968) consoled themselves with the hoary notion that the existence of competing parties—in itself a manifestation of "class struggle"—was unthinkable in a classless society, which Czechoslovakia presumably was.

In the days of Novotny there was something to be said for this thesis. Under his regime an engineer or a doctor earned hardly more than a chauffeur or a male nurse, and so it was all along the line. Above the workers and employees, there was only what Djilas has characterized as the "new class," the party profiteers. And even their privileges took the form of perquisites such as official cars and houses rather than higher salaries. "Income policy" remained inspired by Lenin's early egalitarianism, the belief—which he was soon forced to abandon—that it would be possible "to reduce the remuneration of all state servants to the level of workmen's wages." [12] In Novotny's thinking, too, the new "Soviet man" needed no vulgar materialist incentive to induce him to give his best or to make the effort necessary to acquire special skills. The conquest of the Communist paradise from whose abundance everyone would be rewarded—as Marx had promised—"according to his needs," demanded a capital accumulation that could only be attained by imposing equal austerity on all who were "building socialism."

It was in this spirit that Czechoslovakia's economy was conducted, for a time successfully enough. For, as Ghita Ionescu has pointed out in his illuminating book, *The Politics of the European Communist States*, [13] it is one thing to collectivize and industrialize by coercion, but quite another to force efficiency and productivity out of an industrial apparatus once it has been created. This demands an active interest and good will on the part of the workers at all levels, from the manager right down to the men on the factory floor. And they, in Czechoslovakia as elsewhere, soon proved to be no noble, selfless "Soviet men" anxious to sacrifice themselves for the benefit of unborn generations, but ordinary human beings who needed the stimulus not only of material rewards but also—especially on the higher levels—of a measure of authority over the enterprises in which they worked and a voice in running the society in which they lived.

Realization of this somewhat unpalatable truth finally came home to the Czechoslovak leaders—as it had, indeed, in other parts of the Communist world as well. But nowhere were its practical implications—decentralization, "delevelling," and democratization—accepted so fully and so explicitly as in Prague. Whereas Brezhnev still insists that "material incentives may not influence the inner life of Soviet man," [14] Dubcek was not afraid to say that "profit is the engine of social prog-

[12] V. I. Lenin, "The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It," in *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947, pp. 86-109.
[13] London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967.
[14] Quoted in *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), April 5, 1968.

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ress".[15] He called for a "delevelling of incomes" and echoed Gladstone in speaking of "the harmfulness of egalitarianism." His "Action Program" made no bones about the party's intention "to do away with egalitarianism . . . and [make] the remuneration of people . . . depend upon the social importance and effectiveness of their work, upon the development of workers' initiative and upon the degree of responsibility and risk."

Thus the country was to be transformed from a "mediocracy," in which the members of the "new class" formed the social and economic élite, into a meritocracy, a hierarchy of status and income no longer determined only from above, by official evaluation of social worth, but also by the law of supply and demand. For in the "market-oriented socialist economy" of the Czech reformers' dreams, the planner at the top was to share his power with the consumer below. Indeed, were it not for the fact that the following passage of the Action Program is qualified elsewhere in that document, one would be forced to conclude that the consumer was to be king: "Democratization of the economy . . . will ensure . . . a full and real implementation of the right of the consumer to determine his consumption and his style of life." The Cohn-Bendits and Rudi Dutschkes, with their contempt for the "consumer society," would not have found Czechoslovakia's democratic socialism much to their taste. In spirit

[15] *Rude pravo*, May 30, 1968.

The Price of Egalitarianism:

"Wage-leveling" is a fundamental tenet of a broad working-class ideology that might be termed "anticapitalism." According to this tenet, an equalization of wages and salaries is essential to a just distribution of the national income. This demand for a single and equal wage for labor (without taking into account the purposes, quantity, complexity, and importance of the work performed) is as old as socialism itself, perhaps even older. In the history of socialism the ideas of equality and justice thus conceived have always reflected the interests of the poorest and least skilled classes. Under the Czechoslovak Communist regime, these classes had achieved their goal—a truly unique egalitarianism in the wage sector.

From time to time, party ideologists endeavored to reverse this egalitarian tendency, seeking to establish that, apart from social and human considerations, the criteria of economic value and efficiency also have their place in determining pay policy. Nevertheless, this notion had scant effect in practice, and egalitarian concepts were implemented in a way unparalleled in any country of the socialist camp.

Under Gottwald as well as under his successor, Novotny, the highest political bodies frequently yielded to pressure from below and allowed the normal criteria for work compensation to be swept aside. They acquiesced in the nullification of managerial authority, the market apparatus, and hence of any basis for economic calculation whatever; therefore, the system of wage leveling must be considered a consequence of the *dictatorship of the majority* (for contrary to conventional belief, the "anticapitalist" system that took root in the CSR after the war was not simply "imposed" by the Soviet Union; it had broad domestic working-class support.) Indeed, leveling did not remain merely an expression of anticapitalist ideology but gradually came to be construed as one of the fundamental attributes of socialism. To a majority of the people, it became a standard by which they could measure the progress of "socialization."

Wage-leveling eventually took on two principal forms: leveling between the professions and leveling within any given profession. As for the first, differences in pay for skilled and unskilled labor were virtually abolished. In 1965, for example, the average pay of workers, on the one hand, and engineers and technicians, on the other, was in the proportion of 100 to 135. At present, graduates of higher institutions must reach 50 years of age before their lifetime earnings match those of skilled workers; the lifetime earnings of graduates of intermediate institutions never reach this point of equilibrium. Within the professions, differences in pay, based on the quality of the work performed virtually disappear. Indeed, salaries and wages cease to be economically rational and became a sort of guaranteed social pension due anyone who held a job of one sort or another.

Both types of leveling—between and within professions—had catastrophic consequences:

- A loss of interest in pursuing occupations requiring many years of assiduous study, *i.e.*, any occupations which in modern industrial society are fundamental to economic prosperity.
- A failure to differentiate between good and poor performance, which reduced one's incentive to do good work. The only reasonable reaction to leveling is to exert only as much energy as necessary in a given situation in order to maintain a certain tacit collective standard that has been agreed upon informally. This standard naturally differs from job to job. But as a rule it is the work of the worst workers that sets this standard. The result is that the performance of most men is far inferior to what they are capable of doing, and this general lack of discipline necessarily vitiates managerial and government authority.

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as well as in its social structure, it would have been altogether too much like the more advanced societies of the West which they detest so heartily (an attitude, incidentally, that has earned them the derision of their Czech contemporaries; at a meeting of students of the philosophical faculty of Prague University, Dutschke's ideas were dismissed as "comical, absurd, not worthy of a 15-year-old").[16]

It is clear, therefore, that the new "democratic socialism," aiming at a social pyramid with the technocrats at the top, the skilled workers in the middle, and the unskilled at the bottom, would hardly have made a classless society. As Dr. Michael Young has pointed out in *The Rise of the Meritocracy*,[17] class antagonisms in such a structure are apt to be at least as sharp as in a society where man's place on the ladder is determined by blood or inherited wealth instead of by achievement. That is why the "clashes of view" welcomed by Dubcek were fraught with danger to the cohesion (the "false unity") of the party. The "delevelling" he announced could not but create a new proletariat filled with resentment against the new order. Its members would come from three different groups: unskilled workers seeing the wages of skilled labor

[16] Quoted by Melvin Lasky, in *Encounter*, August 1968.

[17] New York, Random House, 1959.

A Comment by a Czech Economist

• The disappearance of the profit motive as an elementary incentive to economic efficiency. This has had particularly dangerous social and psychological consequences. The impossibility of obtaining better compensation for better work leads to efforts to increase one's income by taking jobs—often illegally—in addition to one's regular work. Thus a minimum of energy is expended on one's regular job, with most of the conserved energy being channeled into moonlighting. This means, in turn, that an increasing segment of the country's labor force attempts to raise its income—in itself a time-consuming task—in a manner calculated not to multiply the country's social wealth, but merely to redistribute it—a situation that is as harmful as it is absurd. The profit motive, driven out the door, comes in, as it were, by the window—and in a far more egregious form. The result is nothing less than the demoralization and dehumanization of the entire society.

Another social, political, and psychological danger resulting from the formal abolition of the profit motive lies in the fact that ambitious men aspiring to a higher standard of living endeavor to attain a position in the political apparatus, because climbing the ladder in the hierarchy of power has its financial rewards. In Czechoslovakia, these rewards have generally not taken the form of higher wages *per se*, but of privileges whose actual scope the vast majority of the population has known very little about and whose valuation in monetary terms cannot always be determined. The political and hence material advancement of such men has by no means been dependent upon their intellectual or moral qualities but rather upon their submissiveness, lack of character, and absence of initiative. By encouraging mediocrity among subordinates, those in command have been able to strengthen their totalitarian hold on the entire system.

• A tragic and tremendous waste of the country's intellectual capacities. A young engineer, for example, is usually so occupied with the laborious and often debilitating necessity of securing the most elementary necessities of life that he simply has neither time nor energy to think about refresher courses in his field, much less take them. Under conditions of a semi-modern industrial system, of course, even a few years' delay in professional training is enough to jeopardize one's career. This holds true for young professionals of all kinds: teachers, doctors, and so on. The losses incurred are not only huge but also nonrecoverable; and they make themselves felt as much in the economic as in the moral and psychological spheres.

• A general state of resignation, passivity, greyness and mediocrity, relieved by one single emotion—that of envy. Before the "Spring of 1968," the willingness of workers to accept the very lowest wage, on condition that the wages of others were not increased, assumed truly fantastic dimensions. I know of no other country where envy of higher income has played such an important social and political role.

It is probably unnecessary to emphasize that those deriving the greatest advantages from this situation were the top bureaucrats. Not only because the true extent of their affluence was for long years hidden behind a facade of "low" nominal incomes, but because their living standards were in no way affected by long periods of economic stagnation. Ordinary citizens, and not they, had to tighten their belts. The "society of equals" had thus turned into the most grotesque parody of the despised "capitalist" system.

—Summarized from "Socialism or Anticapitalism?," by Vaclav Müller, L'Est (Milan), No. 1, 1969. (A former member of the Czechoslovak CP and one of the country's most brilliant young economists, Mr. Müller is presently associated with the Centro Studie Ricerche su Problemi Economico-Sociali in Milan, Italy.)

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going up; workers losing their jobs as uneconomic enterprises closed down or dismissed redundant labor in order to become more efficient; and finally all those members of the "New Class" displaced by the new meritocracy. To allow both the base of the pyramid and its upper regions full freedom of public debate would be to invite the breakup of the party into warring factions. Sooner or later its leaders would have had to choose between reverting to the enforcement of "false unity" or continuing the process of democratization, in effect resigning themselves to the end of the single-party state.

It was because the Western admirers of the Dubcek regime assumed that it would opt for the latter course that the new democratic socialism was hailed as the dawn of a new type of society which would powerfully attract many in the capitalist world as well as in the East. There was no indication, however, that the great majority of the supposed beneficiaries of the new order shared this optimism. They were profoundly thankful for the promise of democracy, but they saw little reason to accept uncritically the other part of the "package deal"—namely, the assurance that democratization would inevitably produce a new and splendidly workable "socialist" order. They had had twenty years to test the economic merits of socialism and had found them badly wanting. One of their own leaders, Professor Ota Sik, had admitted that "we are a long way behind even the poorer countries of Europe, such as Austria".[18] No wonder, therefore, that many Czechs, particularly the young, were deeply skeptical about the very concept of socialism—at any rate as they had known it. Dubcek himself had realized this when he said "we must try and win over the young".[19] I remember a talk I had in Prague last summer with a group of university students; when I asked them whether they were Communists, they hooted with derisive laughter. This did not necessarily mean, of course, that the young had decisively rejected the possibility of a "reformed" socialism, but this could not be ruled out. For if it is considered perfectly natural for the younger generation in the West to show signs of impatience with the existing order, why then should one expect anything different in a Communist country where the foremost spokesmen of the existing order had openly branded it a moral and material failure?

There are other more recondite reasons, too, for doubting that the new, reformed socialism, even if it were to prove both truly democratic and economically efficient, would be particularly successful in recapturing the hearts and minds of men. For the more successful the reformers' efforts to streamline the economy and the more they emphasize material incentives, profits, and income differentiation, the more socialism tends to lose the moral attraction deriving from its egalitarian ideals and its repudiation of "bourgeois" self-aggrandizement. It was Hugh Gaitskell, I believe, who said in a lapidary definition that "socialism is about equality." He may have shown himself a poor student of Marx, for the father of "scientific socialism" rejected "social levelling"—at any rate until the stage of communism had been reached—as did Lenin, in theory if not originally in practice. (Stalin, of course, rejected this concept both in theory and practice as detrimental to socialist production.[20]) But whatever the theoreticians may have said, for the man in the street it was the promise of equality that constituted the essential appeal of socialism. And what would remain of this appeal in the meritocratic hierarchy envisaged by the new "democratic socialism"?

Furthermore, what remains of the ideal of the noble, selfless "Soviet man" in a society which accepts "profit as the engine of social progress" and material incentives as indispensable to effort? What does such a society have left to boast of in the way of moral superiority? Perhaps that its citizens sacrifice themselves for posterity, while our "consumer society" lives and works only for the satisfaction of its selfish wants, its vulgar, trivial pleasures? But this difference, too, if such exists, must largely disappear under a truly democratic socialism, for a people that is its own master will hardly elect to sacrifice itself in order to build a utopia for the unborn.

Thus the moral appeal of democratic socialism is reduced to something largely negative: not the total absence of income differentials, not the absense of classes, but only the absence of great differences in wealth. Likewise its intellectual ap-

[18] Quoted in *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston).
[19] *Rude pravo*, May 30, 1968.
[20] See Stalin address of June 23, 1931 ("New Conditions, New Tasks in Economic Construction") in J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. XII, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955, pp. 58-59.

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peal is much diminished. The orthodox doctrine not only tempts the hearts of men with the promise of a moral paradise of equality, fraternity and selflessness; it also lures their minds with the offer of the intellectual paradise to be gained by all those who, by committing themselves to the creed, are thenceforth entitled to believe themselves the executants of the scientifically ascertained Will of History. While the Prague reformers did not go so far as to reject this part of the doctrine, some of them came quite close to it. Thus, for a man like Eugen Loebl, former director of the National Bank at Bratislava, who has suffered long years of imprisonment for his heresies, the intellectual appeal of socialism no longer lies in the certainty that it is predestined to "bury" capitalism, as Khrushchev thought. For him socialism is preferable only because it is presumably more capable of exploiting the wealth-creating function of science. And that, I am afraid, is pretty weak tea compared with "the opium for the intellectuals" which the orthodox doctrine has to offer. Add to this the implicit, if not explicit, revival of nationalism—as opposed to the orthodox idea of the disappearance of national boundaries and animosities—and one is entitled to wonder what, if anything, remains of the glamor and attraction of the socialist ideal.

Having inveighed at such length against the idealization of Czechoslovakia's Communist reformers, I should like to conclude with a tribute both to the audacity of their enterprise and to the superb courage and good sense of the overwhelmingly non-Communist Czechoslovak nation, which in its hour of truth and for its own purposes identified with them. By their joint efforts they have demonstrated to all the world that dedicated Communists *can* work towards a society which—though far from ideal—offers men a possibility to live and breathe freely. More, the Communist reformers showed themselves not only capable of making a clean break with their own past, but willing to set into motion evolutionary processes that might well have led to the emergence of a full-fledged social democracy. Within a matter of months—indeed weeks—the country's spirit and atmosphere, if not its institutions, changed so radically as to make it totally different from the societies of Novotny or of Ulbricht, with their relentless inculcation of class hatred, their false heroics, their horrendous pseudo-scientific jargon, their brazen lies, and their stifling tyranny over the minds of men. By the spring of 1968, not a trace of this poisonous atmosphere was left in Prague, where a visitor—like myself—could and did feel as much at home as in Scandinavia, England, or Uruguay.

Yet one year later, the valiant hopes and good intentions seem all but forgotten under the relentless pressure of Big Brother in Moscow, and the visitor to Prague—like myself—once again senses something of the old climate of apprehension, mistrust and suspicion, compounded this time by a corrosive feeling of disillusionment and despair. This is not the place for a thorough examination of why the "Spring of 1968" proved to be so tragically short-lived. Yet surely the debacle of Czechoslovakia's "brave new world" had something to do with its human and doctrinal inconsistencies as I have described them above. For the reasons indicated, Czechoslovakia's "democratic socialism" was not really so faultless and completely praiseworthy as to warrant seeing it as the promise of a New Jerusalem. Yet paradoxically, it was obviously too good to last, too close in its spirit to the ideals of freedom, democracy, and human dignity to remain tolerated by its "comrades" in the East.

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Budapest–1956
Prague–1968

I. Parallels and Contrasts

By Bela K. Kiraly

In 1956, Hungary presented the Soviet rulers with the first serious challenge to their hegemony in Eastern Europe; twelve years later, a similar crisis was precipitated by Czechoslovakia. In both cases the results were similar, albeit the actual course of events differed in several essential respects. The Soviet reaction to the Hungarian challenge was to crush it with fire and sword. In Czechoslovakia, bloodshed was averted by means of a massive police action, executed by the troops of the Warsaw Treaty powers, but initiated, led, and orchestrated by Moscow.

If the outcome of both crises was basically the same—that is, the reestablishment and reaffirmation of Moscow's control over Eastern Europe—so were their causes. In both Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the reform movements endeavored to amalgamate socialism with economic, political, social and cultural democracy, to "reintegrate communism into the civilized community." [1] To be sure, there were significant differences between the two. Whereas the Czechoslovak experiment was compressed into a relatively short span of time (January 3 to August 20, 1968), the Hungarian experiment, more than once interrupted by Soviet intervention, was a more protracted process which passed through three distinct stages:

1) Imre Nagy's "New Course" (July 4, 1953-March 9, 1955).

2) The continued ferment under Matyas Rakosi's neo-Stalinism (April 14, 1955-July 18, 1956).

3) The liberal upsurge under the equally dog-

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[1] Robert Conquest's view, as quoted by Edward Taborsky, "The New Era in Czechoslovakia," *East Europe* (New York), November 1968, p. 25.

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matic Ernö Gerö, culminating in Nagy's return to the premiership (July 18-October 24, 1956).

The revolutionary phase of the Hungarian events, from October 23 to 30, 1956, has no parallel in the Czechoslovak ferment, but the invasion of Czechoslovakia on the night of August 20/21, 1968, had much the same effect as the massive Soviet troop movement into Hungary on the night of October 30/31, 1956; in each case, the end of a reform movement was at hand. It is such contrasts and congruities that warrant evaluation.[2]

Origins and Programs

The Czechoslovak reformers drafted a single basic platform—the Action Program of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.[3] Completed as early as February 6, 1968, the program was approved by the Czechoslovak party on April 5 and by the semi-autonomous Slovak party on April 23 and 24.[4] Though it was bitterly opposed by diehard Stalinists, much of the program had been enacted by the National Assembly by the time of the invasion. Its main planks were freedom of speech, assembly, and organization; freedom of the press; freedom of movement inside the country and out; freedom of religion; protection of citizens' personal and property rights; complete rehabilitation of Communist and non-Communist victims of Stalinism; federalization of the Czech and Slovak lands and a guarantee of the "national life and . . . national identity of [Czechoslovakia's] Hungarians, Poles, Ukrainians, and Germans."

The Hungarian counterpart of Czechoslovakia's Action Program was contained in no single document but was incorporated in Imre Nagy's New Course and in a whole series of plans and programs that were adopted by a variety of social and professional organizations over a period of three-and-a-half years. The most outstanding of these plans were outlined in the "Dissertations" that Imre Nagy first presented to the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party in 1955 and again when he was expelled from the party in 1956.[5] The reformers' position was finally synthesized in the Sixteen-Point Program proclaimed by the university students on October 22, 1956.[6]

Neither the Czechoslovak nor the Hungarian movements would have occurred had it not been for two major outside influences. The first of these was Yugoslavia's example of an independent road to socialism. Tito's successful defiance of Stalin indicated that there was not only a theoretical alternative to the Soviet model, but a very real—and workable—one as well. The enormous influence that Tito's system exerted on Imre Nagy and Alexander Dubcek[7] and their followers cannot be overestimated. The Yugoslav example, however, was only an *ignis fatuus* for Hungary and Czechoslovakia, quite beyond the realm of reality. Belgrade had the inestimable advantage of having been drummed out of the socialist community by Moscow itself and so could scarcely be made subject to the doctrine of the "socialist commonwealth" by which Moscow has sought to justify its intervention in Czechoslovakia.

The other major factor that affected the course of events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia was the changes that had been taking place in the Soviet Union itself since the death of Stalin. The collective leadership that had succeeded Stalin's personal dictatorship in 1953 was rent by internecine feuding. These clashes of ideas and personalities absorbed much of the new leaders' energies, loosening direct control over the satellites and weakening totalitarian rule inside the country. The piecemeal changes within the Soviet Union finally affected the most

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[2] This study evaluates the two reform movements topically rather than chronologically, but for a clear understanding the chronology of the complex Hungarian movement is crucial. The reader is therefore referred to Dr. William Juhasz, *Hungarian Social Science Reader (1945-1963)*, New York, Aurora Editions, 1965, pp. 302-21.

[3] "The Action Program of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia," adopted at the Central Committee Plenum on April 5, 1968, in Paul Ello (ed.), *Czechoslovakia's Blueprint for "Freedom,"* Washington, DC, Acropolis Books, 1968, pp. 89-178.

[4] *CSSR: The Road to Democratic Socialism: Facts on Events from January to May 1968*, Prague, Pragopress Feature, 1968, pp. 93-95.

[5] English versions of the "Dissertations" appear in *Imre Nagy on Communism in Defense of the New Course*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1957.

[6] An English version of "The Sixteen Political, Economic and Ideological Points of the Resolution Adopted at the Plenary Meeting of the Building Industry Technological University" appears in *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary*, New York, United Nations General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 18/A/3592, 1957, p. 69.

[7] Alexander Dubcek seems to be idealistic, humane, fair and decent—a very attractive personality. His image, however, has grown out of proportion to his actual influence. He was not the leader of the liberals, but rather a middle-of-the-road moderate; nor did he pull the strings of events but rather was caught up in them. In the latter respect he behaved much as Imre Nagy did in November 1956, but for the sake of brevity the Czechoslovak liberal movement will be identified with his name.

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vulnerable of all the East European satellites: Hungary. At a meeting on June 27 and 28, 1953, the Hungarian party Central Committee condemned Matyas Rakosi's Stalinist regime and promulgated the "June Resolutions," which contained the elements of Imre Nagy's "New Course." On July 4, Nagy was installed as chairman of the Council of Ministers, and in an address to Parliament the same day he outlined his New Course in some detail. The peasants were no longer to be forcibly collectivized and did not have to remain in cooperatives if they did not wish to; more consumer goods were to be made available to the people; police terror was to be abolished.[8] This was no more than a modest beginning of a liberalization process that was to grow in size and intensity, but it had already put Hungary far in advance of all the other people's democracies (except Yugoslavia) as far as destalinization was concerned.

Nikita Khrushchev's address to the 20th Soviet Party Congress on February 25, 1956,[9] had an enormous impact as much in the Communist world as beyond. In the USSR, it precipitated a vigorous destalinization campaign in many areas of public life. Paradoxically (and significantly), however, the campaign was conducted by Stalinists, which meant that the erstwhile dictator was denounced only for his persecution of fellow-Stalinists, and that his ruthless suppression of Bolshevik critics and opponents such as Trotsky and Bukharin—not to speak of non-Communists—was passed over in silence. The bloodshed of two decades was blamed on one man in order to save the prestige of a party that was as criminally guilty as it now judged its leader to have been. Khrushchev launched an attack on the "cult of personality," but he failed to denounce totalitarianism itself. His epoch-making speech, and indeed the whole 20th Party Congress and its aftermath, were thus full of contradictions, but they did at least open the door to change.

Czechoslovakia's Action Program and Hungary's New Course fifteen years earlier were Eastern Europe's most radical reforms: the Hungarian movement was marked by its innovation and initiative, the Czechoslovak by its breadth and comprehensiveness. Where they differed was in their manner of implementation. The Action Program was launched by Dubcek and his associates after they had won key posts in the party and state. Nagy and his followers had to try to carry out their program with only the executive branch of government in their hands—the Stalinists remained firmly in control of the party. The Hungarian reform movement faced even greater difficulties after the fall of Nagy's government on April 14, 1955, which left both party and state under Stalinist sway until the outbreak of the revolution in October 1956.

The opposite was the case in Czechoslovakia. With the reformists well entrenched in the party organization, the Stalinists became more and more isolated, so that Dubcek's struggle was not so much with them but with outsiders. Week by week relations became more strained between the Dubcek regime and the party leaderships of East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union. The Yugoslavs, Rumanians, and Hungarians, by contrast, lent varying degrees of support to Dubcek's efforts.

Between 1953 and 1956 the Hungarian reformers had the support of Yugoslavia alone. Like the Czechoslovaks later, they were denounced by the Bulgarian, East German, and Polish parties. They were also condemned by Rumania and Czechoslovakia, where Stalinists were still in full control. Albania was still subservient to Moscow and joined in the chorus of censure. That Dubcek had the moral backing of many European Communist leaders while Imre Nagy had very little made a critical difference. The Czechoslovaks were buoyed up by the encouragement they received from abroad; its lack was a burden on the Hungarians.

National Fronts

Imre Nagy needed a platform from which the public at large could voice its views, support his New Course, and assist him in breaking the power of Matyas Rakosi and the Stalinist party apparatus. He chose the Patriotic People's Front [*Hazafias Nepfront*]—a coalition embracing the Communist party, the trade unions, and intellectual, social, and professional associations. Under Rakosi, the PPF had been no more than a docile appendage of the Hungarian Workers' Party, a "transmission belt" for conveying the party's policies to the masses; Nagy reorganized and converted it into a more genuinely representative organ of political action.

[8] An interesting account of Soviet destalinization and its repercussions in Hungary appears in Paul Kecskemeti, "Limits and Problems of Decompression: The Case of Hungary," *The Annals* (Philadelphia), May 1958: excerpts are reprinted in Imre Kovacs (ed.), *Facts about Hungary: The Fight for Freedom*, New York, The Hungarian Committee, 1966, pp. 67-78.

[9] "Secret Speech of Khrushchev Concerning the 'Cult of the Individual' Delivered at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," in Russian Institute of Columbia University (eds.), *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1957.

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On October 29, 1954, the Front's Statutory Congress passed a resolution expressing the determination of its leaders and members to have a voice in national policymaking, to support Nagy's program, and to make its influence felt in all spheres of activity.[10] The New Course's liberalizing and humanizing tendency had thus found expression in a mass organization that had been reformed in a spirit of pluralism and participation.

Alexander Dubcek, overseeing his reform program from a strong position within the party, had no major center of Stalinist power to combat; rather, his primary concern was to forestall the resurgence of Stalinism. He took two major steps to secure this aim. First he reorganized the National Front—more or less as Imre Nagy had done. Unlike Nagy, however, he also tolerated a renaissance of political pluralism that verged on a multiparty system. In fact, on May 4, 1968, *Rude pravo*, the Czechoslovak CP daily, invited party organizations to discuss "arguments in favor of a multiparty system."

Two parties were already coming back to life. On March 15, *Lidova demokracie*, the People's (Christian Democratic) Party daily, had called for a separation of state functions from those of the Communist Party. Eight days after *Lidova demokracie's* appeal, the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Socialist party (which hitherto had led a similarly putative existence) urged that non-Communist Party members should be allowed to play key political roles in the country. The Socialist Party wanted to join with the National Front in "formulating the development of the whole of political life at the present important stage in the interest of democratic socialism." [11]

On March 28 the People's and Socialist Parties endorsed Ludvik Svoboda as their candidate for the presidency.[12] On April 4, the Socialist Party proposed overhauling the government so as to reflect the broad base of the National Front.[13] On April 11, it publicly announced its ideological stand: "The Czechoslovak Socialist Party is a non-Marxist socialist party that regards the individual citizen as the foundation of the socialist system, regards humanism, democracy, and personal freedom as the basis of Czechoslovak socialism, and considers the main aim of economic life to be the satisfaction of the interests and needs of the individual." [14] The People's Party published its platform on May 22: "The Czechoslovak People's Party is an independent democratic party professing the Christian world outlook. It regards the present state as pluralistic socialism." [15] The response to these developments was impressive; within a few weeks, the membership of both the Socialist Party and the People's Party showed sharp gains, judging from scattered reports in the provincial press.

The Hungarian students' Sixteen-Point Program also advocated a multiparty system: "We demand general elections in this country with universal suffrage, secret ballots, and the participation of several parties to elect a new Parliament." [16] Imre Nagy, however, opposed the proposal as an open invitation to Soviet reprisal. Ironically, a multiparty system was not revived in Hungary until after the Soviet Union's bloody intervention, which followed upon the failure of Nagy and his associates to maintain political control when operating within the framework of the Communist party alone.

The main difference between Dubcek's and Nagy's use of extraparty organizations was that Nagy prodded the Patriotic People's Front back to life in an effort to induce the Communist Party itself to join the reform movement. Dubcek, on the other hand, restored power to the National Front and tolerated the revival of a multiparty system after the Communist Party was already in the hands of the reformers.

The tactics of both Nagy and Dubcek were extremely hazardous departures from the Soviet model. To Moscow and its closest allies, one of the most sacred Leninist tenets is that which proclaims the leading role of the party.[17] In the Soviet Union, every change permitted by Khrushchev and his successors has taken place under strict party control. The reforms sought by Imre Nagy and Alexander Dubcek were opposed by the Kremlin precisely because they undermined the party's monolithic authority. Today, in the case of Hungary, the Soviet leadership condones Kadar's extensive re-

[10] *Szabad Nep* (Budapest) [official organ of the Hungarian Workers' Party], Oct. 27, 1954; English version in Juhasz, *op. cit.*, p. 176.
[11] *CSSR: The Road to Democratic Socialism . . .*, p. 26.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 27.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 32.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 40.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 51.
[16] *Report to the Special Committee . . .*, p. 69.
[17] The change most angrily denounced by the East Germans was the loosening of party control in Czechoslovakia. Walter Ulbricht feared the possibility of a chain reaction that would affect the German Democratic Republic. See "The Continuous Escalation of Antisocialist and Counterrevolutionary Developments in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic," *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Aug. 25, 1968.

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forms because they have not tended to vitiate the power of the party. In Rumania, Ceausescu's firm insistence on party primacy enables him to pursue a relatively independent diplomatic line, a privilege that was not accorded to Dubcek's pluralistic Czechoslovakia. The reasons are not hard to fathom: any tendency towards pluralism—that is, the existence of genuine political choice—erodes the very basis of Soviet totalitarianism, within both the USSR and the East European bloc, and poses a dire threat to the hegemony of its rulers.

Mass Organizations and Social Groups

In both Hungary and Czechoslovakia the intellectuals and the youth came out early as the vanguard of the reform movement, and in each case the workers joined in more gradually. In Czechoslovakia, apart from the numerous resolutions, manifestos, and declarations issued by factory groups, trade-union locals, and other labor organizations, the most dramatic act on the part of the workers was to screen from foreign observation the Extraordinary Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia held at the CKD plant in the Prague suburb of Vysocany on August 22, 1968. "When the session opened," states the official account of the Historical Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, "almost a thousand comrades—more than the majority of the delegates duly elected by city and regional party conferences—were present." [18] To accommodate, let alone to conceal, such a huge gathering was an act of courage of a very high degree. In a time of crisis, the workers of Prague sheltered the most democratically elected congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party held since the end of World War II, and so demonstrated their support for the reformers.

Similarly, the Hungarian workers not only joined forces with the intellectuals and youth but also, after the Soviet Union's second intervention, took over the leadership of the revolution, putting up the stiffest resistance and launching nationwide strikes. Mass arrests of labor leaders followed; the privileges of the Workers' Councils were suspended; and Kadar went on negotiating with strike leaders until the middle of November. When these efforts came to naught, the Workers' Councils were abolished by government decree on November 21, and the same fate befell all the Revolutionary Committees and other social groups on December 4, 1956. Despite the government's actions, however, the Workers' Councils continued to function and on December 6 staged a mass protest against the repressive measures of the Soviet occupation forces. The protest grew in magnitude and intensity, and on December 9 martial law was declared. The workers responded by calling a general strike on December 12, bringing the whole economy and all communications to a halt.[19] Such total involvement of the working class in opposition to one-party rule has no parallel in Communist history.

In Hungary and Czechoslovakia the youth and the intelligentsia played almost identical roles. The writers' unions and their newspapers, *Irodalmi Ujsag* in Hungary and *Literarni listy* in Czechoslovakia, particularly distinguished themselves. Furthermore, in both countries new professional and social organizations emerged and made their presence felt in the political arena. These included, in Czechoslovakia, KAN (the Club of Involved Nonpartisans), Club 231 (composed of persons persecuted under the notorious Article 231 of the Act for the Protection of the Republic), the Circle of Independent Writers, and the Revolutionary Trade-Union Movement (hitherto no more than an obedient party appendage).[20] The most important organization to emerge in Hungary was the Petöfi Circle, which gradually supplanted the Writers' Union in the vanguard of the struggle against the Stalinist party leadership.

Apart from the trade unions, all the leading liberal organizations in Czechoslovakia were created by popular initiative rather than by the party, and as such constituted a direct challenge to the party's supremacy. In the eyes of the doctrinaire Soviet, Polish, and East German regimes, the formation of these groups was as serious a departure from orthodoxy as was the trend toward a multiparty system, and they were therefore vitriolically denounced. The Petöfi Circle, on the other hand, was set up with the approval of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party on March 17, 1956, as a debating club within DISz (Young Workers' Federation). The Stalinists expected it to function as a safety valve that would help relieve tension, but such was hardly the case. Students,

[18] Robert Littel (ed.), *The Czech Black Book* (prepared by the Institute of History of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences), New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1969, p. 79.

[19] Juhasz, *op. cit.*, p. 327 and related documents pp. 222-26.

[20] Taborsky, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

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writers, scientists, and party members who took part in its meetings heaped invective on the Rakosi regime for its crimes, blunders, and shortcomings.[21]

Much the same ferment developed among Czechoslovak intellectuals during the months leading up to the Prague "spring." At the Fourth Congress of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union in June 1967, the literary community rushed to the forefront of the reform movement, just as its Hungarian counterpart had done in 1954-1956. One delegate to the Congress decried 20 years of Communist rule as Czechoslovakia's "second period of darkness" (the first being the centuries of Hapsburg rule.)[22] Like Rakosi in 1956, the Czechoslovak Stalinists retaliated, expelling leading intellectuals from the party and turning *Literarni listy* into a pliant organ of the Ministry of Culture.[23] The students in both countries also reacted in a similar fashion. The student demonstrations that erupted in Prague during October and November 1967 had their counterparts eleven years earlier in Budapest, where on October 23, 1956, the students came out into the streets in support of freedom, democracy and truth.[24]

The Climax of the Reform Movements

The peak of the Hungarian reform movement before the outbreak of armed violence was the Petöfi Circle's meeting on June 27, 1956. The climax of the Czechoslovak movement was the publication of two articles: the "Two Thousand Words" on June 27, 1968, and a memorial to Imre Nagy on June 13, 1968, the tenth anniversary of his execution.

The Petöfi Circle met in the assembly hall of the Officers' Club of the People's Army, one of the largest auditoriums in Budapest. Hundreds of people jammed the hall while thousands more filled the streets outside, listening to the speeches over loudspeakers. During the meeting, writers and journalists denounced the Stalinist censorship, the personal failings of the country's leadership, and the structural shortcomings of the party. Such popular writers as Tibor Dery and Tibor Tardos were given standing ovations, and when Geza Losonczy—a high-ranking political leader—condemned the party's delay in readmitting Imre Nagy, there was prolonged cheering from the crowds inside and outside the hall. It was 4 a.m. before the meeting finally broke up.

Two days later Poland was convulsed by the Poznan riots. Rakosi, throughly alarmed by the rising tide of discontent in Hungary and hoping that the Poznan explosion would convince the Kremlin that it should hurry to his aid, began a last-ditch effort to curb the liberal forces—an effort that ended with his downfall on July 18, 1956. He was succeeded by another Stalinist, Ernö Gerö, who pursued the same doctrinaire line and likewise failed to silence the liberals. The tragedy of 1953 was repeated. The public supported Imre Nagy and endorsed the demands that emanated from the Petöfi Circle, but Nagy and his followers were out of office. Once again, the reform movement had to work against the power of party and state. This conflict generated enormous tension in the country and stirred up resentment against the Soviet Union, which backed the Stalinists to the hilt, leading directly to the crisis of October 23, 1956, and the subsequent fighting and bloodshed.

In Czechoslovakia, the diehard reactionary elements had already been largely defeated by the spring of 1968, so that a confrontation between them and the liberals, along Hungarian lines, was no longer possible. To be sure, there were differences between the middle-of-the-road reformers who were in charge of the government and the more radical elements within the intelligentsia, labor unions, and the student youth, but these were differences of degree rather than principle, and they were devoid of the bitter hostility characterizing the relations between the reformers and liberals in Hungary 12 years earlier. The "Two Thousand Words," written by novelist Ludvik Vaculik and signed by 70 intellectuals and a few workers, was published by *Literarni listy* and three other Czechoslovak newspapers. Essentially a call for nonviolent mass efforts to accelerate and consummate the evolution towards democracy, it openly warned against attacks on Dubcek, aiming its thrust at the conservative party elements still entrenched in the mass media and in various sectors of public life.[25] The article on Imre Nagy, written by Oswald Machatka and appearing in *Literarni listy* on June 13, a fortnight before the publication of the "Two

[21] Ferenc A. Vali, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism versus Communism*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1961, p. 220.
[22] Taborsky, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
[23] *Ibid.*
[24] Vali, *op. cit.*, p. 231.
[25] For excerpts, see *Problems of Communism*, November-December, 1968, pp. 12-13.

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Thousand Words," praised the Hungarian leader for attempting to emulate the Yugoslav system, and described him as a "forceful proponent of democratic and national socialism" who "as early as in 1955 . . . expressed the view, so *à propos* in our country today, that the leading role of the party cannot be sacrosanct but must at all times be checked against actual social conditions." Neither of these two articles, then, challenged the basic character and motivations of the Dubcek regime, and it was rather to appease the Soviet Union than out of real dismay that the Czechoslovak party's Central Committee censured the publication of both. Significantly, neither their authors nor their publishers suffered reprisals.

Soviet Armed Aggression

The peaceful demonstration that took place in Budapest on October 23, 1956, was similar in its mood and its demands to many of those held in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968. But while the Czechoslovak demonstrators were shown tolerance and understanding by the Dubcek regime, the Stalinist government in Hungary regarded the demonstrators in Budapest as outright enemies and therefore met them not with understanding but with a hail of bullets from the Soviet-directed secret police at the Radio Budapest building. Six hours later, Soviet tanks were rumbling through the streets of the capital and the "Battle of Budapest" had begun. For five days, until the Soviet-Hungarian armistice of October 28, the battle raged. The Hungarian reform movement became a bloodbath, not by any wish of the reformers but solely as a result of Soviet ruthlessness that was encouraged by local Stalinists.

The immediate causes of the second Soviet intervention are not yet altogether clear. We know that inside the Soviet leadership itself there were powerful factions for and against renewed intervention in Hungary. Even Khrushchev admitted this in his Budapest speech of December 2, 1959, when he remarked that some of the Soviet leaders had been opposed to giving "new help" to Hungary, that is, to further forceful measures.[26] The combination of changing Yugoslav and Chinese attitudes, the Suez crisis, and pressure from the Soviet military establishment,[27] however, may have impelled Moscow to reassert full control over Hungary. In other words, there were objective forces both in the world situation and within the Soviet Union encouraging the Kremlin to take the steps it did. Nor can it be denied that the situation in Hungary, where demands for reform were becoming progressively more radical, facilitated Soviet intervention. But these demands became more radical precisely because of the threat of renewed Soviet military measures—a threat which was heightened by the fact that Soviet troops had repeatedly postponed their withdrawal from Budapest after the armistice of October 28.

Indeed, postponements and delays underlay much of the tragic outcome of the entire revolution. Imre Nagy's inclusion in the party and government on October 22 would have prevented the students from demonstrating on October 23. An armistice concluded by a Communist party government led by Imre Nagy, even if Hungary's membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization had continued, would have satisfied the public on October 25 or 26, but it was tragically too late on October 28. A multiparty government not committed to neutrality would have been acceptable on October 28, but it was far too late when Anastas Mikoyan consented to it on his visit to Budapest on October 30 and 31. According to the testimony of the only man in the West who was present during all phases of the negotiations, Deputy Foreign Minister Gyorgy Heltay,[28] Nagy and Zoltan Tildy brought up the question of neutrality with Mikoyan not as a nonnegotiable demand but only as a tentative suggestion. Even so, if Nagy had tried to dissuade his nation from demanding neutrality, October 31 was too late a date to make such an effort. Within a few days, after all, Hungary was to renounce its membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization—an act that was bound to bring the Soviet Army into Hungary.

Yet the fact is that the second Soviet intervention, contrary to general belief, did not begin only on November 4, nor did it flow from the declaration of Hungary's neutrality. Neutrality, in fact, was proclaimed *in response to* the second intervention, which had already begun with a massive movement of Soviet troops from the USSR into Hungary on

[26] *The New York Times*, Dec. 3, 1959.

[27] For an analysis of the Soviet military leadership's possible role in the interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, see Bela K. Kiraly, "Why the Soviets Need the Warsaw Pact," *East Europe*, April 1969, pp. 8-17.

[28] Heltay's personal account given to Vali. See Vali, *op. cit.*, p. 555, fn. 5.

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the night of October 30-31. As they advanced on the capital, Nagy appealed to Moscow to bring them to a halt. His appeal fell on deaf ears. So did a Hungarian Cabinet plea to the United Nations. By November 1, Soviet troops had fanned out over the country, occupying all airfields and surrounding Budapest. The invader was in a position to strike as early as November 1 or 2. Only at the eleventh hour, when all peaceful diplomatic initiatives had failed, did Nagy play his last card. On November 1, he proclaimed his country's neutrality in the forlorn hope that such a dramatic gesture might avert the second shooting phase of the Soviet Union's intrusion. Nagy's move failed to avert renewed bloodshed, but it did succeed in heightening the worldwide furor over Moscow's action.

The Role of the Warsaw Pact

In 1956, it was the Soviet Army alone that invaded the territory of one of its "fraternal allies." The invasion of Czechoslovakia twelve years later was carried out jointly with most of Moscow's military allies—in the case of Hungary, incidentally, to the great reluctance of its leadership, and no doubt against the will of the Hungarian people as a whole.[29] The developments over the past twelve years have thus clearly revealed the essential function of the Warsaw Pact forces: that of a vast police force deployed to safeguard the power of an imperial regime. Though the loyalty of these forces to Moscow is indeed highly questionable, the Soviet Union has demonstrated its readiness to use them whenever either of the two pillars of the "socialist commonwealth" is threatened—the "leading role of the party" and membership in the Warsaw Pact.

By Soviet standards, both Czechoslovakia and Hungary violated these fundamental club rules. In reprisal, much blood was spilt in Hungary; in Czechoslovakia, a bloodbath was avoided. The milder treatment in the latter case, however, does not alter the nature of the acts: both were instances of calculated, cynical, and clearly unjustified aggression.

The Soviet Union's effort to justify its action by invoking the specter of "counterrevolution"—*i.e.*, a radical right-wing threat—was patently specious. It was particularly absurd in reference to Czechoslovakia, whose democratic traditions—despite 20 years of totalitarianism—proved remarkably resilient not only within the country at large, but even within the Communist Party itself. The developments of the winter and spring of 1968 clearly demonstrated that the party, having undergone a moral and political transformation, remained in full control, and in fact succeeded in winning the trust of the population. Even in the event of the emergence of a multiparty system, the Czechoslovak party stood a good chance of remaining the dominant political force in the country. In sharp contrast, when a multiparty system was taking shape in Hungary, the Hungarian Communist Party was in a state of total disarray and collapse. Its disintegration culminated on November 1, 1956, in its self-dissolution and the creation of a rump Communist Party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. In 1968, however, the Soviet Union demonstrated its utter rejection of the possibility of any form of political pluralism, including a modified multiparty system in which the Communist Party would play a strong and vital, yet not totalitarian role. How much more intolerable the situation in Hungary in 1956 must have seemed to Moscow! This was certainly one of the major reasons for intervention and the subsequent reign of terror.

Yet time has proved sheer terror to be no longer a feasible—and indeed, from the point of view of the Kremlin and its allies, desirable—method of rule. In 1959, less than three years after the bloody suppression of the Hungarian revolution, the Kadar regime relaxed its iron grip over the country and launched—at first cautiously, but in time more boldly and extensively—a program of liberal reforms. Today's Hungary is not the country that the vast majority of its citizens had envisioned and fought for in 1956. But neither is it a country ruled by fatuous, narrow-minded, and ruthless Stalinist satraps *à la* Rakosi or Gerö—or, indeed, *à la* Kadar *circa* 1957-1959. Similarly in Czechoslovakia, the reform movement has suffered a severe and demoralizing setback, yet it is virtually certain that the era of Gottwald and Novotny is gone forever, and that, however qualified and limited, the democratic and liberal trends released in the year

[29] There is convincing evidence from both official Czechoslovak and Hungarian sources of Kadar's attempts to moderate the conflict between the Czechoslovak party and the CPSU—attempts stemming, no doubt, from his concern lest the defeat of Dubček precipitate the end of his own relatively liberal regime. In addition, Kadar was clearly cognizant of the profound connection and similarities between the events of 1956 and those of 1968. The behavior of Hungarian troops in Czechoslovakia, as well as the testimony of many visitors to Hungary during the months of August and September 1968, attested to the sense of shame felt by the ordinary Hungarian about the role his country was forced to play in the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

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1968 will continue to assert themselves henceforth.

But Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968 also demonstrate another lesson—namely, that Moscow remains determined to preserve the essentials of one-party rule, and to keep the East European bloc under its control—by whatever means may be necessary. It is the continuing conflict between these two forces—the indigenous pressures for internal liberalization and national independence, and the dogged determination of the Soviet rulers to preserve the status quo—that will shape the destiny of Eastern Europe in the years ahead.

II. Spokesmen of Revolution

By Tamas Aczel

When the Hungarian revolution erupted in late October 1956, the Czechoslovak Communist Party was among the first to condemn it. On November 3, just one day before the Soviet attack, Czechoslovak President Antonin Zapotocky publicly denounced the "counterrevolution [which] has been raging [in Hungary] for the past few days." As if anticipating the repressive line which only three months later would be officially espoused by the Kadar government, he decried the "Fascist white terror . . . the murder of thousands of workers and common people, the Hungarian reaction [which] hand in hand with Western imperialism is carrying out a plan, prepared long ago, directed not only against the Hungarian regime but ultimately against all socialist countries."[1] The plan, according to Zapotocky, called for the return of the "large landowners and capitalists," as well as of the "old bankrupt political parties." Two days later, *Rude pravo* declared:

It goes without saying that the Hungarian workers deeply appreciate the Soviet government's help in quelling the counterrevolution. Its assistance is equally appreciated by the Czechoslovak people, the other friendly countries, and all honorable men throughout the world.[2]

It was not until twelve years later, when Soviet tanks rolled into the streets of Prague, that the bitter irony of these words became fully apparent. The "appreciation" of the Czechoslovak people turned into outraged protest; and it was *Rude pravo* itself which forcefully announced that "under no conditions" would the party and the nation as a whole "accept the presence of foreign troops on our soil.[3] As for the Czechoslovak intellectual community, its stand was bluntly expressed by *Literarni listy*, the organ of the Writers' Union:

A teacher of creative writing and modern European literature at the University of Massachusetts (Amherst), Mr. Aczel was awarded the Kossuth and Stalin Prizes for literature in his native Hungary, from which he fled in 1956. His publications in English include Revolt of the Mind *(with Tibor Meray), New York, Praeger, 1959. An anthology of underground Russian poetry (with Laszlo Tikos and Joseph Langland) is in progress.*

[1] Radio Prague, Nov. 3, 1956.
[2] *Rude pravo* (Prague), Nov. 5, 1956.
[3] *Ibid.*, Aug. 30, 1968.

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The dilemma over the Soviet Union's role—whether it is to be apostle or policeman of the socialist world—has finally been resolved: the USSR has returned to the trusted Russian tradition of Cossack diplomacy.[4]

The fact that both *Rude pravo* and *Literarni listy* reacted so vigorously to the invasion was significant; for it testified to the profound moral awakening of an *entire* nation. Yet there is no doubt that—just as in the case of Hungary twelve years earlier—it was the intellectuals who played the major role in this process. Curiously, in the days when the Hungarian people fought against the invader, the Czechoslovak intellectuals had remained silent and detached. Not only did many Poles, who were themselves in the throes of a moral and political transformation, openly support the aims of the Hungarian revolution, but even a number of Russian intellectuals managed to send encouraging messages through sundry Hungarian intermediaries, such as students, tourists, or delegates returning from the USSR. I remember how moved I was upon receiving a message hastily scribbled on the back of a matchbox by my friend, the late Emmanuel Kazakevich, a distinguished Leningrad novelist and Stalin Prize winner. It read: "If you win your battle in Hungary, perhaps we in the Soviet Union will win our war."

Given the Stalinist terror which still gripped the Czechoslovak people in 1956, the silence and passivity of the intellectuals are easy to understand —and forgive. In any case, later developments proved this silence to be but a lull before the storm. When, twelve years later, the Czechoslovak movement gained momentum, its scope and intensity proved to be at least as great, if not greater, than the Hungarian.

In 1956, Czechoslovakia offered sanctuary only to fleeing Hungarian party functionaries (in that beautiful baroque city, Pozsony-Bratislava, where the 18th-century Hungarian nobility pledge *vitam et sanguinem* to the Empress Maria Theresa). But by 1968, it unmistakably understood its obligations to persecuted intellectuals. Thus—to cite one example out of many—in April 1968, in the wake of the antisemitic and anti-intellectual purge in Poland, the philosopher Karel Kosik declared:

In keeping with the principles of human solidarity, the philosophical faculty of Charles University should invite the persecuted Polish thinkers [Bronislaw Baczko and Leszek Kolakowszki, recently dismissed from the University of Warsaw] to come to Prague, where they may work and propagate progressive socialist ideas.[5]

The significance of this offer lay not in its (dubious) feasibility, but in its recognition of Czechoslovakia as the center for "progressive socialist ideas" and a leading force for moral rebirth.

It was this sense of moral rebirth which inspired both the Hungarian and the Czechoslovak reform movements, and which was primarily responsible for the articulation of specific demands for personal and political freedom. The intellectuals of the two countries aroused the interest and admiration of the world. By generating an atmosphere of political involvement, they captured their peoples' imagination and reactivated latent national energies.

Yet this emphasis on moral renewal does not mean that the two movements ignored their countries' very real economic difficulties. As far back as 1953, Hungarian intellectuals protested their workers' and peasants' low standard of living. And in 1968 a Czechoslovak characterized his country, once among the most highly industrialized in Europe, as a place where "millions have forgotten how to work, agriculture has been ruined, [where] countless useless industries are tied to Russia, [and] prewar plants are all run down."[6] A deep awareness of these economic weaknesses lent a greater urgency to the intellectuals' quest for change. Yet neither the Czechoslovaks nor the Hungarians based their protests on classical Marxist economic arguments. Even when the problem of Soviet economic exploitation was publicly aired, as it was in both countries in the case of uranium ore, the emphasis was clearly on the moral rather than the economic (or even political) aspects of the issue. I remember the words of Professor Lajos Janois, at a meeting of the Petöfi Circle in Budapest on June 27, 1956: "Recently, when we went to Moscow to confer with our Soviet colleagues, it turned out they knew considerably more about Hungarian uranium fields than we did . . . . This is a morally indefensible situation." This statement was repeated almost verbatim in Czechoslovakia some twelve years later: "I consider the whole uranium situation—the secrecy and the political atmosphere surrounding it—highly immoral and politically harmful."[7]

[4] *Literarni listy* (Prague), Aug. 29, 1968.

[5] *Ibid.*, April 4, 1968.

[6] Quoted by Anatole Shub, "Moscow to Prague," *Encounter* (London), July 1968, p. 88.

[7] V. Pekarek, "Uranium—Our Source of Wealth," *Svoboda* (Prague), April 21, 1968.

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The intellectual community's preoccupation with moral questions was hardly accidental. In both countries the men who spearheaded the reform movement were members of the ruling "new class," many of whom recognized their personal complicity in the "crimes of the past." As the Hungarian novelist Tibor Dery wrote:

During the last ten years our country has been pulled inch by inch out from under our feet. We thought we were going to build socialism; instead, they put us behind prison walls built of blood and lies. I myself feel responsible, because my eyes were opened late, and when they were, I found that neither my voice nor my silence were eloquent enough to communicate to all.[8]

In Czechoslovakia, Ludvik Vaculik put it even more forcefully:

The Communist Party betrayed the trust that the people placed in it after the war. It preferred the glories of office until it was left with nothing else. Both Communists and non-Communists have been disappointed. . . . We are all responsible for the present situation, although the Communists bear the largest burden.[9]

Disillusioned, sharing a deep sense of guilt, both Czechoslovak and Hungarian intellectuals courageously turned to the future. Their first task was to clarify the distinction between the truth of the party and what a Czechoslovak philosopher labeled "the fundamental truth." A man who was once editor of *Szabad nep*, the Hungarian party's pre-1956 daily, and who was later executed, admitted:

We have been told there are two kinds of truth, that the truth of the party can be more important than objective truth. We have been taught that the truth and political expediency are, in fact, identical. . . .

If there is a truth of a higher order than objective truth, if the single criterion of truth is political expediency, then even a lie can be "true," for even a lie can be momentarily expedient. This is a terrible thought, yet its importance must be squarely faced.[10]

Less than 12 years later, this truth was "squarely faced" by a Czechoslovak philosopher:

Next to the public reason that tells me to believe I have only one eye though I know I have two, the voice of conscience is but a private interest endowed with a small, negligible authority. Since I am presented with a conflict between two opposing authorities—one large and one small—I can unhesitatingly suppress the voice of my conscience. [However], a man who has lost his reason through calculations of personal gain has neither reason nor conscience left. Such a man has lost everything and won nothing. If we remember that the word "nihilism" comes from "nothing," then a man without reason or conscience is a true nihilist.[11]

This was the essential difference between the new and the old morality. The allusion to contemporary nihilists was aimed at the *apparatchiki*—the bungling, incompetent and corrupt officials who had caused the party's disintegration. The chasm between the party functionaries—for whom reforms were only a matter of expediency—and the Communist intellectuals, who had dedicated themselves to the total transformation of society, had always been there; now it emerged fully into the open. Indeed, the Communist party bureaucracy became the principal object of the intellectuals' wrath and indignation.

Consider the portrait of a typical party bureaucrat, as depicted by the Hungarian writer Gyula Hay in his famous satirical essay, "Why I Dislike Comrade Kucsera":

Kucsera is an upstart, and all *parvenus*, like the *nouveaux riches* who give themselves airs because of their newly acquired wealth, are repulsive. I doubt whether history has ever known a comparable flourishing of *parvenus* like the Kucseras. . . . Kucsera, with his salary, car, apartment, private shops and rest houses, each day grows more and more alienated from the people, from the party. . . . The other reason I dislike Comrade Kucsera is his dilettantism. Kucsera knows nothing and meddles in everything on the executive level. . . .[12]

Twelve years later we see again these *parvenus*, this time, however, in a state of panic:

Dictators become ultra democrats, arrogant functionaries become philanthropists, cruel cadre officers turn into socialist Samaritans, and unsuccessful geniuses become prophets. Even those who have never felt the slightest sympathy with this nation, the vengeful sheriffs of the screening commissions, the inquisitors, the bloody prosecutors are in a hurry to be "in" on the process of regeneration. . . . The political relief in our society is reminiscent of a freshly ploughed field. It is time to begin sowing—and weeding.[13]

The *apparatchik*'s moral and political weaknesses had been mercilessly exposed by Gyula Hay:

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[8] Tibor Dery, "A Letter to my Friends," *Irodalmi ujsag* (Budapest), Nov. 2, 1956.

[9] *Literarni listy*, Jan. 1, 1968.

[10] Miklos Gimes, "Two Truths," *Beke es szabadsag* (Budapest), Oct. 3, 1956.

[11] Karel Kosik in *Literarni listy*, Jan. 1, 1968.

[12] Gyula Hay, "Why I Dislike Comrade Kucsera," *Irodalmi ujsag*, Oct. 6, 1956.

[13] V. Ferko, "Spring 1968 and Its Fashions," *Predvoj* (Prague), March 28, 1968.

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Lies are not lies for Kucsera, murder is not murder, justice is not justice, and man is not man. Kucsera preaches "socialism" and means a system which, hindering socialist progress, keeps *him* going. He preaches "unity" and applies it to himself and a few others. . . . He preaches "democracy" and means his own hegemony. He preaches "production" and refers to that barren round-and-round movement that ensures his existence. . . .[14]

Similarly Ludvik Vaculik, charging that "no human problems have been solved in our country for twenty years," lashed out against the party functionaries for not understanding that

. . . freedom exists only where people do not need to speak of it. The *apparatchiki* wish people wouldn't complain about what they see, [but] instead of changing what people see [they] are trying to change people's eyes. [In the meantime] we are losing the only ideal that is truly valuable: the dream of a government identical with the citizen, of a citizen who governs himself. Is this dream realizable? [15]

The question asked by Vaculik reached into the very essence of the problem that animated both the Hungarian and the Czechoslovak intellectuals. For in leading the revolt against Stalinist bureauc-

[14] Hay, *loc. cit.*

[15] From the speech by Ludvik Vaculik to the Fourth Congress of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union in Prague (June 27-29), published in *East Europe* (New York), September 1967.

Politicians and Writers

The party's preoccupation with writers and intellectuals concealed behind a mask of paternal solicitude a fundamental fear and contempt for them. Ostensibly, the party leaders considered it their sacred duty "to keep an eye" on the intellectuals and "protect" them, like children, lest they fall and bump their heads. In reality, what prompted the leaders' concern was a keen awareness of the traditional role of writers and intellectuals in Eastern Europe as implacable enemies of tyranny. Hence they were always ready to bribe them if possible, to blackmail them if necessary, or to isolate them if that appeared to be the only way to silence them.

Bribery and blackmail were naturally their sharpest weapon. I remember an occasion in 1955 when Rakosi summoned me to his office. It was just after a long and stormy Politburo session at which it had become apparent that blackmail and intimidation had failed, and that the split between the writers and the party leaders was open and irrevocable. I stood there before his desk, filled with foreboding. He looked old, exhausted, unable to comprehend what had happened. After a brief pause, he began shouting at me. "What do you want? Tell me, what the hell do you want? Haven't we given you everything? The Kossuth Prize, the Stalin Prize. . . . What else do you want? Tell me!" It was clear that if I had said I wanted a new apartment or a new car, my wish would immediately have been granted.

These tactics, of course, were not unique to Rakosi. In Czechoslovakia, Novotny applied the same pressures, feeling the same way about intellectuals in general and writers in particular. "The writer should be held in the palm of one's hand like a sparrow," Novotny reportedly said to Eduard Goldstücker [President of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union]. "You must not squeeze him too hard or he might die, and you mustn't open your palm or he will fly away. What you have to do is pluck out his feathers one by one. Then even if he does fly away, he will always return to the warmth of your hand."

However, when the revolt of the writers intensified and the party felt threatened by the sparrow's misbehavior, the fatherly smiles froze on the self-assured faces of the leaders. The mask fell, and the fear and hatred stood revealed. In August 1956, Janos Kadar called a conference at party headquarters to discuss the writers' "anti-party" behavior, this time comparing them to "flies." Kadar, just out of jail and recently reinstated as a Politburo member, declared: "The writers believe that they alone were responsible for the changes that took place in July [Rakosi's dismissal]. Let them understand once and for all that these changes were directed by the Central Committee and carried out by ordinary worker and peasant party members. The writers remind me of the fly who settles on the reins and thinks he pulls the cart."

Kadar's sarcasm expressed the party's terror of anything it had not accomplished by itself. But, sparrows or flies, and no matter how warmly sheltered they had been kept in years past, the writers had now tasted freedom. Featherless, even wingless, they had escaped—this time for good.

—T.A.

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racy, the intellectuals retained their faith in certain Marxist ideals: the conviction that society's moral forces would eventually triumph over the party's physical forces, and that only a truly socialist-humanist transformation of society could answer the question left unanswered by totalitarian regimes.

At the same time, to a greater or lesser extent, both movements recognized that the existing anachronisms, distortions and corruption in their countries were organically related to the system; they knew that the "mistakes" that were ascribed to certain party leaders were to some degree rooted in Marxist-Leninist theory and were the inevitable consequences of a "dictatorship of the proletariat" (that is to say, a one-party autocracy), and not merely accidental and atypical results of the "cult of personality." In 1956, Tibor Dery wrote that the Hungarian intellectual movement was faced with a "structural flaw in the system," and added that "we must root out those organic faults that allow our leaders to misuse their power and render us incapable of dealing humanly with one another." [16] In 1967, a similar view was voiced by the Czechoslovak philospher Jan Fibich:

The concept of individual development, originally a cornerstone of Marxist communism, became under Stalin but a fiction of bourgeois-liberal ideology. Thus the individual became a mere offshoot of the collective, and private interests were quite openly subordinated to the so-called public interest.[17]

And in what amounted to a statement of principle, the philosopher Ivan Svitak asserted:

Dictatorship must be replaced by an open society, the monopoly of power must be liquidated and the power elite be regulated by a free press. The bureaucratic control of society must give way before a just implementation of fundamental human rights. [All this must be accomplished] by the workers' movement together with the middle class, to the exclusion of *apparatchiki* and their collaborators. This evolution must take place under the leadership of the intellectuals.[18]

Though Svitak's statement might have shocked certain bureaucrats, all it really did was describe an existing situation. The intellectuals in Czechoslovakia, like those in Hungary 12 years before, were in the vanguard of the developing "open society," thus reasserting, in effect, their traditional role in East European societies. After decades of silence and servitude, the intellectual emerged once again as the embodiment of his nation's conscience. Bonds between the intellectuals and the people were restored and a new national union forged. No wonder both movements were characterized by a sense of joy, freedom, and self-confidence that even the rapidly approaching danger could not destroy.

I can clearly recall Hungary in the summer of 1956. Time and again strangers stopped writers on the street to congratulate them on a new poem or article; literature had become, at last, common property. Openly and almost lightheartedly the doctrines and institutions of the state were argued about and attacked; the theory of "socialist realism" was as vulnerable as the secret police. Protestors urged that the victims of Stalinist terror be rehabilitated and those responsible be punished. This atmosphere was relived twelve years later in Czechoslovakia:

One day the spring broke. We said to ourselves, "We Communists can no longer keep still. It is a crime and a disgrace; we are covering up a distorted reality." The risks were great, and for a long time we paid dearly for this attitude. But the moment arrived when fear vanished and the myth of party infallibility collapsed.[19]

The two movements shared not only certain ideals, but also some specific tactics. In his article in this issue, Mr. Kiraly describes at considerable length the organizational importance of the writers' unions and their newspapers, as well as the function of extra-party writers' groups. Suffice it to add—and to emphasize—that both movements were forever ready to exploit opportunities offered them by the regimes, such as converting writers' congresses into open revolutionary forums. Similarly, each movement had its "Magna Carta": in Hungary, the so-called Memorandum of 1955, signed by 69 leading Communist intellectuals, and in Czechoslovakia, the so-called "Two Thousand Words." Finally, both movements turned to their advantage the fact that their regimes continued to balk at fully rehabilitating the victims of Stalinist persecutions. The growing public indignation thus became a mandate for demanding further concessions from the reluctant party leaderships.

Yet the differences between the Hungarian and Czechoslovak experiences were at least as impor-

[16] Tibor Dery at the meeting of the Petöfi Circle, June 27, 1956. Quoted by T. Aczel and T. Meray in *The Revolt of the Mind*, New York, F. A. Praeger, 1959, p. 404.
[17] J. Fibich, "Institutional Alienation and the Freedom of Man," *Filosofia* (Prague), No. 6, November-December 1967.
[18] I. Svitak in *Literarni listy*, March 1, 1968.
[19] Pavel X, "From Prague to Paris," *Encounter*, February 1969, p. 7.

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tant as the similarities. Mr. Kiraly notes that the Czechoslovak movement was able to conduct its activities from key positions within the party and government, while the Hungarian movement was always on the periphery. This distinction is fundamental. In Hungary, the party played an unambiguously reactionary role. It was opposed to the movement from the very start, even when, from June 1953 to March 1955, it formally endorsed its demands. In its struggle against the reformers, the party resorted to various tactics, including the dissemination of unflattering rumors about individual intellectuals, ideological "vigilance campaigns", threats, intimidations, deprivation of jobs, and expulsions from the party. This attitude did not change even after Rakosi's fall in July 1956, and lasted until the outbreak of the revolution. The Hungarian movement, then, always found itself cast in an oppositional role, even when—in the summer and fall of 1956—it was at the peak of its influence. Continuously forced to respond to the tactics of the party—either actual or anticipated—it was never able to widen its scope, to work out a positive program.

The price for the lack of a well-prepared, coherent, and positive program was paid on October 23, 1956, when the institutional power collapsed, leaving the country in a political void. It may of course be argued that even the presence of a program would not have saved the Hungarian revolution, what with the swift train of events in the country at large outpacing the demands and actions of those who were trying to lead it. But it is also conceivable that the headlong pace of events and the resulting tragedy could have been averted by a carefully thought-out program of action designed to channel popular passions into a more positive and constructive direction. Whatever the merits of these speculations, it is clear, in retrospect, that the oppositional nature of the movement left deep imprints on the Hungarian national scene. Predominantly emotional, unprogrammatic—and indeed, almost unideological—it gave rise to impassioned articles and essays, mordant and revealing short stories and wonderful poems that will long be cherished by Hungarian readers. By the same token, whatever its historically moral value, the movement failed to produce any lasting theoretical works or truly profound and penetrating contributions to the understanding of that unique and turbulent period in Hungarian history.

Until January 1968, the situation in Czechoslovakia was similar to that in Hungary in 1956. Much like their Hungarian counterparts, the Czechoslovak intellectuals fought a lonely battle against an entrenched and vindictive party bureaucracy and without the active support of the population at large. After Novotny's fall, however, an entirely new situation came into being. True, the Dubcek leadership did not come from the ranks of the liberal Communist intellectuals, and the party *apparat* remained largely in the hands of conservative functionaries bent on preserving their prerogatives of power and deeply antagonistic to the goals of the reformers. But with the leadership more and more responsive to the latter's demands and aspirations, with the renunciation of police terror and the growing rapport between the intellectuals and the rest of society, the movement quickly acquired an altogether different character: it became in effect a "loyal opposition," whose tactics alternated between affirmation and criticism, between support of the new regime and attacks upon the remnants of the old. The hostility that had characterized the relationship between the party and the intellectuals was replaced by a sense of common values, and a consciousness of strength and independence replaced the intellectuals' erstwhile mood of alienation and despair. As one Czechoslovak writer put it: "Before January we were against 'them.' Afterwards we were for 'them.'" After having lived "for so long under the crushing weight of didacticism, in a dehumanized society . . . it was wonderful [to see the return] of humanity [and] respect for the individual." [20]

Nowhere was this new national ethos and the new position of the intellectuals expressed more forcefully than in the "Action Program" of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, adopted by the Central Committee on April 5, 1968. "Artistic creation," said the document, "must not be subjected to censorship. . . . We have full faith in those who create our culture and we rely on their responsibility, understanding and support."[21] With their freedom of expression assured, their influence immeasurably strengthened and their moral position vindicated, it was now the intellectuals' turn to prove their loyalty and generosity:

. . . the Communist Party . . . is honestly striving to use this last opportunity to save its own honor and the

[20] *Ibid.*
[21] *Rude pravo*, April 10, 1968.

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nation's. . . . We will oppose views, should they arise, that it is possible to carry out some type of democratic revival without the Communists—or possibly against them. This would be both unjust and unreasonable. The Communists already have functioning organizations, and we should support their progressive wings. . . . The battle is now over the formulation of laws and other practical measures. We must give the ministers, prosecutors, chairmen and secretaries time to prove themselves.[22]

The second striking difference between the Hungarian and Czechoslovak movements was that the latter—unlike the former—clearly raised and seriously discussed the problem of opposition parties in a socialist society. I have already mentioned the virtual absence of any philosophical or political writings in Hungary *circa* 1956—an absence clearly caused by the intellectuals' need to devote themselves to tactical matters. The Czechoslovak intellectuals, operating in a far less inimical political climate, had the time to refine their thinking on some of the more basic implications of their struggle for a "new socialism." Their writings on the subject of political pluralism under socialism—described by Mr. Kiraly in the preceding article—is probably one of the most important achievements of their movement.

Finally, the Czechoslovak intellectuals took an unequivocal stand on the role of the Communist Party in a socialist state. In Hungary, the reformers limited themselves, by and large, to exposing the bankruptcy of the party. "It is up to the leadership," said the writer Tibor Tardos, "to draw its conclusion, to change its line, to analyze its theories and later its practices." [23] For in the words of another writer, "even now, after the 20th Party Congress in the USSR, our party is still smothering writers and journalists, still discriminating against those who tell the truth. . . ." [24] The Hungarian movement revealed the gap between the party and the intellectuals but did not try to narrow it; rather, it pushed the party away. The Czechoslovaks, instead, discussed the reasons for disunity and promoted a morally renewed party. In the words of one of them:

The main causes of disunity are the contradictory views held by the party's two wings as to the management of a socialist society. One group can create nothing but a new absolutism. . . . The other group demands an open socialist society, one which will for the first time in history approach the ideal of a state in which economic sufficiency is equalled by spiritual freedom. The two groups are about as compatible as fire and water. We must summon an extraordinary congress, at which either the two wings of the party will come to an agreement . . . or the party will divide. Only thus can a morally renewed party be born. . . .[25]

Regardless of their differences, it was here, on the plane of moral unity, that the two nations' intellectual movements converged. Both wanted to create a humane and moral socialist society. Both ultimately borrowed a great deal from the liberal and socialist conceptions of the 18th and 19th centuries. They succeeded in setting invaluable historical precedents and guidelines for the continuing struggle of free peoples against totalitarian dictatorship.

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[22] Ludvik Vaculik, "Two Thousand Words," *Literarni listy*, June 27, 1968

[23] Tibor Tardos at the meeting of the Petöfi Circle, Aczel and Meray, *op. cit.*, p. 407.

[24] Tibor Meray at the meeting of the Petöfi Circle, *ibid.*, p. 407.

[25] Pavel Kohout, *Literarni listy*, May 16, 1968.

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Yugoslavia Today

EDITORS' NOTE: As the first and only country within the Communist orbit to have successfully challenged Moscow's hegemony and embarked upon its own independent "road to socialism," Yugoslavia today is as puzzling and fascinating to scholars as to the hundreds and thousands of tourists who flock to its cities and seashore resorts. The scholar who attempts to understand the country and its system on the basis of published sources and the visitor who draws his perceptions from personal experience and observations may each arrive at somewhat different conclusions — if only because ideological disquisitions and even statistics are not always the most reliable guides to reality. But they may also find that they agree in some essential respects — if only because they are no longer dealing with a totalitarian system that suppresses unpalatable realities for the sake of doctrinal "truths," but with a country in which the search *for truth is given ever-increasing latitude. All this is amply borne out by the articles below, one written by a longtime student of the Yugoslav system, and one by a journalist recently returned from Belgrade.*

The Evolution of a System

By Paul Shoup

The present article will undertake to do two things. First, it will endeavor to provide a comprehensive survey of recent changes and reforms in the political system of Yugoslavia. Secondly, it will attempt to evaluate these changes within the broader framework of the evolution of the East European Communist systems generally, and to identify in what respects the current political trends in Yugoslavia are similar to those in the East European bloc countries, and in what respect they are unique and least applicable to other Communist political systems.

The present thrust of Yugoslav political change can best be understood against the background of several developments that antedated the July 1966 plenum of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav League of Communists (YLC), which was the catalyst that set the current wave of reform in motion.

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The most important of these developments was the implementation of economic reforms in the 1950's and early 1960's. There is no need to review them here [1]; suffice it to note that for over a decade and a half Yugoslavia has been in the throes of an economic revolution which has involved complex developmental problems, and which at the same time has confronted the Yugoslav leadership with the difficult task of dismantling the old Stalinist command economy. The problems which have arisen in the course of this dual process have not yet been solved, with the result that the current political changes are taking place in an economic situation which, if not desperate, is serious and not amenable to easy solutions.

Another development which helps to clarify the present direction of political reform in Yugoslavia is the conflict among the various nationality groups within the country, a conflict which has cut across the lines of the liberal-conservative split in the party since the early 1960's—more specifically, since the Central Committee plenum of 1962, at which the liberal forces of the northern republics and the conservative elements in Serbia openly clashed for the first time.

A third key factor has been the high degree of consistency with which the Yugoslav regime has endeavored to put into effect the main elements of the Titoist political program formulated over a decade and a half ago at the Sixth Congress of the YLC. With all the emphasis on reform in Yugoslavia today, it nevertheless remains true that the essential goals for which the regime is striving are little different from those formulated in the first wave of liberalization in the early 1950's.

The increased tempo of political reform in recent years has resulted from the complex interaction of the factors just alluded to. Economic liberalization has forced a showdown with conservative forces and simultaneously generated the need for still further economic reform. The defeat of the conservatives has been accomplished through concessions to the republics, whose power today is such that they have become a factor of decisive importance on the Yugoslav political scene. The need to adapt the party to the new economic situation has resulted in widespread dismissals of veteran party functionaries and their replacement by younger, more professionally trained cadres. The command structure of the party has also been drastically reorganized to limit the influence of the conservatives and create a harmonious leadership. Finally, these and other changes are all taking place in a climate of political and social instability resulting, in part, from the deteriorating economic situation. Every segment of Yugoslav society is experiencing this instability to such a degree that one might even describe the situation as one of barely controlled chaos. The very least that can be said is that there is in the present political situation a greater sense of urgency than at any time in the past, with the possible exception of the crisis that preceded the showdown with the Rankovic forces in 1966.

These general observations will perhaps help to clarify the goals that the present political reforms are intended to achieve. Let us turn now to the reforms themselves, starting with changes that have been made in the party and in the governmental and legislative apparatus.

Party Reorganization

Reorganization of the party has been a major element in the policy of political liberalization pursued by the Tito regime since the early 1950's. Earlier measures modified the party's command structure, reduced the role of the professional party apparatus, liberalized intra-party relations, and in general altered the character of the basic party organization by restricting the number of party cells in administrative and economic organizations in favor of territorial party groups. There was also a conscious effort to encourage the circulation of members of the party élite through such devices as "rotation" and limitation of the number of jobs which an individual party member might hold. By restricting the command functions of the party bureaucracy, the leadership hoped to adapt the party to new social and economic conditions—without, however, diminishing its political authority and monopoly control over the decision-making process.

The pattern of reform has now been carried a step further through a series of proposals which were embodied in a new party statute adopted by the Ninth Congress of the YLC in April of this year. The changes introduced by the new statute and the decisions of the Congress may be briefly recapitulated.

At both the federal and republic levels, there has been a radical reshuffling of the command structure. The party congress, meeting at least

[1] See the author's "Problems of Party Reform in Yugoslavia," *The American Slavic and East European Review*, October 1959, pp. 334-50.

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every fifth year, remains the ultimate authority in the party, but in the future an annual "conference" will meet to discuss party policies. One-fourth of the delegates to these annual conferences are to be elected by the republican party congresses, with the delegates of each republic to serve as a permanent delegation to the annual conferences until the next republican party congress. The remaining three-fourths of the conference delegates are to be chosen by party conferences at the grass-roots (commune) level.[2]

The Central Committee of the YLC has been replaced by a Presidium (*predsednistvo*) composed of about fifty persons representing the republican and provincial party organizations. The leading figure in the party is now the President, and not the First Secretary. Finally, the Ninth Congress at the last moment created an Executive Bureau of fifteen persons, headed by President Tito.[3]

At the republic level also, the party congress of each republic remains the ultimate party authority. Republic party congresses are to meet every four years, but here, too, annual party conferences have been newly instituted to discuss policy problems in the respective republics between congresses. The republic party central committees remain unchanged, with day-to-day control of the party organization resting in the hands of an executive committee. The two leadership positions in the republic party structures are the posts of President, normally occupied by the most prestigious person in the party, and of Party Secretary.[4]

The make-up of the new Executive Bureau of the YLC is of special interest because it was evidently decided only at the last minute. In what appears to have been a very astute political maneuver, Tito has brought into this body leading figures from several of the republics who had hitherto been unwilling to serve in party or government positions at the federal level. Notably, Vladimir Bakaric, leader of the Croatian party, and Krste Crvenkovski, leader of the Macedonian party, have both been made members of the YLC's top executive body.[5] This seems to indicate that Tito is counting heavily on the newly-created Executive Bureau to assure political stability in the country after he passes from the scene.

Another notable aspect of the Ninth Party Congress reforms is the increased power placed in the hands of the republican parties. Members of the YLC Presidium are now chosen by the republic party congresses, and the composition of the central Executive Bureau is carefully designed to satisfy the national aspirations of the individual republics. The republic parties are also given the right to draw up their own statutes through their party congresses, and a limited amount of policy-making authority has been granted to them.

Some of the most significant party reforms, however, do not have to do with structural reorganization. Brief allusion has already been made to the current policy of replacing old-line party functionaries with younger, professionally trained cadres, which has already resulted in the retirement of many distinguished veterans of the Communist movement in Yugoslavia from active public life.[6] A renewed effort is also being made to limit the number of public posts which an individual party member may hold. These changes are having great cumulative impact; in fact, they are creating a new postwar generation of party leaders better educated than their predecessors and presumably more capable of dealing with the complex tasks imposed by present Yugoslav conditions. At the same time, various steps have been taken to increase the rights of party members, to encourage freedom of discussion within the party, and to give greater autonomy to lower-level party units.[7]

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[2] For the new party statute which incorporates these changes, see *Komunist* (Belgrade), March 16, 1969, pp. 6-10.

[3] In addition to Tito, the members of the Bureau are: Edvard Kardelj, Vladimir Bakaric, Krste Crvenkovski, Nijaz Dizdarevic, Stane Dolanc, Stevan Doronjski, Kiro Gligorov, Fadil Hoxha, Cvijetin Mijatovic, Miroslav Pecujlic, Budislav Soskic, Mijalko Todorovic, Miko Tripalo, and Veljko Vlahovic. Each republic has two representatives on the Bureau, each autonomous region, one. *Komunist*, March 16, 1969, p. 2.

[4] See *Sesti Kongres Saveza Komunista Srbije* (Sixth Congress of the League of Communists of Serbia), Belgrade, 1968, p. 117. Republic statutes differ slightly on the method of selecting delegates to the annual party conference and the role of this new party body. See *Komunist*, Jan. 30, 1969, p. 5.

[5] As a result of this action, Bakaric and Crvenkovski will presumably have to be replaced as presidents of the Croatian and Macedonian parties, as will also the president of the Bosnian party, who was similarly named to the new Executive Bureau.

[6] One byproduct of these changes has been the creation of a "Council of the Federation" (*Savet Federacije*) made up of distinguished persons in the party, some of them still serving in leading party organs (Kardelj, Vlahovic), and some not (Koca Popovic). The functions of the Council are outlined in *Sluzbeni List* (Belgrade), July 12, 1967, p. 861.

[7] The new party statute provides, for example, that disciplinary action against a party member shall be decided by a "comradely court" (*drugarsko vece*), with the member in question having the right to name one-third of the court's members; that opposition views may be expressed provided that implementation of the majority position is not obstructed; and that party units at the local, regional and republic levels are auhorized to draw up their own standing rules, or statutes. Other provisions grant greater authority to the party organizations of the autonomous regions.

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Parliamentary Reform

Parallel with the restructuring of the party, there have been important changes in the complex set of parliamentary institutions created by the constitution of 1963. Under Article 165 of the 1963 constitution, the Federal Assembly consisted of five chambers: the Federal Chamber (*Savezno vece*), the Economic Chamber (*Privredno vece*), the Educational and Cultural Chamber (*Prosvetno-kulturno vece*), the Social Welfare and Health Chamber (*Socijalno-zdravstveno vece*), and the Organizational-Political Chamber (*Organizaciono-politicko vece*). The Chamber of Nationalities was a component part of the Federal Chamber and met only on specified occasions when matters of concern to the republics were to be discussed. Members of the Federal Chamber were chosen by direct election, while those of the other four chambers were indirectly elected by local government assemblies.

After several years of debate over the method of electing delegates to the Federal Assembly and the role of the Chamber of Nationalities, a series of amendments to the 1963 constitution was adopted in December 1968, effecting important changes in the parliamentary structure.[8] The Chamber of Nationalities is a major beneficiary of these changes. Although an earlier constitutional amendment enacted in 1967 had already made the Chamber a separate body independent of the Federal Chamber, its powers remained limited. Now, however, legislation introduced by any of the component chambers of the Federal Assembly will require its approval. This, in effect, restores the Chamber of Nationalities to a position analogous to the one it enjoyed under the 1946 Stalinist constitution.

Another change is the elimination of the Federal Chamber, reducing the number of chambers making up the Federal Assembly to four. These retain their earlier form, but with the abolition of the Federal Chamber, the renamed Social-Political Chamber (formerly the Organizational-Political Chamber) has assumed increased importance. It is now to be directly elected and is supposed to represent the interests of the communes. Thus, the principle of direct election is still retained to a degree but has less importance than in the past.

It should also be noted that a number of other proposed amendments received serious consideration but were finally rejected. One was a proposal that would have made decisions in the Chamber of Nationalities subject to veto by a single republic's delegation. Another was a suggestion emanating from Serbia that the legislative competence of the Chamber of Nationalities be restricted to matters of primary concern to the republics. Again, although the "Councils of Work Communities" were criticized for their narrow economic and professional concerns and proposals were made for merging them into one body, little change was finally made in their structure or organization. All this suggests that there will be a continued confrontation of interests within the revamped federal parliament.[9]

Nationality Problems

It is evident from the preceding discussion of changes in the party and the parliamentary structure that one of the major objectives of the current reforms is to alleviate pressures arising from rivalries among the different nationality groups in the country. Moreover, while the economic reforms themselves are not within the scope of this discussion, it should be stressed that a further objective of the current reform program as a whole is to cope with increasing conflicts among economic interest groups. It is therefore necessary to examine both these areas of conflict more closely.

As noted at the outset, it was the July 1966 Central Committee plenum that sparked the current wave of political reform. In precipitating the downfall of former Vice-President Aleksandar Rankovic, the plenum not only was a victory for the liberal forces in Yugoslavia, but it also marked the defeat of the Serb nationalists and the ascendancy of the Croatian and Slovenian elements within the party. To cement their victory over the conservatives and protect themselves against a future threat of Serb hegemony, the liberal nationalists of Croatia and Slovenia have continued to press for greater rights for the republics than were recognized in the 1963 constitution. One result of this campaign can be seen in the increased power recently conferred on the Chamber of Nationalities. Nevertheless, the

[8] The amendments appear in *Sluzbeni List*, Dec. 30, 1968, pp. 1293-96.

[9] The rules of order of the Federal Assembly have also been amended to provide for consultation between the chambers and their counterparts in the republics prior to reaching decisions in areas affecting republic interests. This further enhances the ability of the republics—which are also represented in the Federal Executive Council of the Assembly—to influence legislation and the shaping of policy at the federal level.

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problem of future relationships among the republics is still far from settled. Pressure continues from Slovenia and Croatia for even greater autonomy. While it is as yet too early to speak of a Yugoslav confederation, proposals have been made which would bring such a system a great deal closer.

Thus the president of the Slovenian Supreme Court, writing in *Borba* (August 8, 1968), suggested the limitation of federal legislative power to precisely defined areas, with this power to be exercised only after consultation with representative organs of the republics. Legislation in all other areas would be the sole responsibility of the republics, and executive decrees and regulations could be issued only at the republic level. While suggestions of this sort are premature and evidently designed more to influence the general direction of policy than to articulate a clear-cut and immediate goal, the movement for greater autonomy in the affairs of the republics is unmistakable and gathering momentum. The Macedonian constitution refers to the "statehood" of the Macedonian republic. Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia engage in "foreign affairs" activities.[10] The explosive situation in the Kosmet is being dealt with by making unprecedented concessions to the Albanian minority, with the result that the region is being transformed from one representing a mixture of national elements to one that will be considered predominantly Albanian in character.[11] The Moslems, too, are now to be considered a distinct nationality, reversing a long-standing party policy of treating the Slav Moslems of Yugoslavia as a religious and not a national group.[12]

But while the grant of increased autonomy to the republics and the greater recognition of nationality rights have temporarily allayed fears of Serb hegemony, they have by no means removed all sources of tension. Economic rivalry, long a divisive force among the republics, has grown in intensity in recent years. The Fund for the Development of Underdeveloped Regions, through which 1.85 percent of the total social product of the country was theoretically to be channeled into economic assistance to the less advanced republics, has failed to solve the problem of underdevelopment. The hoped-for acceleration of economic growth in the underdeveloped areas has simply not materialized, and all the symptoms of economic stagnation which Yugoslavia as a whole has been experiencing in recent years have manifested themselves most strongly in the lesser-developed regions. As a result, the future of the development fund itself is now the subject of intense and often heated debate, with the more developed republics advocating its total abolition.[13]

Economic Pressures

Rivalry among the republics, however, is just one form of economic conflict. The liberalization of the Yugoslav economy has been accompanied by a burgeoning of economic associations, regional pressure groups, industrial lobbies, and other special-interest groups as complex and varied as those encountered in the West. Not only do these groups exist and vigorously defend their interests, but their activities are recognized and even encouraged in certain ways by the government. This has been demonstrated dramatically in the behavior of the Federal Assembly during the last few years. Since 1967 the federal government has been under constant attack by the economic and social chambers of parliament over the implementation of economic reforms. While the Federal Executive Council has always managed to win final approval of its programs, it has often found it necessary to modify its proposals to the Federal Assembly in the light of criticisms voiced in the social and economic chambers. Reports of these debates in the Yugoslav press and minutes of the Federal Assembly indicate that they are unusually free and sometimes highly emotional. On occasion even a lone deputy has dared to take exception to a government measure, as for example in the summer of 1968, when Deputy Cedo Kapor tried to amend a proposed law on motor transport forbidding socialist enterprises from utilizing private trucking firms for transporting goods.[14] Similarly, the dissatisfaction of the un-

[10] The Croatian and Slovenian republics have entered into negotiations with other countries—for example, the recent Croatian negotiations with Austria over common problems. Recently, also, the Slovenian Economic Chamber formed a special section for cooperation with COMECON countries, the first of five such sections which will deal with various world economic groups.

[11] Albanians in the Kosmet will be permitted to celebrate their own national holidays and to have a national flag, and officials in the region will henceforth be required to master both the Albanian and Serbo-Croatian languages. *Jedinstvo* (Pristina), Oct. 7, 1968, p. 1. These and other changes emphasize the Albanian rather than the multinational character of the region. The question of republic status for the Kosmet is discussed below.

[12] *Komunist,* Aug. 8, 1968, p. 12.

[13] See *Politika,* July 28, 1968, p. 8.

[14] *Borba* (Belgrade), July 20, 1968, p. 3. The amendment was defeated, only Kapor voting for its passage.

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derdeveloped republics over the state of federal economic assistance has repeatedly come to the surface in parliamentary debate, proving strong enough on one occasion to force the convocation of the Chamber of Nationalities even before the recent amendment to the 1963 constitution.[15]

Economic pressures also find expression outside the Federal Assembly. Associations of manufacturers publicize their views through trade journals and newspapers with national circulation and usually act as a counterweight to the strong pressures exerted by the republics and smaller territorial units. At the same time, the trade unions have become a force for defending the interests of the workers and are able through their organizations to bring pressure to bear on the Federal Assembly and the government bureaucracy. This new activism on the part of the workers' organizations was dramatized in 1967 by the dismissal of Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo as trade union chief for his outspoken criticism of policies considered detrimental to the interests of the workers.

As the foregoing account suggests, it is often the Federal Executive Council which bears the brunt of criticism from the various economic interest groups. In the summer of 1968, following a show of defiance by the Assembly of the Croatian Republic and a threat of strikes against the regime's economic policies, the Council took the unusual step of calling the Federal Assembly into session and asking for a vote of confidence in its program of reforms. The Council won the backing of the Assembly, which voted a resolution supporting the government, with a single deputy abstaining.[16]

The emergence of these group pressures may be considered a logical and even necessary response to the changes which have been taking place in the Yugoslav economic and political system over the past decade. What perhaps needs emphasizing in this complex and highly fluid situation, however, is that the aggressive pursuit of regional and other interests stems from deep dislocations in Yugoslav society, and that the conflicting demands of the various groups cannot therefore be easily reconciled by the bargaining methods and tactics of compromise usually associated with interest-group politics.

The emotion-charged atmosphere of group bargaining in Yugoslavia today may itself be a clue to why the regime has allowed conflicts of interest to be aired in public. There has been an apparent attempt to take the most intractable problems out of the hands of the normal decision-making bodies in the party and government and transfer responsibility for policy in these areas to impartial or nonpolitical institutions or groups. Such considerations, for example, could well have prompted the regime's decision, after years of sterile inner-party squabbling over the distribution of investments between the wealthier and poorer republics, to create the fund for aid to underdeveloped regions. The Constitutional Court—a unique institution in a Communist country—represents a similar type of quasi-impartial body for regulating relations among the republics and between the republics and the federal government. Parliamentary discussions also are encouraged in an effort to depoliticize economic disputes by forcing advocates of contending positions to offer reasonable and responsible public defenses of their stands. Industrial associations embracing producers in a given industry throughout Yugoslavia are being officially supported on the theory that they are able to resist local pressures more effectively than the federal government. And it now seems that the trade unions will be brought into the process of establishing uniform wage rates—a problem which the federal government considers too explosive to deal with by the usual political or administrative methods. Thus, paradoxically, the articulation of group interests in Yugoslavia is both highly political and at the same time is being divorced, in certain limited ways, from the political process.

Ideological Trends

At this point, something should be said about the manner in which the Titoist ideology has been changing—or refusing to change—under the impact of recent developments. As has been pointed out before, the main elements of the Titoist political creed remain remarkably similar to what they were a decade and a half ago. Self-management remains the central and immutable principle of the ideology, and the struggle to implement it in the face of "bureaucratic" obstructionism is considered the single most important objective of the reform movement. Debureaucratization and democratization are therefore viewed as essential elements in the current program of political reform, and both are seen in an institutional context involving reform of the party, the strengthening of the trade unions and the Socialist Alliance, and of course the spread

[15] For details of this affair, see *Borba*, Jan. 29, 1967, p. 5.
[16] *Borba*, July 19, 1968, p. 1.

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of self-management institutions in economic enterprises. With respect to the broader problems of political authority and political participation, the Titoist creed advocates "direct democracy" and vigorously rejects the practices of "bourgeois parliamentarianism." Finally, of course, Titoism stands in strong opposition to centrally-planned economies of the Soviet type.

The preceeding points, while they perhaps reduce the ideology to something simpler than it is in reality, seem to cover the substance of the political program of Titoism as spelled out in a number of policy statements over the last few years: the "Draft Theses" of April 1967 [17]; the "Guidelines" issued by the Presidium and the Executive Committee of the YLC in June 1968 [18]; and the Ninth Party Congress resolution on "Socialist Development in Yugoslavia." [19] This political platform derives a certain credibility from the fact that Yugoslav life is undeniably more free now than in the past and continues to evolve in a democratic direction. Meanwhile the economic reforms of 1965 and earlier years, by freeing funds for use by enterprises, have created the economic preconditions for workers' self-management in industry.

Nevertheless, the failure of these policies to generate widespread enthusiasm in recent years is quite evident. There are several reasons for this. For one thing, economic problems have been multiplying, generating distrust in the regime's reform policies among liberals and conservatives, pro-Communists and anti-Communists alike. Unemployment, growing inequalities in income, the revival of private trade, and failure to eradicate abuses connected with the purchase of foreign cars and the construction of villas by party bureaucrats have all contributed towards undermining the party's authority, especially among the two groups in which the leadership has hitherto placed its greatest hopes—the workers and the youth. Worker dissatisfaction has manifested itself in a constantly increasing number of strikes, a reported total of 1,365 work stoppages having occurred between 1958 and 1966.[20] At the same time, there has been a steady drop in the number of young persons joining the party, although the decline appears to have been arrested—if only temporarily—by a renewed feeling of solidarity between the party and the people, spurred by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Above all, the student demonstrations of June 1968 clearly underscored the frustrations which have been building up among Yugoslav youth as well as other segments of the population.

Notwithstanding the leadership's continuing commitment to democratization, another cause of dissatisfaction has been the growing impatience of many groups in Yugoslav society with the limited freedom—especially intellectual freedom—which the regime allows its people. It is here that the forces of modernization generated by current social changes find political expression—in the form of appeals for greater respect of parliamentary practices, advocacy of a new humanist-Marxist creed, or muted but persistent criticism of workers' self-management as an economic failure and a political deadend for Yugoslav socialism.

The critics of the official ideology have had a visible impact on Yugoslav political life in recent years. On the one hand, there has been greater discussion than ever before of the need to extend democratization to the point of bringing a multiparty system into being—*de facto* if not *de jure*.[21] This is not exactly a new idea, and it has always been resisted by the party leadership, although some voices can be heard, even in top party circles, in support of a modified two-party system.[22] The system of "direct democracy" has also been subjected to frank analysis, with the party permitting some restrained debate on the issue of privileges in the party bureaucracy and the problem of the "new class" in Yugoslavia.[23] The right to strike has been openly defended as a supplement, and even to some extent as a corrective, to the system of workers' self-management.[24] Student criticism of "capitalist" practices in Yugoslavia has led the government to retreat from its policy of allowing private enterprise to compete with the socialist sector.

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[17] *Ibid.*, April 27, 1967, p. 1.
[18] *Ibid.*, June 14, 1968, pp. 4-6.
[19] *Komunist*, March 16, 1969, pp. 32-41.
[20] *NIN* (Belgrade), Oct. 29, 1967, p. 4.

[21] See especially the much publicized article of the political scientist Stevan Vracar, "Partijski monopolizam i politicka moc drustvenih grupa" (The Monopoly of the Party and the Political Power of Social Groups) *Gledista* (Sarajevo), No. 8-9, August-September, 1967, pp. 1053-66.
[22] For example, Mijalko Todorovic, Secretary of the YLC Presidium and a member of the new Executive Bureau, has been associated with the idea.
[23] A relatively free debate took place on these issues early in 1967. See especially Mihailo Markovic, "Neposredna demokratija kao ideoloski mit i kao realna tendencija istorijskog procesa" (Direct Democracy as an Ideological Myth and as a Real Tendency of the Historical Process), *Encyclopedia Moderna* (Zagreb), No. 2, January-February, 1967, pp. 16-21.
[24] The right to strike has been advocated by the political scientist Jovan Djordevic and by the leading Croatian Communist, Vladimir Bakaric, among others. For Bakaric's views, see *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), Oct. 26, 1967.

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On the other hand, the regime has displayed determination not to let freedom of political expression get out of hand. Confiscations of journals for publicizing views considered hostile to socialism have increased in recent years, and spokesmen for the official ideology often seem more concerned with criticizing their opponents—be they bourgeois liberals, humanist Marxists, "technocrats" accused of supporting the views of James Burnham, or conservative neo-Stalinists—than with making their own programs more comprehensible and attractive to the Yugoslav people.

The regime nevertheless continues its allegiance to the goals of self-management and democratization and, as part of its strategy, is striving to curb the power of the local party bureaucrats, whose resistance to change has been a major obstacle in the path of reform. This has proven to be no easy task. For instance, in the April 1967 elections, there were numerous cases in which old-line party conservatives who had been rejected for further official posts nevertheless managed to win election to the Federal Assembly or were subsequently chosen to head local government assemblies over the opposition of the higher party echelons.[25] The problem is complex because the party—if it is to continue to rule—cannot dispense with its local power base entirely. This seems to explain, in part, why the republican party organizations have been spared in the regime's recent attacks on bureaucratic interference in self-management.[26] Meanwhile, action to deprive party officials of undue privileges has been less than determined; indeed, the problem has recently been exacerbated by the grant of large government pensions to party members removed from their posts as part of the campaign to infuse new blood into the party and state apparatus.

Amidst all this ferment, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds the question of whether the Yugoslav party-state power structure still retains a monopoly position behind the scenes, or whether, on the contrary, it is relinquishing its control to the new groups and institutions which have attracted so much attention in recent years. No one can answer with confidence. It is well to note, however, that the quasi-democratic procedures practiced in Yugoslavia are infused with elements of power-elite conflict. This is true not only in such obvious cases as the clash over aid to underdeveloped areas, but also in the conflict between the social-economic chambers of the Federal Assembly and the Federal Executive Council. Today the chambers of the Federal Assembly tend to be the abode of older party members, while the Federal Executive Council is the stronghold of the younger and better-informed but less prestigious elements of the party. Analogous problems exist at the local level, where the workers' councils must obviously be restrained from unduly increasing their wage funds but at the same time must be encouraged to support more energetic management. Short of abolishing the workers' councils themselves, these objectives cannot be attained by destroying the local power structure, but only by reeducating it, or—as we may now be witnessing—by relocating effective control over industrial enterprises at a higher level of the government and party structure.

A Larger View

What, then, is the significance of the recent political changes in Yugoslavia? And what relation do they bear to trends in the other Communist-ruled countries of Eastern Europe?

Since economic needs have unquestionably acted as a spur to political change, it may be useful to begin by considering the interrelationship between the economic problems of Yugoslavia and those of the East European Communist countries. For Yugoslavia, as for most of Communist Eastern Europe, the decade of the 1960's has been a time of readjustment in which it has become necessary to come to grips with the excesses of earlier periods. In this connection, it is misleading to put undue stress on the fact that the Yugoslav economic system in the 1960's was already more liberal than the economies of the East European Communist nations. For one thing, the undoubtedly greater importance placed on a system of free prices in Yugoslavia did not create a free market for capital prior to 1965, and if current complaints about the monopoly position of the banks are to be believed, centralized political control over investments still remains a feature of the Yugoslav system. Hardly any less than the East European Communist states, Yugoslavia suffered from overly rapid industrialization, neglect of agriculture, a worsening balance of pay-

[25] A highly publicized case in point occurred in the Serbian town of Lazarevac, where Radivoje Jovanovic, a former lieutenant-general in the Partisans, got himself elected to the Federal Assembly over the candidate put up by the party. The case is interesting in view of subsequent press charges that Jovanovic used his position in the Assembly to build up his own political machine in Lazarevac in opposition to the reforms of the past several years. Jovanovic was eventually "recalled" by the voters of his constituency. It should be noted that the "unauthorized" election of *liberal* elements has been less of a problem.

[26] See Alvin Z. Rubenstein, "Reforms, Non-Alignment and Pluralism," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1968, p. 37.

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ments, and other problems associated with forced economic development, and in recent years she has found these ills just as difficult to cure as have the East European states.

Insofar as a common set of economic problems of the type just described existed (and it is admitted that not *all* the East European countries had this experience in the 1960's), we can speak of certain common political consequences. When some of the features of an underdeveloped economy—such as a plentiful supply of labor or a high rate of return on investments—cease to work to the advantage of the regime and to encourage a massive mobilization of resources, but instead become liabilities and generate frictions, the resultant difficulties tend to impose politics of compromise, cautious reform, and a return to stability. While the Yugoslavs have shown reluctance to recognize the necessity of such a change in tactics, recent Yugoslav experience seems to support the expectation that the 1970's will be a period of retreat and adjustment, just as the 1950's and early 1960's were a time of rapid economic growth and dynamic political change.

Another observation which can be derived from the Yugoslav experience is less speculative. In brief, this experience suggests that our conception of the political implications of modernization has until now been vastly oversimplified. This is particularly true of the assumption that, under the impact of rapid industrialization, political attitudes are transformed from a disordered array of communal, religious, or traditional interests into a homogeneous, secularized political culture. Of course, this generalization has always been qualified by the observation that "modern" and "traditional" elements were likely to coexist in even the most advanced political systems, but the persistence of the belief that development brings with it a more advanced and well-integrated social and political system has been remarkable among both Western political scientists and their Communist counterparts. Yugoslavia, on the contrary, shows signs of becoming an increasingly segmented political and social system as she becomes more modern. This has been only partially offset by the emergence of nationwide economic interest groups with well-articulated and essentially reasonable demands.

What is nevertheless of great interest in the Yugoslav case is the extent to which these opposing trends not only can coexist but are to a certain extent interrelated. Thus, at the same time that centrifugal forces erode national unity and sharpen differences between liberal and conservative forces within the party, steps are being taken to depoliticize sensitive problems through the creation of independent agencies standing outside politics, as mentioned earlier. This process has been spurred by the fact that competing group demands have created a felt need for more objective data than has hitherto been available through official channels. Hence, for example, the recent joint proposal put forward by the Trade Union Council, the Economic Chamber of the Federal Assembly, and the Federal Executive Council, for the establishment of an institute to investigate and provide information on the effect of current economic policies on incomes and the standard of living.[27] (Of course, recognition of the need for depoliticized institutions of this type does not guarantee that they will be free of politics in practice, and the desire for accurate information as a basis for mediating the claims of contending groups may be impossible to satisfy, given the nature of the system.)

The failure of modernization to produce a homogeneous political culture is also evident in the multitude of clearly identifiable political currents abroad in Yugoslavia today. Limitations of space make it impossible to consider them here, but attention should be drawn to the fact that these currents, or the groups they represent, can no longer be conveniently divided into "liberal" and "conservative" categories. Many students with idealistic beliefs, as well as an important segment of the non-Communist population outside of Slovenia and Croatia, are hostile to economic reform because of the dislocations it has produced. On the other hand, the dedication of the Slovenian and Croatian Communists to economic liberalism can be attributed only in part to the development of progressive beliefs as a concomitant of the modernization process. It is rather the *relatively* greater efficiency of the northern republics, as compared to the rest of the country, which generates pressures for economic decentralization, in particular for local control over investment funds.

Not only are the political currents in Yugoslavia more complex than a simple model of economic and political modernization would lead us to assume, but they also cannot be understood solely in terms of the internal situation and internal developmental problems. This is certainly true, for example, of the domestic growth of "humanistic Marxism"—which is an international or, more particularly, an

[27] *Borba*, Feb. 19, 1969, p. 6.

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East European phenomenon. We can see here the operation of the so-called "demonstration effect," whereby certain political beliefs and forms of political behavior, with the assistance of the mass media, spread rapidly and almost spontaneously from one country to another. A particularly striking illustration of this was the widespread student demonstrations of June 1968.[28] While the actions of the conservative elements in Yugoslav politics do not appear to be influenced by an international movement, or by anti-liberal nationalist groups elsewhere (such as the Partisans in Poland), they do reflect forces that are at work in many parts of Eastern Europe—forces which seem likely to play a continuing and very important part in the political life of these countries in the next decade.

The National Perspective

Nevertheless, it may be assumed that the future development of Yugoslavia's, or indeed any country's, political life will, within broad limits, be the product of forces which can be analyzed only from a national perspective—that is, by considering the impact of international events on the country, the quality of the local leadership, and the internal balance of political forces. From this point of view, perhaps the most important question that needs to be asked with respect to Yugoslavia's future is whether or not the commitment to change and reform will be maintained. Let us consider this question in the context of two related problems that are crucial for the future of the Titoist political system: first, the potential effect of changes in the Yugoslav leadership; and second, the limits to which an authoritarian system is capable of being adapted to liberalizing tendencies and reforms.

The leadership situation in Yugoslavia seems to preclude any one person succeeding Tito. A collective leadership made up of republican party heads, acting through either the newly-formed Executive Bureau or the Party Presidium, appears inevitable. The possibility of factional warfare is great in view of the acknowledged existence of a pro-Rankovic "underground" in Serbia.

It may also prove that what is distinctively "Titoist" in Yugoslav political life today will not survive Tito himself. One can argue the point with respect to at least two aspects of the Titoist system: workers' self-management and nationality relations. The attraction of workers' self-management for the more developed republics lies to a large degree in the way it operates to help keep funds in local enterprises, and therefore inside those republics. If the republics should gain more or less complete control over their own affairs, however, the need for the more advanced republics to stress self-management will disappear. In any case, very little has been done in recent years to give the workers greater power—and understandably so, given their propensity to spend rather than invest enterprise funds.

While the assumption of greater power by the republics seems inevitable, nationality relations may also change in a more conservative direction once Tito's influence is no longer felt. This seems most likely in the case of the Kosmet, where some of the recent concessions made to the Albanian national minority are likely to be withdrawn not only because of their unpopularity in Serbia but because the most likely alignment of the republics in the near future will necessitate putting a damper on minority rights.[29] Secondly, "alignments" and "spheres of influence" among the republics are already developing in the economic sphere and will very likely emerge at the political level as well. (The precedent for this lies in special agreements made between the Serbian and Montenegrin parties on economic and cultural matters, and between the Serbian and Macedonian parties, prior to Rankovic's ouster in 1966.) Any such development would obviously inhibit the emergence of a truly federal system or a confederation of autonomous and equal republics.

Finally, let us turn to the limitations inherent in the Titoist political system as it attempts to meet the problems pressing in on it. These limitations lie, first of all, in the inability of the system to maintain its authority and unity in the face of public discussion and criticism. In a word, the Titoist regime, despite the existence of an entrenched party and a loyal following dating back to World War II, suffers from the fundamental weakness of any authoritarian state which rules in defiance of majority will. The complex system of "direct democracy," with its strong corporate elements, only serves to accentuate this dilemma.

[28] For student demands made during the demonstrations, see *Student* (Belgrade), June 4, 1968.

[29] A reaction to the unrest in the Kosmet is already visible. See the Central Committee statement of February 1969 on national relations, in which it was made clear that the Kosmet would not be granted republic status. *Jedinstvo*, Feb. 10, 1969, p. 5.

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There is, in theory, an alternative to "direct democracy." It is the concept of "socialist pluralism," and it seems to be much more a part of actual Yugoslav socialism than self-management. This concept has indeed found favor among many political scientists in Eastern Europe because it can be defended—as has been done by Polish political scientists, for example [30]—within the context of a one-party system. In addition, socialist pluralism recognizes the need to integrate economic and social forces and groups in more complex and flexible ways as the country in question modernizes and becomes more open in character.

Theories concerning this alternative path for the evolution of Yugoslav communism are nevertheless vague about the kind of political power that would be required to introduce and maintain pluralism in a non-democratic context. In the Yugoslav case, moreover, the activities of interest groups and of the power structure are so intimately intertwined that to publicize the former would be to reveal compromising facts about the latter. Meanwhile, those associated with the pluralist idea continue to urge, as a first step, the full exposure of all "group" activities, including "informal" ones (*e.g.*, local power configurations). This creates an impasse, since the exercise of power in Yugoslavia under the present system cannot tolerate the criticism that would inevitably follow the exposure of such "informal" group activities.[31]

On the other hand, authoritarianism has many faces and may be maintained in many ways. Even if Titoism should destroy or undermine party rule, many institutions will still remain with a stake in the system and the power to maintain themselves in authority. This seems all the more likely should the decade of the 1970's, throughout Eastern Europe, prove to be one in which retrenchment, stability and nationalism are the dominant themes.

[30] See the work of the Polish Political Science Association, *Studies in the Polish Political System*, Warsaw, 1967. The April 1968 "Action Program" of the Czechoslovak Communist Party took a similar line in connection with the development of interest groups.

[31] In a study of the method by which enterprise managers are chosen in Yugoslavia, the political scientist Janez Jerovsek discovered that the secretary of the communal party committee and the president of the communal assembly actually have the decisive word in selecting managers despite the fact that they are not on the selection committee made up of local government and enterprise representatives. Jerovsek argued that in view of this informal practice, it would be far better for these two officials to be made members of the selection committee, so that their influence could be exercised openly. "Neformalni elementi u odlucivanju na nivou opstine" (The Informal Structure of Decision-making at the Level of the Opstina), *Studijski projekat 'Sociolosko istrazivanje jugoslovenske komune—Bilten*, Institut za sociologija in filozofijo Univerze v Ljubljani, Ljubljana, No. 5, n.d.

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From a Reporter's Notebook

By Christopher Bird

The Yugoslav border is one of the freest in the world today. I was reminded of this genial attribute—which, more than any other, makes the land of the South Slavs a Western rather than an Eastern nation—when I arrived in the United Kingdom after spending a year as a correspondent in Belgrade and Dubrovnik.

We drove off the North Sea ferry at Hull, a mixed lot of cars bearing European license plates. Britishers were all waved into one lane, foreigners into another. Maybe it was the bizarre yellow-and-black Yugoslav plaque on my car, with its tiny red star, or maybe it was my graying black beard, or perhaps both: anyway, the customs guard signaled me into a holding lane. Only after a long wait and a thorough grilling by higher immigration officials was I issued a short two months' residence permit and told to report to the Home Office when I got to London.

By comparison, entering Yugoslavia was simplicity itself: on the train from Trieste to Zagreb, a cursory glance at passports; a cordial "Have a good stay!" Four trunks, three suitcases, and a number of assorted parcels were left lying on the floor of the compartment unexamined. One could almost have been crossing from Kansas to Nebraska. A curtain? Even the rod was gone.

Belgrade's "open-door" policy has applied not only to incoming visitors but to outward-bound Yugoslavs from the time the border was opened. On the financial side alone, the impact has been enormous. Increasing numbers of Western tourists have poured into the country each year, especially in summer; their spendings amounted to $135 million in 1968, up from $63 million in 1965.[1] By the bold step of allowing Yugoslav citizens to seek work abroad, the regime has greatly alleviated, if not completely solved, one of the country's socially most explosive problems—unemployment. Moreover, the 300,000 to 400,000 Yugoslavs who have migrated to find jobs in Western Europe have sent home savings to their bank accounts and relatives in convertible currencies, amounting to another $135 million in 1968—up from $32 million in 1965.[2] A third source of hard currency—transport receipts from cross-European haulage—netted Yugoslavia's transportation sector $152 million in 1968,

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[1] Unless otherwise indicated, all statistical data in this essay are derived from National Bank of Yugoslavia sources.

[2] The amount would be much larger if savings currently banked abroad were remitted home.

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up from $118 million in 1965.[3] Together, this triumvirate of invisibles will soon produce, if trends in their growth hold steady, the sum of over half a billion dollars annually.[4]

The injection of foreign currency into the Yugoslav exchequer is not the only, nor even the most significant, aspect of the "open-door" policy. With respect to the Yugoslav migrants working abroad, a good majority—once they have saved money enough for a home, a car, and other amenities of modern-day living—will turn their faces and their footsteps homeward.[5] What the effects of this mass return of the native will be is difficult to judge, particularly since no systematic study has as yet been made of who goes abroad, who comes back, and why. But even in the absence of hard information, one can surmise that Yugoslavia will profit from the heightened sophistication and purged parochialism of the returning migrants, in their capacities both as workers and as observers of comparative systems. At the same time, their experience may impel them toward voicing new demands that are presently neither heard nor even imagined in their country.

The exposure to new attitudes and customs, to new ways of thinking and doing things, is also bound to affect thousands of Yugoslavs working in overseas foreign-aid or contractual projects. An engineer who had spent two years in Asia, later transferring to Africa, remarked in a letter to me that "one idiot, one genius, and two-score workers all deliberating together do not equal an experienced, self-confident director in the decision-making process." This opinion, the result of his personal experience working abroad, ran counter to current Yugoslav views on the benefits of workers' councils, self-management groups, and the like, which suffuse work with an ideological mystique back home.

Thus Belgrade runs the risk of future challenges from its returning citizens, but it also gains the opportunity—so far unavailable to the Soviet-dominated countries—of enriching its own system and society through free international contact. To enforce isolation in a technologically advancing and diversifying world is to limit experience. Of this last the Yugoslavs are demonstrably unafraid.

The reverse tide of visitors to Yugoslavia also has its impact. Travelers in the country are as free to move about and do what they want as they would be in Norway, Canada or West Virginia. There is no monopoly agency such as Intourist in the USSR to exact from them a pre-set daily tithe of money. On the contrary, there is a burgeoning complex of competing tourist agencies, each vying to offer the visitor more than the next, and each clamoring for his walletful of bills.

Aside from his money, the ubiquitous foreign visitor brings a social bonus to Yugoslav society in terms of his attitudes and requirements. These are felt most immediately and strongly in the hotel and restaurant business. *Maitres d'hotel* and assistant managers bear the brunt of contact with foreign groups sophisticated enough to press for more service than is offered. So far the effect of competition on services is spotty. One tourist agency in Dubrovnik sent weekly boatloads of tourists to the lovely island of Mljet each Sunday last summer. But though their arrival for lunch was expected by the monastery-turned-hotel, located in the middle of a lake on an island within the island, the tourists were bitterly disappointed by the lack of food and indifferent service—the result of the hotel management's unwillingness to adapt the routine of quiet weekdays to the weekend rush.

On the other hand some service is excellent. One of the best Yugoslav restaurants in the country is located in the basement of Zagreb's Esplanade Hotel. It was set up with the assistance of Intercontinental Hotels, a Pan American subsidiary, to cater largely to foreigners. Operations of this quality take the lead in pulling tourist money into the country.

The example of the successful enterprises is not lost on competition. Hotel and private restaurateurs, responding to such influence, are sending their personnel for training to such countries as Switzerland and Austria. Recently more than 2,000 Yugoslav tourist-industry representatives visited the United States to attend a two-day seminar on hotel operations and tourism organized by the US Commerce Department and run by Cornell University's School of Hotel Management. While a lady from Bulgaria rose to protest that air-conditioning was not necessary in hotels ("Furthermore, it is un-

[3] See footnote 1.

[4] This should go a long way toward offsetting Yugoslavia's negative trade balance ($537 million in 1968).

[5] In one Serbian village near Belgrade, I was approached by a local man, speaking German, who could hardly contain his enthusiasm as he boasted to me in front of several of his compatriots that his big three-story house, the largest in the village, had been built with money he saved while working in a quarry near Linz, Austria, and that he had driven home on vacation in the Volkswagen parked before its front door. He said he was planning to return to the village for good as soon as he had saved enough money to buy land.

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healthy . . . I know because I am doctor"), Yugoslavs were busy taking down the information and statistics that proved air-conditioning was a winning, worldwide trend in the competition for visitors.

It would be misleading to suggest that all of the effects of Yugoslavia's free-border policy have been beneficial. In one respect particularly, the country has suffered a negative impact; the migration of workers has been paralleled by a migration of professionally-trained people who are less likely to return. This might be called Yugoslavia's contribution to the "brain drain." To cite just one field, nuclear physics, such leading figures as Maglic, discoverer of the particle that bears his name, and Anton Peterlin, former head of the Stefan Nuclear Institute in Ljubljana, have both emigrated to the United States.[6] The same has happened with respect to less eminent people in various scientific fields: the example of a lady research-biologist who left one of Yugoslavia's largest industrial firms to join a Pennsylvania (US) college where she could have her own research laboratory has probably been duplicated many times over. Engineers who cannot find jobs at home are leaving the country permanently.[7] One of the most frequent references to the mass migration of professionals concerns the current residence in Paris of a small army of architects, estimated to number as many as 3,000. A social psychologist who has traveled all over the world, and even taught for a year and a half at the the University of Hawaii, told me that he found Yugoslavs in centers of learning throughout Europe and the United States.[8]

King "Ethnos"

All these stimuli blow a new cosmopolitan wind over a country too long absorbed in its own solipsisms and still not yet fully awakened from the trance induced by the hypnosis of ideology.

To many foreign residents, Yugoslavia seems like a vehicle which, in trying to ford a swift-moving river, suddenly finds itself stalled in midstream. As the water swirls around it, the passengers of the car are more prone to squabbling among themselves as to which places they shall sit in, who shall drive, and who shall be allowed to back-seat drive, than to getting the motor running again and the car in motion. After a 25-year history which has seen the nation broken but not beaten in war, Sovietized, and then de-Sovietized into a singular brand of Titoist communism, the vehicle of state finds itself in midstream—that is, in the midst of an economic and social transformation wherein old institutions and controls struggle with newly released forces and concepts.

Ruling over the vagaries of the situation is an old monarch, King "Ethnos." His Greek name has the advantage of meaning both nation and people. The establishment of six republics in Yugoslavia after World War II gave political and territorial recognition to the six principal peoples of the nation and translated a pervasive, if often mystical, ethnic self-identity into more tangible self-government. The Yugoslav Federation is now engaged in a gradual transfer of central power to these republics (on which more shortly). Decentralization is the key fact of the day, and it is proceeding apace.

To grasp the Yugoslav reality, it is necessary to recognize that two main factors have held these republics together until now: the profound impact of Tito's leadership, and the threat of pressure—any pressure—from without. To continue the analogy of a vehicle, whenever the pressure is on, the motor hums smoothly—as it did during World War II when Yugoslavs of all ethnic derivations fought the invader; as it did in the 1950's when the country rallied behind its leaders in the face of grave Soviet threats; and as it did most recently when Yugoslavia's reformist neighbor, Czechoslovakia, fell prey not to threats but to outright invasion.

Remove Tito, turn off the current of pressure, and the motor may die. The leadership factor is bound to be altered in a few years; Tito's replacement is a committee of 15 men (described by Mr. Shoup in the preceding article), whose ability to hold the nation together remains to be seen. The factor of pressure will depend on European events. It is significant to note that when actual pressure on Yugoslavia has been lacking, Tito has been adept at fostering the impression that threats nonetheless lurked everywhere, warning his countrymen at one time or another about the dangers posed by Italian army maneuvers in Venetia, by the new junta of colonel-dictators in Greece, by the Bulgarians casting covetous eyes on Macedonia, by the CIA, by the presence of the US fleet in the Mediterranean, and so forth. It seems obvious he felt it was better to

[6] The former teaches at the University of Pennsylvania, the latter at Duke University.

[7] I rented a house in Dubrovnik from a Yugoslav oil engineer who was working for an American oil drilling outfit in Hassi Messaoud, Algeria. He visited me, driving up in a brand new green Mustang convertible bearing an Alberta (Canada) plate.

[8] He is returning home to become a professor in Ljubljana.

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keep popular attention riveted on outside enemies and what they might be doing, than to have various Slavs striving to best their neighbors.

Ethnocentrism pervades the life of the country. When one lives in Belgrade one is in Serbia, not Yugoslavia. Try to cover a story on art, books, cinema, education, religion, press, theater, behavior, or whatever, and you find you get a Serbian view of the Serbian side of the issue. Serbian actors on these many stages often do not know, and more often do not care to know, what is going on in Ljubljana, Skopje or Zagreb. And the reverse holds as well.

Nowhere else in Europe is this ethnic absorption so obvious. From Madrid to Helsinki, from Paris to Sofia, the capitals are the foci, the brains, the reflection of the entire nation. The only possible exception is Italy, but even there regional self-centeredness does not approach that in Yugoslavia.

Like a computer conceived and designed ethnically, each Yugoslav republic is programmed to calculate in terms of its own ethnic interest. Where it is in the lead, it neither needs nor looks to the nation. Slovenia, fast becoming a sort of Slavic Austria in material respects, aims at the further development of its economy on a self-sufficient rather than an interdependent federal basis.

One could feel the hot breath of Slovenian chauvinism in the air at the opening, in the spring of 1968, of a $30 million rail spur linking the new port of Koper (the old Italian Capodestria a few kilometers south of Trieste) to the national rail grid. A crowd of 3,000 heard a brass band compete with high oratory to herald the new iron artery as a Slovene-planned, Slovene-financed and Slovene-executed acomplishment. Press handouts and brochures featured the republic as a crossroads in the transportation network of central Europe, appending a map that linked up Slovenia with a heartland consisting of North Italy, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The only accent on federalism was a banquet given to Tito and his entourage at a local hotel that evening.

Where the republic is culturally and technically in the rear, as for instance in the Yugoslav "*mezzogiorno,*" [9] it tends to look to the federation as to a parent for help in distributing the family wealth equitably among all the children.[10] It also leans much more heavily toward the coordination of economic needs on a federation-wide basis. But it nevertheless fetes its economic achievements in a spirit of republicanism. For example, in the fall of 1967 the city of Skopje (Macedonia) celebrated the official opening of a $160 million steel mill—an investment which almost equalled, in one lump, the entire industrial capital invested in Macedonia since the end of World War II. Half the city's population turned out for opening day, and the streets were lined with children waving flags. But again, it was only the presence of Tito, who arrived to cut the tape, that gave this Macedonian festival a touch of Yugoslav flavor.

Many economists are doubtful whether the Skopje steel complex will be profitable, but the local force of engineers and other personnel, all of whom trained for the project from scratch at their own initiative, are optimistic that they can make steel pay by keeping labor productivity high and integrating final production into the Yugoslav economic system as a whole. While the project may appear illogical from the all-Yugoslav viewpoint, no one can deny that the Macedonians have created skills and jobs where none existed before.[11]

On another front, totally divergent republican approaches to life were revealed among the youth in the manifestos of student bodies in Belgrade and Ljubljana during last fall's university protests. While the Serbs' remonstrances centered on the idea, or ideal, of material egalitarianism ("Enough of Red Capitalism," "More Peasant and Worker Sons and Daughters at the University," "Equal Wages for All"), Ljubljana's manifesto was rife with anti-establishmentarianism (no matter what the establishment) and anarchism.

These esoteric variations among students are paralleled by a pride in language differences that extends down to the least educated, barely literate element of the populace—a factor that seriously impedes unity within the country.

A Slovenian highway patrolman who stops a for-

[9] A straight line drawn from the island of Krk, near Rijeka, southwest to the town of Pirot on the Bulgarian frontier divides the country into its developed northern and less developed southern halves. South of this line lie most of Bosnia-Herzegovina, all of Montenegro and Macedonia, and the southern part of Serbia.

[10] The equivalent of $110 million was invested in this area in 1968 through a special fund for underdeveloped regions administered at the federal level.

[11] It is one of the anomalies of Yugoslavia that whereas workers will migrate to Western Europe to find jobs, there is very little job-seeking across republican frontiers within the country. Though in the South unemployment is severe, jobs available in the North go begging. Many teachers prefer to remain, jobless, in Belgrade than to take up a teaching post in the provinces.

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eign car for a traffic violation will open with the query (in his own language), "Do you speak Slovenian?"—as unlikely a probability as if Basque had been in question—and only then try another language, usually German rather than Serbo-Croatian.

On one occasion a Croat friend and I crossed the border from Croatia into Slovenia to visit the little town of Krsko just over the frontier. The visit had been recommended by Janez Stanovnik, the affable Minister of State, a native of the town. During World War II the entire adult population of Krsko had been sent to Germany as forced laborers; upon their return, they had used the diverse skills they had learned to build a remarkably modern and economically active community in what was one of the most backward parts of the republic.[12] As we drove into town, we stopped to ask a uniformed policeman the way to the city hall. The cop, somewhat harassed by his duties as a traffic director (one in seven people owns a car in Slovenia today) yelled the way at us, adding rudely in his native language: "And why the hell don't you talk Slovenian?"

Dismantling the Mind

However fascinating these linguistic differences are to the philologist, they are the continuous seedbed sprouting rancor and discord in a nation where the top leadership is currently trying to get everybody to concentrate on one priority task: restyling the economy. The first thrust of this effort, which may be termed the dismantling phase, was launched by the Economic Reform of 1965.[13] It has involved the decentralization of the economic network and the placing of responsibility on individual enterprises to run at a profit or go under. The reform's chances of success have been debated at length in the Yugoslav press, but the issue will not be finally decided for several years.

One of the difficulties involved in the dismantling of a Stalinesque economy and its restructuring into a new model is the problem, not of self-management (a concept which, like God, no one can be against because no one has as yet proved it harmful), but of management *per se*. Ask any Yugoslav manager whether self-management is *good* management, and you get a puzzled reaction. In short, the hardest part in the dismantling process is the dismantling of the mind, the reshaping of thought processes and day-to-day reactions—and, especially, the creation of a new spirit of commercial aggressiveness and initiative in managers wholly unfamiliar with the business atmosphere that has been created.

One visit I made was to a toy factory in Istria, a modern-looking, smokeless industrial plant nestled against the low hills near Izola. Small electric-train sets were rolling off a production line tended by a labor force composed nearly entirely of women. An executive of the plant who was hosting the tour proudly showed us tiny freight cars, tank cars, refrigerator cars, and locomotives, all with the labels "Santa Fe," "New Haven," "Great Northern" or other names of US railroads. "Why only American names? How about European railroads?" we asked. The answer: "All our production is for the United States."

An astounding and encouraging reply—for at the heart of the reform is the calculated effort to make Yugoslav products competitive on the world market. Any factory which can crack the problem to the extent of selling its entire production to perhaps the toughest market of all, the USA, must be given high marks under the reform program.

"Yes, but the trouble is we don't make any money on them," said the executive. "See this," he continued, holding up an HO-model electric locomotive: "This sells for $12.98 in New York, but we only get a little over $1.75 for it here." "Why so?" he was asked. The reply, from an executive of the plant (!): "I don't know."

We stumbled onto the answer by accident. In the director's office we were informed that he was just breaking up a meeting with some Americans and would be free to talk. We met him and the "Americans"—one from Liechtenstein, the other an Austrian, and both with calling cards

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[12] I had presented to Stanovnik my idea that migrant workers represented a potential investment for Yugoslavia; the notion appealed to him, and he cited Krsko as an example of the return that could accrue from what was, at the time, a totally involuntary investment.

[13] The reform did away with governmental responsibility for the management of resources, transferring this responsibility to banks, firms and local leaders. Concomitant goals included: stimulating modernization and raising productivity in industry (through the import of modern, mostly Western, equipment and know-how); improving investment decisions by putting them on a wholly economic basis; pushing exports to the West to earn convertible currencies in order to offset the pressures of an increasing external debt and a negative balance of payments; devaluing the dinar by 40 percent to help the export drive; releasing many prices from government control and readjusting others; preventing inflation by monetary and fiscal measures; and liberalizing import regulations to provide competition to Yugoslav producers. For details, see Fred Warner Neal and Winston M. Fisk, "Yugoslavia: Toward a 'Market Socialism,'" *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1966.

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giving a post-office box address in Chappaqua, New York. In short non-American middlemen.

The sad sequel to this tale is that US embassy officials had provided the director with plentiful information on direct sales outlets for his products throughout the United States. His one need was to get on a plane and go make the contacts. But two or three years had passed and he had taken no action.

I could give several more examples of this sort reflecting the fact that the kind of business reflexes needed in management do not exist in many cases and that it is going to take another generation to instill them.

This is certainly not to imply, however, that the entrepreneur spirit is entirely lacking. The growing realization of the need to expose management to new ideas is emphatically illustrated by the recent birth of various consulting firms, advertising bureaus, and multi-purpose enterprises which combine service with production.

One of these latter I visited in Novi Sad. Its wide spectrum of projects already included the sale of 100 supermarkets to Hungary (for which it had handled all details from product design to final packaging), the solution of a variety of problems for business clients, and the nationwide distribution —partly with the aim of self-advertisement—of a weekly trade journal with a print run of 20,000 copies.

I interviewed the young director in his office. Fashion models were buzzing in and out with new modes for the director to examine. Secretaries flitted up from time to time with urgent questions. The place was alive with action. The director was not at all eager to discuss the theoretical aspects of the economic reform or of self-management; his interest was to make known to a foreign journalist the practical results of his and his colleagues' activity—the firm's growth and success.

"We anticipated the reform by at least two years," he said, "so we were all tooled up to enjoy its benefits. As for workers' participation in management, when we're making money and distributing a bonus, all our force is right behind us." The "we's" were delivered with an index finger pointing to his chest and a smile that had pragmatism written all over it.

This kind of anticipation and forthright approach to practical problems has not been the norm. An important underlying reason is that the economic reform, while opening the Yugoslav house to the breezes of worldwide business practice, has set so swift a pace of innovation and change that the archaic and nostalgic social philosophy—and its loyal adherents—cannot keep up.

Because of a kind of "San Andreas fault" between what is economically practical and what is socially ideal, many urgent problems requiring rapid decision-making are allowed to fester while the proper theoretical approach is sought. During a year-long period in 1966-67, for instance, an obviously necessary move to merge the six shipbuilding yards on the Adriatic was delayed by an effort to persuade a small minority of workers in the two smallest yards, who had voted against the merger, to see the advantages of cohesion. This was applauded in many quarters as an example of the functioning of workers' democracy and self-management. But in the meantime, several key engineers in the yards were invited to Holland to work with Dutch shipbuilders—and are now, in all likelihood, lost to the home industry.

At times it seems that the country, having written itself a prescription with its economic right hand, is unwilling to administer the dose with its political left hand. One need only look at the equivocal nature of the investment law of 1967 to realize

White-collar Yugoslav enterprise employee to blue-collar worker earning one-third his salary: "Why so annoyed? The factories belong to the workers."

—From Jez (Belgrade), April 4, 1969.

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the kind of compromise which, if it does not kill, will hardly cure, the patient. The purpose of the law is to attract foreign investment capital, but so far it has failed to do so. The nut of the problem is that the authorities have not been realistic enough with respect to the limits they have imposed on foreign control and ownership. Thus it seems likely that the law will have to be rewritten if it is to attract the amount of capital the country needs, especially to develop its considerable riches in extractables. This is a touchy question. But the Yugoslavs cannot have it both ways: they cannot have an inflow of money and also expect to exercise all control over it, as Indonesia found out under Sukarno, as Peru may be about to discover, and as countries such as Mexico, Japan and Iran seem long since to have recognized. Pavlovian-reflex references to the prewar Yugoslav experience, buttressed with Marxist sloganeering, will not solve the equation.[14]

A proposed law that would prohibit enterprises from shipping goods in privately-owned trucks (mentioned in Mr. Shoup's article) provides another case in point. In seeking to penalize the private truckers, the law, if it were passed, would probably hamstring the enterprises themselves. If the socialist trucking enterprises were well organized, the private truckers (who make perhaps the largest incomes in Yugoslavia) could be run right out of business.[15] But instead of tackling the real problem, the proposed solution simply creates others.

This kind of "backward-think" is all too prevalent in Yugoslavia. The source of it is envy and jealousy. One is constantly aware that these emotions, rather than rectitude, lie at the heart of demands for social equality.[16] Yet the fact is that the social system has failed to provide, not just a good trucking system, but a host of other services that could make the country not only economically more efficient but a pleasanter place to live.

Private restaurateurs on the Dalmatian Coast who go about their business of dispensing service for profit—to the profit of the Yugoslav tourist industry as well—are harassed, on the basis of petty regulations, by jealous neighbors and local officials whose main motivation is envy rather than interest in seeing that the restaurants function within the law. Such regulations—including a ceiling on the number of employees a private enterprise may hire[17]—stifle the attempts at variety and innovation that are precisely the qualities most needed in this multimillion dollar business.

The Brake of Conservatism

A few years back, one of the sole places in Belgrade for the young to entertain themselves was, apart from the youth house Dom Omladina, a discotheque inaugurated by three young people in 1967. After a long battle with neighbors who lived in an adjoining apartment building and who mistakenly saw in the enterprise everything from a bawdy house to a drug dispensary, the discotheque was closed down by the authorities. One spirited journalist commented in the press that though the reactionaries would probably be able to close down nine more discotheques like Belgrade's first, all for the wrong reasons, there would come a time when the eleventh one would be accepted as the entertaining, and totally inoffensive, place for fun and congregation that it was.

Having failed in Belgrade, the trio next tried to open a second discotheque in the vacation city of Dubrovnik, in a large cellar underneath a government office that had not been used since the war. But after months of trying to unsnarl the red tape wound around the project by a wooden officialdom, they gave up.

A sociologist, writing to me about this case of initiative thwarted by traditional forces of authority, commented:

On the discotheques, the Dubrovnik episode would make an excellent subject for a Ph.D. thesis today on Yugoslavia. The story wouldn't lack any of the necessary ingredients, including investment of capital, private initiative, competition with government-operated bars, red tape, administrative and bureaucratic snarls, dubious interpretation of the law, disregard for time, police-made references. It was a real Kafka novel put into practice.

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[14] In 1968 foreign loan capital flowing into the country, mainly in the form of Western suppliers' medium-term credits, fell just short of $400 million. The World Bank loaned some $50-60 million for the construction of the Belgrade-to-Bar railroad. Direct foreign investment was inconsiderable.

[15] One couple, he a radio staffer, she a doctor, told me that their combined salary was many times lower than the income of a relative who owned a private truck. Many professionals own trucks and employ chauffeurs to operate them.

[16] These emotions may be part of the Serbian national character. I was told the following joke on several occasions: A Serb peasant is visited by an angel and told that God has decided to grant him one wish. He has a hard time deciding. Pressed for an answer by the angel, he finally makes his choice: "I wish my neighbor's cow would drop dead."

[17] Private-sector enterprises are limited to a maximum of 5 employees; how much unemployment could be absorbed by removing this constraint is difficult to assess.

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He could also have added that the "system" had deprived itself not only of the opportunity to develop an economic asset where none had existed before, but also of the taxes that would have derived from that asset.

The frustration that is engendered in people who have had an opportunity to look beyond the country's frontiers, and thus to compare the "Yugoslav way" with others, is illustrated by the comment of a section chief for a large tourist enterprise, who had lived and worked abroad for several years. After listening one evening to the complaints of several foreigners that there was no variety in Belgrade's night life (a drabness that undertakings like the discotheque were designed to correct), the tourist executive wiped his brow. "You're telling me?" he groaned. "Long before I left to go abroad, I suggested that we could use some foreign restaurants or at least some café-night clubs featuring the food and music of our republics. But I never got anywhere against the general apathy."

The publisher of a popular illustrated monthly told me that I could look into the problem of self-management in microcosm right in his own shop. Abroad he had noticed that greeting cards with amusing cartoons and pithy comments were fast-sellers. At home he proposed to his workers' council that the enterprise be the first to produce them. None of his colleagues agreed. "Why take the risk?" "Let someone else try and if he succeeds, then we can do it!" After months of persuasion, the publisher was finally able to overcome resistance. The result: good sales and bonuses for everyone.

Whether a semi-developed nation can afford the luxury of deferring to conservative inhibitions and nostalgic ideological notions in the face of economic competition on the world scene is a question that is most germane to any speculation on the future of Yugoslavia. The Economic Reform has half answered that question with a loud negative. We shall have to wait to see how far the reform will take the country.

There are many problems, of course, that the reform cannot cure. Some of these derive from Yugoslavia's isolation within Europe. "When shall we finally join Europe?" was the rhetorical question posed by a prominent columnist, as he discussed the somewhat ephemeral advantages of belonging to the bloc of non-aligned and uncommitted nations that has been Tito's pet preoccupation in the international arena.[18]

Not being in Europe hurts. To cite one example, I recall visiting "Sirmium," a huge industrial farm near Sremska Mitrovica. The highway out to the farm was a living contrast of the old and new systems of agriculture. To the left, on the consolidated lands, wheat was coming up in an endless blanket stretching for miles. Tractors and fertilizer-spreaders rolled over it. One could have been in Oklahoma or Saskatchewan. To the right, peasants tilled the soil in the traditional manner, with horse and plow. The whole flat Voivodina countryside was cut up into small parcels, many of which, though the year was advancing into summer, were planted to nothing at all.

The giant 6-foot-6 director expatiated on his successes, which were considerable. What were his problems, he was asked. He had two. Concerning the first, he pointed to a collection of pens and sheds. "See that operation?" he said: "We fattened 20,000 baby beefs for sale there last year. Do you know how many we will fatten this year? 400." The reason: the Italians had closed off a rich market for Yugoslav beef by raising tariffs. Only an agreement with the European Economic Community (at whose headquarters Yugoslavia as yet has no officially-recognized mission) could solve the director's dilemma.[19]

His second problem was related to the first. "None of us has concentrated on retail marketing," he said. "But we have a potentially good market for food in this country if we could build our own retail outlets." The solution, if the complex details could be worked out, would be for large farm operations to establish their own food-store chains.

I was particularly impressed with the strides made in agriculture at Sirmium and a dozen other farms I visited. Notably efficient operations included a farm, "Beograd," of over 100,000 hectares, entirely reclaimed from swampland across the Danube River from the capital it feeds, and "Grocka", an orchard of peaches and other fruits covering miles of hills.[20]

The three-tier system of agriculture has put an end to the vicious social struggle that still char-

[18] Yugoslavia's trade with such political allies as India and Egypt is minimal. Tito's policy may fade, after his passing, as fast as de Gaulle's policies on the foreign scene seem to be fading in France.

[19] The Yugoslavs maintain a representative with ambassadorial rank in Brussels, but he is not officially recognized by the EEC. In late May of this year the EEC turned down a Yugoslav request for negotiations on his status and other problems.

[20] "Grocka" is undertaking vast replanting, putting in stock that largely originated in Oregon, USA.

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acterizes agriculture in the Soviet Union and much of Eastern Europe.[21] Land-buying by the bigger farms has decelerated recently, but it is expected to pick up again when their profits rise and when more abundant employment opportunities in the cities induce greater numbers of peasants to sell out. If the trend of the past decade continues, one can foresee the end of private peasant farming in a generation or two, at least in those areas of the country where it is patently inefficient.[22]

The Political Puzzle

No commentary on present-day Yugoslavia would be complete without a glimpse at the political scene, though that is a hard subject to tackle in brief.

Understanding the twists and turns of Yugoslav political life, even when one is in the country, is a frustrating and complicated business. One can begin by perusing the two morning dailies in Belgrade, *Borba* and *Polityka*, whose columns are translated into English by nightfall by a joint British-American committee for the use of the diplomatic corps. Reading this press was one of the least satisfying experiences this writer has had since becoming literate. The language often has the ring of some 16th or 17th-century sectarian debate. Hard and reliable facts are few and far between in the 50 or so closely-typewritten, legal-size pages the translators churn out each day. The meaning must be ferreted out from hints, suggestions, allusions, indirect references, and aspersions.

Personal communication is often just as unsatisfactory. A member of the party Central Committee whom I interviewed was so tautological and tortuous in his verbiage that, after a good half-hour, I was still unable to elicit one concrete piece of data about the party's "reorganization," the principal focus of his concern. This appears to be part of a game that goes on all the time. At a press conference given by the outgoing head of the Communist Youth, questions requiring factual replies were consistently referred to staff members to be answered at a later date. Finally one foreign journalist got to his feet to ask if anything *at all* of interest was going to be aired at the conference. This directness produced nods of assent from his press colleagues and a reaction of merriment among many of the Yugoslavs in the room.

Perseverance is mandatory in the hunt for the Yugoslav political animal, which, after hours of conversations and bushels of words, one thinks one begins to discern in the thick jungle of cant and sanctimony that all too often pervade political discourse. Fortunately, there are moments of revelation. For example, the deputy director of a leading political weekly let out some frank remarks on the party's "reorganization," a catchword which can be interpreted as "the on-going search for a new political structure in the country."
He said:

The economic reform is a sort of cattle prod to politics; it is part of an unexplored river down which we are being driven by the force of the new economics. All intelligent people recognize that technocrats are an important new force outside the party. Indeed, the party men may have to take a back seat to them in coming events.

With similar candor, a noted economist with whom I talked proffered the theory that none knew any longer what the party's role really was or what it ultimately should be. He felt that in any event there was no longer any need for indoctrinating either party members or unaffiliated citizens in positions of responsibility. "Yugoslavs have become good socialists the way Britishers became good democrats," was the way he put it.

At the same time he went on to defend the notion—currently in vogue among Yugoslav ideologues—that the creation of a multi-party system, even on a peaceful basis (this doubtful at best) would be a retrogression, if not a disaster, for Yugoslavia.[23] He stated:

[21] Under this system, adopted in the early 1950's, three type of agricultural operations are carried on: large industrial farms are operated like factories with a force of peasant employees; smaller industrial cooperative farms have contractual relations with individual peasants who are supplied with stock, equipment and technical know-how in return for a part of their production; non-cooperating private peasants work their own land.

[22] While the trend is away from private farming, it might be noted that many peasants make a healthy income from specialty crops. Some were earning the equivalent of a year's factory wages from a single hectare during the strawberry season. In Macedonia peppers have been very profitable in recent years.

[23] Several philosophical articles have been written in the past two or three years on the possibility of a multi-party system, but none of them has come to real grips with the problem of the diversities in the country around which such parties would form and the tensions that would result. The subject is still risky in any event. The author of one such article, a young philosopher, turned down my suggestion for a conversation in a tone (over the telephone) of mixed anger and fear. The anger stemmed from his impression that West European papers had distorted his article in a simplistic manner; the fear reflected his obvious concern over what official reactions might follow from his having become the focus of so much foreign interest.

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We want to get rid of political society as such, with all its party leaders and party bureaus. We want everyone to play a role; we want to form an "association of associations," with a rotation of the people in power to counteract stagnancy. We are on the verge, perhaps, of a period something like that in 19th-century England and France, where liberal capitalism produced Western democracy. We feel we can, with our system, produce real social democracy.

This theme, albeit with varying overtones, is constantly in the wind. A prominent expert in international relations adumbrated the notion that the League of Communists will ultimately have to disappear somewhere far along the line. In the meantime, he stated solemnly, every society must have an elite which influences general thought patterns and sustains efforts to arrive at goals. It is problematical whether thinking Yugoslavs really give credence to this notion of a future "a-party" system. But it is an important doctrinal innovation of Titoism and it is therefore bandied about in an almost ritualistic fashion. As for the man on the street, it was my impression that he was largely apathetic about both politics and ideology, contemptuous of politicians, and interested primarily in his own material advancement.

A West European specialist with long residence in the USSR and other parts of East Europe saw political Yugoslavia as an oligarchy in its most classical form, upheld by a party trying to cure itself of its own sclerosis but totally unsure of the right therapy. "You can paste any label you want to on this oligarchy," he went on unpedantically, "it's not important. What *is* important is to determine whether progress toward economic and social goals is being made on a rational basis." He saw a great deal of evidence of such progress insofar as domestic issues were concerned, but was skeptical about Yugoslav foreign policy, which he characterized as "confused by ideology." He was also pessimistic about the ability of any post-Tito directorate to push its own self-liberalization, giving two reasons: the paucity of historical precedent, and the fact that many institutions in Yugoslavia constitute a real block to the further growth of freedom.

For the puzzled onlooker, I would suggest a look at Mexico as a backboard on which to bounce the current Yugoslav political prognosis. Not only does this lead one away from the dismal swamp of ideology and its interpretation but gives the advantage of certain parallels upon which to construct possible comparisons and predictions. Not the least of these parallels are the one-party system, the myth of an on-going revolution, and a rapidly developing economy faced with a massive problem of income distribution. Somehow Mexico has managed to exist—and indeed to achieve considerable progress—over the past few decades under a one-party system (the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional*) which provides an institutional framework for contending political views and factions, and which—despite a tendency to corruption—shows no sign of evolving into an oligarchical or personal dictatorship. Perhaps this is the direction in which the Yugoslav system is heading, too.

The professional "Communists"—the party functionaries—in Yugoslavia make a valiant effort to rationalize the political situation, which often confuses the issue by raising as many questions as it answers. One of the more communicative officials with whom I talked defended the party's mediating role in what he called Yugoslavia's "historical-philosophical-humanistic struggle." From the party's point of view, as I could assess it, dangers to the development of the current Yugoslav system have arisen from two conceits. The first is rooted in self-seeking, which has caused resistance to economic reform and the ideas of self-management by a large clique of persons who long to return to what was for them a more secure past. The second springs from intellectual arrogance, expressed in the attitude of so-called "radicals" within the intelligentsia who—seeing themselves as political pragmatists—scoff about "our hope and belief that our young working class of uneducated and semi-literates can one day take their place in a society which will allow everybody to develop on an equal basis." In the minds of party theorists, the rank opportunists and the self-centered eggheads (respectively symbolized, perhaps, by Rankovic and Djilas) are equally dangerous to their own concept of how Yugoslavia should develop.

Future Prospects

What the future holds for Yugoslavia, given the maze of contradictory imponderables in that beautiful, many-faceted country, is hard to predict. Within the maze, the course of development with respect to three of the problems discussed above will be crucial. These key problems pertain to the uncertainties of the political succession, the impact of ethnic rivalries, and—of course—the progress of economic reform.

Concerning the succession, those attempting to apply what Lenin termed "*kto kovo*" to Yugoslavia are in for a difficult time. To reach for an analogy,

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the setting up of a 15-man executive bureau to succeed Tito can be compared to the custom in prize-fighting of naming a list of the principal heavyweight contenders. Nobody will know who the real sluggers are until they get into the ring, and that won't happen until the final retirement of the present champion.

As for King "Ethnos," however strong the centrifugal force driving the various Yugoslav peoples to serve their own interests, a counteractive centripetal force exists simply because of the absence of any solid, viable alternative to unity. The idea of converting Yugoslavia from a federation into a confederacy is sedulously suggested in many quarters as the next step that ought to be taken to institutionalize ethnic rights on a more harmonious basis. Perhaps this notion will bear fruit.

The problem of economic reform involves the bipolarity of an economic system that is trying to combine commercial and fiscal pragmatism with neo-Marxist theology. At present pragmatism is to the fore, and progress reports on the reform are encouraging. Following a period of slowdown, the economy took a new upturn in mid-1968, when the government adopted a policy of reflation. The year 1968 as a whole registered an advance over 1967 of 6.5 percent in industrial production and 4 percent in overall growth. A good part of this gain was attributable to increased productivity, since employment in the same period rose only 1 percent (nevertheless reversing a two-year decline). Exports leaped forward 13 percent, for the most part in a westerly direction, indicating that the economists who bet on the ability of Yugoslav enterprises to compete, once they were under pressure to do so, may well win their wager.

Signs point to the continuation, strengthening and broadening of the economic reform. It got solid backing at the Ninth Congress of the Yugoslav party early this year, and more and more people in the population at large seem to be moving toward the view that the advantages of the new measures far outweigh the handicaps. At the same time many problems remain to be ironed out. For example, something must be done about income policies—so far left to the determination of workers' councils in each enterprise—since, with characteristic lack of foresight, many factories have been voting themselves higher wages than their production warranted, at the expense of capital investment. This problem could be solved by legislation requiring that a given proportion of net income be set aside for investment.

One could speculate at length on more radical directions in which the reform could move, including the further liberalization of private economic activity, the passage of a new law on foreign investments offering better terms to foreign capital, and the establishment of closer bonds with Western Europe. To return to an earlier analogy, steps taken along any of these paths would give new impetus to the Yugoslav vehicle of state out in midstream. But at present they appear to be remote possibilities; certainly they could not come about without a further erosion of doctrinaire attitudes and more fearless action in the spirit of the "open door."

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BOOKS

The "Spring of 1968"

Z. A. B. ZEMAN: *Prague Spring.*
Hill and Wang, New York, 1969.
HARRY SCHWARTZ: *Prague—200 Days.*
Praeger, New York, 1969.
PHILIP WINDSOR and A. ROBERTS: *Czechoslovakia, 1968.*
Columbia University Press, 1969.
ROBERT LITTLE, ED.: *Czech Black Book.*
Praeger, New York, 1969.
JOSEPH WECHSBERG: *The Voices.*
Doubleday, New York, 1969.

Reviewed by Cary O. Fisher

THREE AND A HALF centuries ago, on May 23, 1618, not long before noon, a hundred Czech barons and knights arrived at the Bohemian Chancellery in the royal castle in Prague. They were armed and angry, and they were looking for two royal governors whom they held principally responsible for denying the Protestant estates and subjects of Bohemia the religious freedoms the King had granted them almost a decade earlier. When they found the culprits, they threw them out of the castle windows. The startled bureaucrats landed on the dung-cushioned floor of the King's moat and walked away humbled, richly scented, but not otherwise harmed. Thus, in a mild way, began an uprising in defense of a religious confession that embodied the spiritual heritage of the emergent Czech national culture. It was also the spark that touched off the Thirty Years' War, a catastrophic conflagration which eventually engulfed most of Europe and devastated Bohemia culturally as well as physically. More than two centuries were to pass before the cultural heritage of the nation was revived and before its propagators began reassessing the prerogatives of Czech nationhood.

The double relevance of that historical defenestration must have struck many of those living in Prague in the anniversary year 1968. Once again detested bureaucrats personifying an alien culture, disappointed hopes, and broken promises were cast out of the castle in Prague. With the ouster of Antonin Novotny as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on January 5, 1968, a revolutionary development was set in motion which aimed at reasserting the cultural and political continuity of the Czechoslovak state—and, by that very fact, presented a critical challenge to the political system and foreign policies of the Soviet Union, the now dominant power in Ceneral Europe.

By February of 1968 it was evident that more than a change of leading personnel was taking place in Prague; that indeed the political thrust originating both within and outside Communist ranks had as its objective nothing less than final the destruction of the system of political power which Stalin had imposed in 1948-49 and which the Czechoslovak CP had operated for twenty years with devotion—and with disastrous consequences.

In scanning the brief history of Czechoslovakia's "renewal" (and its current process of "normalization"), it is instructive to recall the rhetoric

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offered in March 1968 by the present, ever agile Party First Secretary, Gustav Husak. The changes carried out since the January Plenum, he declared in a speech in Bratislava, mean in practice "an end to the system of personal power [which] . . . , translated into political terminology, means tyranny. To bring about the end of tyranny, there must first be an end to tyrants." Husak, at that time still far from the center of power, continued:

Comrades, in the system which has crystallized and stabilized itself in the course of the past 50 years and which to a certain extent has gradually accepted changes and compromises, yet in substance remained firm, we are now experiencing *revolutionary changes, a revolutionary turn. Our party, our society, seeks another political system, the opposite of the political system that we have had so far.*[1] (Author's emphasis.)

The visionary goals as well as the positive political program of the "renewal" movement rested solidly on the historical traditions of Czech humanist radicalism. This is how the old Communist, Josef Smrkovsky, who among the new party leaders had become the most vigorous spokesman of the Prague Spring, summarized on television in March 1968 the political plans as well as the universal aspirations of the reform movement:

We can afford to institute a true democracy . . . Power will be strictly divided between the government, the National Assembly and the national committees [local government bodies]. Each of these organs will participate in exercising state power on the basis of the party program and the Constitution. We will democratize life in our social organizations. The citizens will decide their affairs for themselves. . . . They will elect their leaders from their own ranks. We will support all democratic rights. We will make ourselves strong for the liberty of the people based on their constitution, for civil and human rights, for freedom of assembly and for the right to travel freely. . . .

We are convinced that we Czechs and Slovaks not only can, but must [link socialism with freedom]. . . . *We have the preconditions for raising society to a higher level of socialism.* And we are sure that what we are doing will set an example for the comrades in other socialist countries who term what we are doing a great experiment. *We think it is a project, a deliberate project, which hitherto has not been carried out by any socialist society.* (Author's emphasis.)

On the night of August 20-21, 1968, Soviet armies swept across the country, thus scuttling the great project of the Czechoslovak reformers. Yet what the "preconditions for raising society to a higher level of socialism" indeed are, and what country may possess them, remains to this day a question of more than passing historical interest. We should, therefore, be grateful to the authors of the books under review for having illuminated this problem in their discussions of last year's Czechoslovak events.

OF THE FIVE BOOKS, Mr. Zeman's *Prague Spring* touches upon the question in the most direct manner. Perhaps this is so because its author approached the subject with two distinct advantages: he grew up in Czechoslovakia, and he is a trained historian (currently teaching modern history at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland). His origin thus enabled him to consult original Czech sources and to speak with people during his visit to Czechoslovakia last year, and his training made him sensitive to the distinct historical roots and the wider cultural context of the 1968 renewal.

In one of his chapters, Mr. Zeman refers to the Czechoslovak spring as "an historian's revolution" —a very apt characterization, for it reminds us that in 1968 the Czechs and Slovaks not only reverted to the language of the sane, not only embarked upon a thorough-going criticism of their social, economic, and political order, but also—indeed above all—began to inspect their country's immediate as well as its more distant past. The abandonment of censorship, which took place simultaneously on the 20th anniversary of the Communist seizure of power and the 50th of the country's inception as a free and independent state, led to a reexamination of Czechoslovakia's place in the world and in history. It led to demands for redress of the wrongs inflicted upon thousands of citizens in the past, to a study of the causes of recent social and economic calamities, and to a search for new institutional forms that would express the country's new political imagination. In their extraordinary attempt at self-understanding, Czechoslovakia's intellectuals and political leaders looked farther back, too—to the Republic of the elder Masaryk, to the Czech cultural rennaissance of the 19th century, and to its Hussite leadership of the 14th—for inspiration and guidance. The Czechoslovak renewal movement of 1968—before and after August—was thus a very self-conscious process, a truly deliberate revolution, and not a spontaneous one (as Mr. Harry Schwartz unfortunately asserts in the introduction to *his* book).

Professor Zeman is at his best where he discusses and documents this national preoccupation with the meaning of Czechoslovakia's cultural and political heritage. He does so most effectively in his chapters dealing with recent Czechoslovak literature and the Writers' Congress of June 1967; with the historical

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relationship of Czechs and Slovaks; and with the research on political reform and the requirements of the scientific-technical revolution, sponsored by the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences in 1966-1968. All this is immensely helpful towards a clarification of the still much misunderstood sources of the Czechoslovak revolutionary movement in 1968. At the same time, it is a valuable contribution to the broader problem of the capacity of Marxist thought and of the Soviet political system to adjust to the cultural requirements of modern society.

Unfortunately, Professor Zeman is rather at a disadvantage where he attempts to analyze the *process* of the Czechoslovak revolution—that is to say, the political forces and institutions, both internal and external, that first brought the revolution to life and eventually suppressed it. In these sections of the book, the narrative is often vague and incomplete. One finds curious lapses of judgment and, in a few instances, even factual errors. It is not true, for instance, that the statue of Stalin which had for a number of years loomed over Prague "was removed after Khrushchev's speech to the 20th Party Congress in 1956"—it was demolished six years later, in 1962. Mr. Zeman's assertion that his contemporaries of middle-class origin (now in their 40's) "had successfully . . . . come to terms with the political situation after 1948" stands in curious contrast to his later statement that "as the final irony, measures against the defeated 'class enemy' sent thousands of people to factories, mines and other places of *honest but unaccustomed* employment" (author's italics). Last year's testimony of some of the 60,000 or more veterans of prisons and forced labor camps starkly contradicts the cavalier tone of both these statements. Similarly, Professor Zeman would surely be tempted today to revise his conclusions that Dubcek "can deal with the Russians as an equal," that he is "tough and has a political program," and that by February 1968 he had "made certain of support or at least benevolent neutrality on the part of the influential Communist leaders in Eastern Europe." Such lapses of judgment, as well as the final chapter, evidently hastily added on the publisher's urging, unfortunately detract from what is otherwise an admirable commentary on the Czechoslovak Spring.

THE WORK OF HARRY SCHWARTZ, *Prague's 200 Days*, is a fine complement to Professor Zeman's book. Mr. Schwartz is of course the veteran reporter, editorial writer and resident Sovietologist of the *New York Times*, and he has put here his professional skills to excellent use. His book is a well-balanced, meticulously researched, and compassionate account of Czechoslovakia's struggle for democracy. He begins with a survey of the first two decades of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia and then leads up to the core of his subject with a comprehensive account of the principal issues—the economic crises, the Slovak revolt, and the intellectual ferment—that led to the unseating of Novotny and his regime. Unlike Professor Zeman, Mr. Schwartz carries his account through the period of the Soviet invasion and the subsequent popular resistance and official accommodation to the invading forces.

As a seasoned student of Soviet as well as of world affairs, Mr. Schwartz devotes a good deal of attention to the international aspect of Dubcek's struggle for survival. Just as Professor Zeman familiarizes the reader with the cultural context of the Prague Spring, Mr. Schwartz imparts an intelligent comprehension of the outward limits on the Czechoslovak efforts at emancipation. Unlike many other observers, he is keenly aware of the restalinization of Soviet politics since the Siniavsky-Daniel trial in early 1966, and of the acute danger that the Czechoslovak experiment represented to the Brezhnev leadership, apprehensive as it is over the stability of its imperial domain. Despite all the appearances of detente in Europe in 1967, the reader of *Prague's 200 Days* may legitimately conclude that given the facts of Soviet power in Central Europe and the squalid political imagination of the current Kremlin leadership, the international preconditions for Czechoslovakia's revolution simply did not exist in 1968.

IT HAS BECOME amply evident that most of the reform Communist leaders in Prague had never come to terms with this unpalatable fact. The shocked disbelief that overwhelmed them on the night of August 20 was genuine. It is well to remember, however, that had they known better, they might not have had the courage to free the forces of public opinion in February and thus make possible not only the Czechoslovak Spring and the healing of their two nations, but also their own unprecedented rise to authority.

All this has relevance in juxtaposition to the sympathetic criticism that Mr. Schwartz directs at Alexander Dubcek and his fellow leaders. "These men promised to tell their people the truth," he

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writes, "but they never frankly discussed the Soviet threat with their nation before August 20. . . . By completely ruling out the possibility of armed resistance to an invasion, they threw away the possibilty they had of preventing the entry of the 'fraternal armies.'" True enough, but this judgment fails to take into account the limits of the subjective universe in which Dubcek and his comrades in the leadership lived. They were lifelong Communists, convinced as Marxist socialists of the righteousness of their cause, and they were utterly inexperienced in the world of international power politics. They simply could not bring themselves to view the Soviet threats with the seriousness they deserved. As a result, they thought it prudent to remain discreet about Soviet behavior so as not to encourage their conservative opponents and discourage their supporters. Before August, the anti-Soviet front in Czechoslovakia had not yet been solid. By the same token, since they could neither admit to themselves the possibility of an armed conflict with the first land of socialism, nor admit to the Russians that the Czechoslovak program in any way contradicted Soviet interests, they foreclosed for themselves the opportunity of making even political use of their army. In the end, as captives in Moscow, they surrendered the political trust that was theirs, and forfeited their party's last chance to national leadership. Their personal tragedy is intimately bound up with the profound contradictions of the Communist movement which brought them to the fore, as well as with the old existential dilemmas of the two nations they once courageously represented.

In his somewhat melancholy final reflections, Mr. Schwartz offers his conclusions—all sensible, even though one may wish he had qualified them here and there. Prague, in Moscow's view, "had to be stopped from further progress toward democracy because it threatened the bureaucratic dictatorship in the Soviet Union and the satellite countries." The invasion, in its global implications, has accelerated the missile race, darkened the prospect for general adoption (with special reference to German accession) of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and exacerbated the Sino-Soviet conflict. All in all, "the insecurity and the incompetence of the Brezhnev leadership in Moscow emerge vividly from the history of Czechoslovakia in 1968," concludes Mr. Schwartz, also indicating, quite sensibly, his uneasiness over the thought that such a regime should command enough nuclear power to devastate the earth.

MR. PHILIP WINDSOR, Reader in International Relations at the London School of Economics, reaches a related conclusion—namely, "that one cannot assume any real continuity of policy in the Soviet regime, and that the party and system are at present in an extraordinary state of flux." His essay, "Czechoslovakia, Eastern Europe and Detente," is one of the two contributions that make up *Czechoslovakia 1968*, a book published under the auspices of the London Institute for Strategic Studies. As his title indicates, Mr. Windsor is principally concerned with the implications of the Czechoslovak crises for détente in Europe. Yet this —like so many aspects of his study—does not always emerge very clearly. Indeed, it is the marvel of Mr. Windsor's essay *in toto* that quite a number of valid conclusions and interesting observations emerge from an analytical exercise which is as ambitious as it is disconcerting: observable facts vie with rather vague generalizations, one assertion seems to be contradicted by another, and penetrating insights are frequently followed by tantalizing hypotheses that raise more questions than they answer.

Mr. Windsor's treatment of Soviet reactions to the "Czechoslovak Spring" provides perhaps the most glaring illustration of these solecisms. The reforms, he indicates again and again, including those spelled out in the "Action Program," were hardly different in substance from those that had already been adopted "inside the Soviet Union, or . . . at least aspired to in the Soviet Union by men who were ready to support [them] when [they] occurred somewhere else" (p. 17)—surely an astonishing observation, as even a cursory reading of the relevant materials is bound to confirm. Discounting the very conspicuous consternation caused in the Warsaw Pact capitals by Novotny's ouster and its immediate aftermath, Mr. Windsor asserts that at the so-called "Dresden Conference" of the Warsaw Pact powers, which took place at the end of March, "Czechoslovakia's conduct of its affairs was not on the agenda" (p. 27)—whereas, as the communiqué of the conference made explicit, Czechoslovakia had not only been discussed, but had indeed been the principal topic of the conference. "There is no evidence," Mr. Windsor states confidently on p. 30, that "anyone" in Eastern Europe was "seriously concerned" about "the developments in Czechoslovakia" as a "threat to the stability of the other regimes in Eastern Europe." Yet fifteen pages later, he (quite correctly) notes that "the evolution of events . . . in

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the Eastern Bloc was causing increasing concern to the Soviet leaders about the extent of their authority in Eastern Europe." And in his conclusion he makes a similar remark—though again asserting that "the interaction between developments inside the Soviet Union, particularly in the sphere of economic policy, and the developments in Eastern Europe, was considerably closer than had been generally assumed" (p. 74)—a fascinating but, alas, totally unsubstantiated piece of speculation.

Such curiosities aside, Mr. Windsor's essay contains a number of astute observations that are worth noting. It is his view, for instance, that as a consequence of the "Brezhnev doctrine" postulating the indivisibility of "socialism" (including the right of Soviet intervention where "socialism" is threatened), and the revived Stalin doctrine in effect subordinating the interests of communism to those of the USSR, no country in Eastern Europe can feel safe any longer unless it slavishly follows the Soviet line; and that this in turn clouds the prospects for a European détente with fundamental uncertainty. There is ample evidence, Mr. Windsor notes, that while the Soviet Union may wish to reach a *modus vivendi* with the United States, it is less than enthusiastic about similar arrangements in Europe, involving—as they inevitably would—a relaxation of its hold on its East European empire. Yet, the will for détente has survived in Europe, and, Mr. Windsor argues, the effort is worth continuing. "Very little can be attempted unless much is attempted," he observes, following up this felicitous phrase with a number of qualified suggestions to the West, including the offering of "certain assurances to the Soviet Union" (recognition of the GDR, for example), radical rethinking of the existing political and military arrangements in Europe, and steps (whose nature he unfortunately does not spell out) designed to encourage the more progressive forces in the Soviet leadership.

IT IS PARADOXICAL that the integrative social process that was set in motion in Czechoslovakia after January 1968 received its strongest impetus only after the Soviet invasion in August of that year. Shocked to the core by the unexpected attack of their "allies," the people of Czechoslovakia launched a protracted national resistance to the occupation armies and achieved a unity of state and society which the country had never experienced before. For the first time in 1968 and, indeed, in the history of the Czechoslovak working class, the workers found a common purpose with the rest of society, thus bringing the three essential ingredients of the renewal movement—socialism, democracy, and self-determination—to full fruition. At the same time, as the last vestiges of Czechoslovak sovereignty were being destroyed, Czech and Slovaks discovered how strongly common interest binds them to a common state. In the turbulence of that last week of August, the idea of Slovak separatism may well have been extinguished forever.

The study by Mr. Adam Roberts, "Czechoslovakia: Invasion and Resistance," which follows that of Mr. Windsor, deals precisely with the issues engendered by the Soviet invasion. A longtime student of non-violent resistance and currently a lecturer in International Relations at the London School of Economics, Mr. Adams is clearly at home with this subject. His lucid exposition brings out the remarkable features of the Czechoslovak civilian resistance: its relationship to the country's national traditions, its lack of advance planning or, for that matter, central direction, and—despite the latter—its scale "never previously [paralleled] . . . in a militarily occupied country." The resistance was peaceful and its principal feature was total and consistent non-cooperation with the invading armies, aimed at frustrating the invader's military and political policies and undermining the morale and efficiency of the expeditionary forces.

It is the singular achievement of the *Czech Black Book*, admirably edited and prefaced by Robert Littell, and of Joseph Wechsberg's poignant little volume, *The Voices*, that they capture the quality of spirit of the Czechoslovak resistance, its rationale, its techniques and some of its devastating effectiveness. All this is recorded in minute detail, to be pondered, analyzed, or just savored by all those who recognize the drama of 1968 as the great human event that it was. The first volume is a rather stark compilation of eyewitness testimony, official documents, appeals, speeches, leaflets, newspaper articles and radio broadcasts hastily assembled in September by members of the Historical Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. It is an invaluable record of the invasion and resistance in Prague. Mr. Wechsberg's testimonial is more personal in nature. Throughout the first invasion week, he sat stunned and bereaved by his radio in Vienna, recording the dedicated voices coming out of the ether from his native land. His account is a moving and instructive document—

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though unfortunately marred by many misspellings of Czech names and places .

CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN THE WAKE of the invasion was a political anomaly. It was an occupied country without an occupation government, or for that matter without *any* authoritative government. Yet it maintained civil order and conducted a comprehensive — if passive — struggle against the invasion forces. The strength of resolution required for this accomplishment is the best testimony to the deep national commitment to the Renewal program of the preceding months. Still, the organization of the resistance would have been impossible without the astounding performance of the free Czechoslovak radio. Just as the media launched the revolution in the early months of the year, so now the men and women of the radio, through astonishing feats of political sagacity and technical ingenuity, became the true government of the resisting country, redefining the national purpose, defending the integrity of the state, articulating the doctrine, the aims and the modalities of the resistance, informing the population, maintaining order and buoying up the national spirit. They were the real heroes of the year.

The effects of the non-violent resistance made themselves felt quickly enough, and Mr. Roberts spells out many of them with convincing argument. Since the Czechoslovak response was instantaneous and comprehensive, embracing all the elements of the national organism from the individual citizen and every social organization to the remaining legal authority, including the person of the President, General Svoboda, the Soviets failed to subvert the political unity of the country, to rally the remaining conservative anti-Dubcek forces, to establish the legitimacy of their military intervention and to form a subservient collaborationist regime. They failed, in other words, in accomplishing the first political goals of the invasion.

Today, with a collaborationist regime finally installed in Prague, the early successes of the Czechoslovak resistance may seem so much history—and no more. But any such conclusion would be misleading. For not only did the resistance save the lives of the imprisoned reform leaders in Moscow and help to prevent large-scale arrests at home; not only did it gain for the reform movement another valuable seven months of relatively free expression during which the values of the renewal could be reaffirmed and incorporated into the national heritage. It did more than that: by forging a common defense of the 1968 revolution, it presented the peoples of Czechoslovakia with an historical vindication of their national traditions. As the country approaches the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion, the prospects of salvaging any meaningful *political* portion of the reform program seem to be virtually nil; but the moral achievements of the Czechs and Slovaks, both before and even more so *after* the Soviet invasion, will no doubt sustain them in their future trials.

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Nationalities in the USSR

ROBERT CONQUEST, Ed.: *Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice.*
New York, F. A. Praeger, 1967.
ERICH GOLDHAGEN, Ed.: *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union.*
New York, F. A. Praeger, 1968.
R. VAIDYANATH: *The Formation of the Soviet Central Asian Republics.*
New Delhi, People's Publishing House, 1967.

Reviewed by Violet Conolly

DURING THE CRUCIAL formative years of the Soviet Union, the Bolsheviks supressed all opposition on the part of non-Russian nationalities to the policy of socialist "unification." A half century later the non-Russian minorities still have little or no political freedom, yet the USSR more and more confidently asserts its claim to be the only country capable of solving its nationalities problems to the satisfaction of all concerned. This claim has been given an aura of historical respectability by legal semantics ingeniously devised to cloak what are in fact quite arbitrary procedures in a semblance of "voluntarism." The facts of this complex situation warrant careful scrutiny.

The three books under review are therefore to be welcomed for the light they shed on various facets of the Soviet nationalities problem and the fluctuations in policy before and after the Bolsheviks came to power. The history of Islam in the Soviet Union, from the assurances contained in the fervent appeal to "All Muslim Toilers of Russia and the East" in 1917, which won many of these Turkic peoples to Lenin's side in the Civil War, to the subsequent denigration and persecution of Muslim nationalists, is one of the most glaring examples of Soviet bad faith in dealing with minorities.

A root cause of the trouble lay in Lenin's possibly sincere but essentially naive assumption that the hostility of non-Russian nationalities to the centralized government in Moscow would disappear with the removal of hated Tsarist institutions and the establishment of a socialist regime. This ideological prognostication was entirely disproved by the reaction of the nationalities to the realities of Soviet power. For the most part they did not find a satisfactory substitute for their separate identities and national traditions in Marxist-Leninist "abstract internationalism." But there was little they could do to alter the situation; the scales were weighted against them by the preponderance of Russians in the dominant RKP(b), that is, in the *Russian* Communist Party (Bolshevik).

In a little classic of succinct, informed statement and apt quotation, Mr. Conquest traces the variations in the Soviet approach to the nationalities problem from Lenin's original theses to the practical implementation of "sovereignty" in the Union Republics today. In a series of chapters, he lays bare, as it were, the anatomy of Soviet power and its contrived legislative basis. His book should be an invaluable aid to students and even lecturers who may not have the necessary bibliographical sources at hand to explore these subjects in depth. In two appendices, Lenin's long unpublished "Notes on the National Question," which originally appeared in *Kommunist No.* 9, 1956, and the section of the CPSU program dealing with party tasks in the field of national relations, are reprinted in full. I have only one criticism of the very useful source notes appended to each chapter: the ref-

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erences to Stalin's and Lenin's collected works give no indication of the dates when particular items were published.

WHILE MR. CONQUEST'S volume concentrates on the general principles and practices of Soviet nationalities policy, *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union* is much more detailed in its treatment of the problems of nationalism in particular Soviet republics, *e.g.*, the Ukraine, Armenia, Central Asia, and Belorussia, though it also includes more general chapters on the economic and ethnic impact of "unification." As a symposium from the pens of different authors, it is perhaps inevitable that it displays a certain unevenness in the quality and value of different chapters. I certainly found this to be so. In his very readable and impressive introduction, the editor, Mr. Goldhagen, strikes a balanced note in his appraisal of Soviet nationalities policy, observing that "the truth is neither as black as some Western writers paint it nor the pastoral idyll drawn by Soviet propagandists. The condition of the ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union is complex and many-hued, a unique and novel phenomenon defying the labels of political polemics." He pays tribute to the "cultural ascent of the minorities under Communist rule," but emphasizes the Soviet leadership's ruthless suppression of all aspirations to national independence. He reminds us that, during World War II, six ethnic groups were dealt with so severely that their very existence as coherent, viable entities was endangered. But, in discussing their rehabilitation after Stalin's death, Mr. Goldhagen forgets to add that the Crimean Tatars were never fully amnestied nor restored to their homelands, a fact which has led to considerable ferment and open protest on their part in recent months. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 tragically confirms his observation that the Soviet leadership's preoccupation with manifestations of nationalism—both in Eastern Europe and at home—is intensified by their "perplexity at a phenomenon for which Marxist theory cannot account."

In spite of the intellectual and cultural restrictions imposed on the nationalities with a view to achieving their ultimate "unification," it is Mr. Goldhagen's opinion that "their ethnic personalities are alive" and that the nationalities are quietly, but persistently, resisting such pressures. I should like to feel equally optimistic about the future integrity of these national minorities. Admittedly, attempts at Russification often serve to heighten national feeling among non-Russian intellectuals, but they constitute only a small elite, and there are good grounds for believing that Russification is more effective among the less nationally conscious masses.

In his study of "The Ethnic Scene in the Soviet Union," Professor John Armstrong brings some interesting facts to light about what he calls "Mobilized Diasporas" involving peoples like the Jews and the Armenians: "a small minority of the total Soviet population who are highly urban, have high relative educational levels and are geographically mobile." Though the number of Jews according to the 1959 census declined to 2.3 million or 1.1 percent of the total Soviet population, they have produced far more specialists and intellectuals than any other Soviet ethnic group—one-tenth of the Soviet Union's non-manual workers, one-tenth of its advanced students, one-tenth of its writers, one-ninth of its scientific workers and one-sixth of its physicians. This is a remarkable achievement, if one bears in mind the Tsarist pogroms, Nazi massacres, and the renewal of antisemitism in Soviet Russia in recent years. The Armenians have also done well in Russia since the Turkish massacres of 1915. Like the Jews, a disproportionate number of Armenians are highly educated specialists and scientists; unlike the Jews, however, they have their own Union Republic in spite of their small numbers. According to Professor Armstrong, "there is a strong current of anti-Soviet feeling among Armenians fostered by the Dashnak organization"—a nationalistic group, based outside the USSR, that has long agitated for Armenian independence. But, however anti-Soviet the Dashnak may be outside the Soviet Union, I should be surprised, without further proof, if it had much influence in Armenia today.

The "Armenian Cultural Pattern under Communist Rule" is dealt with in a separate chapter by Mary Kilbourne Matossian. The picture she presents is wholly encouraging. The Armenian language continues to flourish, Armenians provide most of the local leadership, and Armenians have managed to use Soviet institutions "to produce wealth, discover truth and create beauty that bring credit to themselves." Miss Matossian believes that in the case of Armenia the Soviet leaders even find it worthwhile to promote non-Russian nationalism. If true, this is indeed a most exceptional state of affairs for a Union Republic. But the author, by relying so heavily on Soviet sources, does not inspire complete confidence in her conclusions.

A major section of this symposium is devoted to

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the economic progress of the non-Russian republics. The analysis by Mr. Vsevolod Holubnychy is thoroughly documented from Soviet and other sources, but on the score of Soviet investment priorities his judgment often seems swayed by emotion. Thus, in discussing regional resource allocations, he concludes that the decision to invest heavily in Siberian rather than Ukrainian electrification was the result of "essentially political processes." On economic grounds, there may be a case for disputing the decision to invest so much capital in the Siberian power stations, but whether or not the decision was politically motivated is open to question. Nor would I agree that "there is no justification whatsoever for pushing the development of Siberia and Kazakhstan so hard." This seems to overlook the importance to the Soviet national economy of Kasakh non-ferrous metals, coal, iron, and wheat, as well as the unique mineral resources of the Soviet Far East such as gold, diamonds, tin, tungsten, oil and natural gas, etc.

Nevertheless, there is a great deal of interesting information in this chapter on the relative economic development of the Russian and non-Russian republics, and in more than one case Mr. Holubnychy shows that—despite Lenin's predictions to the contrary—there are still "wholly inexplicable gaps" between them.

Jewish life under Soviet rule is surveyed with great competence by Joseph Brumberg, his son Abraham Brumberg, and William Korey. The late Joseph Brumberg had a long and close connection with East European Jewish problems as a leader of the Jewish Bund in Poland between the two world wars. The frustrating and fluctuating situation of the Jews in the Soviet Union is well described in these essays, but the vast industry expended by the younger Brumberg on examining every issue of the Yiddish periodical *Sovyetish Heymland* may seem excessive to the general reader.

Considerations of space preclude detailed discussion of the other essays in this symposium. Some are devoted to other major nationalities such as the Ukranians, the Baltic, and Turkic peoples, and Edward Allworth contributes a thoughtful article on "The 'Nationality' Idea in Czarist Central Asia." These studies indicate that Moscow's approach to the nationalities question varies considerably from one non-Russian republic to another. The Ukrainians, for example, have experienced much more ethnic repression than the Balts. But Yaroslav Bilinsky surely overstates the case when he accuses the central government of attempting to "break up the Ukranian nation physically and morally." This would seem a tall order even for the present Kremlin leadership.

UNTIL THE APPEARANCE of Dr. Vaidyanath's admirable study on the formation of the Soviet Central Asian Republics, Indian scholars had shown remarkably little interest in this region, despite its proximity to their homeland. Dr. Vaidyanath has profited by several years' residence in the Soviet Union, where he could consult source material not available in the West (although he also deplores the inaccessibility of certain Soviet archives necessary for a definitive study). His introductory chapters on the peoples of Central Asia from colonial times to 1917 enable the reader to appreciate the complexity of the problems which the Soviet government fell heir to in this area—problems it sought to solve by means of the comprehensive territorial revisions of 1924. Dr. Vaidyanath provides a masterful account of this extremely complicated administrative process which totally transformed the former multinational political units of Turkestan, Bukhara, and Khorezm into relatively homogenous ethnic entities, *i.e.*, the Soviet Central Asian republics. His analysis of this massive unscrambling is more penetrating and exhaustive than anything yet published in any language, including Russian.

The territorial reorganization of Central Asia, masterminded principally by Russian Bolsheviks, was accomplished in the astonishingly brief span of one year; local inhabitants had little to say in the matter. Since then, an accute controversy has arisen between Soviet and non-Soviet scholars as to the merits of the undertaking. Dr. Vaidyanath examines this controversy impartially, outlining the main points of disagreement. Soviet defenders of the territorial reform argue that the establishment of basically homogenous national republics in Central Asia put an end to the murderous feuds which had plagued the region for years past. Non-Soviet scholars maintain that the Russian Bolsheviks undertook the reorganization in order to thwart the proposed unification of the Turkic peoples in a Soviet Turkestan. That the Bolsheviks gave short shrift to local opposition to their reform and to popular proposals for a Central Asian federation suggests that non-Soviet scholars may have grounds for their skepticism, but at the same time it must be recognized that tribal feuds are now a thing of the past in Soviet Central Asia—for one reason or another.

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Reviews in Brief

The Young Ilyich

NIKOLAI VALENTINOV: *Encounters with Lenin.* Translated from the Russian by Paul Rosta and Brian Pearce. New York, Oxford University Press, 1968.

THE MEMOIRS OF Nikolai Valentinov (N. V. Volsky) were first published in Paris in 1954, in Russian. It is good to have them available now in this English translation, not only for the light they shed on their author, but more importantly as one of the very few uncensored personal accounts of the young Lenin, whom Valentinov admired greatly when he came to know him in Geneva during the early months of 1904—and with whom he broke later that very year.

Valentinov, an astute observer with an inquiring mind and catholic interests, strong in body as in will, was drawn to Marxism because of its optimism and to Bolshevism because of its activism. When, as a rebel student, he made his way abroad to escape renewed arrest in Kiev, he went to see Lenin in Geneva and for several months found himself under the hypnotic spell of his personality. Lenin, who evidently took a liking to the bright, straightforward lad, used him as a sounding board as he was composing his *One Step Forward—Two Steps Back* and readying the "organizational consequences" of his split with the Mensheviks.

Valentinov reconstructs in colorful and persuasive detail how Lenin, after first blaming his moderate opponents for making a political mountain out of procedural molehills—"a very unimportant disagreement," he had said—characteristically came around to "constructing" a capital case against their "treasonable" outlook:

During the seven or eight days in which I had not seen him, Lenin's attitude to the Mensheviks had turned into a burning, unbridled, and savage hatred. "There is a children's game of bricks," he told me. "Each side of each brick shows a part of something—of a house, a tree, a bridge. . . . [Only] if you find the right sides of the bricks and fit them together, do you get a meaningful picture. . . .

So it was, Lenin argued, with the words and actions of his opponents:

At first [they] suggest only lack of thought, the stupid chatter of a clique, personal resentment, inflated self-esteem. If, however, you have the patience to play around with the bricks . . . the picture shows beyond all doubt that [they are] the opportunist and revisionist wing of the party. . . .

As Valentinov shows so convincingly, Lenin was as compulsive in his insistence on total obeisance from his followers (despite his own frequent equivocation and dubious compromises on "tactical" grounds) as he was in his total condemnation of those with whom he disagreed. He allowed for no accidents, no nuances of meaning, no doubts about the veracity or motives of his opponents. By equating mild and honest political disagreements with infamy, he laid the moral and "methodological" basis for the grotesque charges which Stalin and Vyshinsky were later to hurl against their erstwhile comrades.

The Lenin who emerges in revealing detail from Valentinov's pen was concerned with politics, and only politics. Everything would be politicized in the hothouse atmosphere that surrounded Ilyich—and all else, be it the personal behavior of his associates, metaphysics, or the value of Dostoevsky's novels, would be judged by its political utility. As for other interests and activities—from hikes in the Alps to a game of chess—he indulged in them only insofar as he considered them physically necessary or otherwise helpful to the Cause.

It was during the months that Valentinov spent with Lenin that the latter came to articulate what was to become the quintessence of Bolshevism—its unrelenting emphasis on centralism, discipline, and dictatorship. Valentinov illustrates this by quoting a revealing outburst of Lenin's:

They charge us with Jacobinism, Blanquism, and other horrible things. These idiots, these Girondins, don't even understand that they are paying us a compliment by making such charges. . . . The dictatorship of the proletariat is an absolutely meaningless expression without Jacobin coercion. . . . It is precisely the attitude towards Jacobinism which divides the socialist world movement into two camps—the revolutionary and the reformist.

The author also depicts the shabby intrigues, the pettiness of great and little men, the gossip of émigré life, with all its intensity, bitterness, hope, and despair. However, what upset and alienated Valentinov above all else was the Bolsheviks' intolerance: here the contrast in attitude between Lenin and Martov was strikingly apparent. As he mused on his way home from a wretched argument with Lenin, Valentinov recalls:

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What was wrong was the incredible intolerance shown by our leaders, and most of all the savage intolerance of Lenin, who would not brook the slightest deviation from his ideas and beliefs. Under such conditions, could I continue as a member of the Bolshevik organization which implicitly obeyed Lenin in everything?

The answer was no. With a measure of wistful detachment and a sense of tragedy, Valentinov acknowledges fifty years later that, at the end of his life, Lenin apparently came to see what earlier he had so intemperately scorned and abused. In his "Better Less, But Better" (1923) Lenin was belatedly warning his comrades against the illusion of certainty: "We must come to our senses in time. . . . The worst thing of all would be to rely on the assumption that we know everything."

Few other sources manage to convey so much of the atmosphere, of the mental and political climate of early émigré Bolshevism as does Valentinov's very honest, very personal, and very insightful memoir of his *Encounters with Lenin*.

Alexander Dallin

Prague in the 1930's

GEORGE F. KENNAN: *From Prague After Munich: Diplomatic Papers, 1938-1940*. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1968.

IN 1938, AS A YOUNG diplomat assigned to Prague, Mr. Kennan was in a unique position to observe the developments in Czechoslovakia from its first dismemberment in September 1938 to its total partition in March 1939, culminating in the establishment of Hitler's "protectorate" in Bohemia-Moravia and an "independent" Slovakia. Kennan knew both Czech and German and already posessed that unusual power of perception which is so peculiarly his. He traveled to Slovakia before and after it had emerged as a separate state and even studied the mysterious Ruthenia of Monsignor Voloshin. He watched, listened, and reported his findings to the State Department.

Most remarkable, perhaps, was his detachment. Of course he made judgments, but his viewpoint was that of a representative of a neutral and still isolationist United States, a country with limited interests in Central Europe. He disliked the Nazis mainly for what they were and what they had done to Germany as well as to the Czechs and Slovaks; but his dislike of the former did not lead him to bestow any special virtues upon the latter. Unlike so many other chroniclers, Kennan did not labor under a burden of guilt because of the Munich Agreement: his government had played no part in it.

It is Kennan's detachment that enhances the value of his observations, not all of them pleasant—*e.g.*, that after Munich President Benes was probably the most despised man in the country; that Benes' successor, Emil Hacha—who would have been hanged after the war had he not died in Benes' prison—enjoyed for several years the overwhelming support and affection of his countrymen; that the standard of living in Prague, even after the occupation, was considerably higher than in Germany itself; that instead of closing the ranks in the face of an external enemy, the Czechs and the Slovaks turned against each other. The reader learns about the outburst of Slovak nationalism and about the typically subtle, rather than heroic, Czech forms of resistance.

The current crisis in Soviet-dominated Czechoslovakia in some ways adds to the poignancy of Kennan's book, which went to print long before the events of August 1968. If we compare 1968 with 1939, Dubcek appears as another Hacha, trying to cushion the impact of the foreign occupation. Today, as in 1939, the Slovaks are mainly preoccupied with asserting their separate national personality. The Czechs now view the Soviets in much the same way as they viewed the Germans—as invaders in the guise of "protectors." There are few Jews left in Czechoslovakia, but the current accusations of "Zionism" echo similar charges leveled against the Jews by the Slovaks 30 years ago.

However, the temptation to look for analogies should be controlled, if only because there are vast differences between conditions then and now. Hitler had a popular base in Czechoslovakia, the Sudeten Germans, many of whom continued to live in the "protectorate" after the annexation of the Sudetenland, while the Soviets draw their support among Czechoslovakia's Moscow-oriented Communists, that is, from a political rather than an ethnic base. The Czechs of 1939 had no friends anywhere; today they enjoy considerable sympathy both in the Communist and non-Communist worlds. There is another difference. In 1939 the Czechs had only six months of transition between Munich and the stunning blow of the complete loss of independence; today's Czechs have had twenty years to adjust, however reluctantly, to the realities of Soviet power.

Kennan's documents are supplemented by an "Epilogue" by Frederick G. Heymann. It contains a number of keen observations, but his apology for Kennan's lack of moral righteousness appears gratuitous: on the eve of World War II most of mankind had not yet become aware of the total villainy of Hitler's regime.

Heymann's application of the present-day values to the past may be justified for the purposes of political education, but it nevertheless hinders our ability to comprehend historical developments within the context of their time. *From Prague After Munich* is useful to students of history precisely because of its scrupulous attention to detail and careful avoidance of political hindsight.

Vladimir Petrov

Arms Across the Amur

MORTON HALPERIN, ED.: *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control*. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1967.

FROM THE STANDPOINT of illuminating one aspect of past Sino-Soviet relations, it is useful to examine the role of arms control and disarmament questions. Equally important is a recognition of ways in which arms control and related security issues may in the future both affect, and be affected by, the course of relations between Communist China and the Soviet Union. We now have a book which breaks new ground along both these lines.

The ten essays which make up the volume under review are contributed

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by specialists in three fields: Sinology, Sovietology, and arms control. Most of the essays were originally presented as papers at a 1965 conference on the theme of Sino-Soviet relations and arms control, but they have been selected, edited and updated in order to form a coherent whole. An effort has been made to balance the attention given to each of the three converging fields, and to take into consideration such hypothetical yet important questions as Sino-Soviet relations in a possible Chinese-American crisis. The book presents some "building-block" analyses which, hopefully, will stimulate greater attention to the whole subject of the interaction between Sino-Soviet relations and Soviet/Western-oriented arms control, as well as to the future relationship of the problem of arms control to Communist China.

One of the most interesting aspects of the study is the light it throws on the manipulative use of disarmament themes as pegs for polemics in the Sino-Soviet dispute and on the role of genuine differences over such issues in contributing to the growing rift between the two countries. Although in some cases the role of arms control matters may be overstated, the book is nonetheless a useful corrective for the previous lack of recognition given to such considerations. Most interesting of all, perhaps, is the way in which security issues growing out of Communist China's determination to acquire nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union's reluctance and final refusal to continue assisting Chinese nuclear development are intertwined with the evolving stand of both governments on related disarmament matters, notably the cessation of nuclear testing.

Most students of Sino-Soviet relations will probably agree with the main line of analysis, but some specific interpretations will probably be disputed. Indeed, several of the contributors disagree (as does this reviewer) with the interpretation advanced by the editor that the Quemoy crisis of 1958 did not give rise to Sino-Soviet discord. Such differences of opinion, however, serve to enliven rather than to detract from the volume.

Although *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control* does not attempt in any systematic way to assess the future prospects of international arms control in the light of the Sino-Soviet dispute, it is the first major effort to broach the problem, to focus attention on the hitherto neglected interconnection between the two, and to pose some of the key issues for the future. One could hardly ask for more.

Raymond L. Garthoff

Fidel's Path

ANDRES SUAREZ: *Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966.* Foreword by Ernst Halperin. Cambridge, Mass. The MIT Press, 1967.

MR. SUAREZ'S BOOK on Cuba is the latest in a series of "Studies in International Communism" produced for the Center for International Studies at MIT under the able direction of William E. Griffith. A major concern of the entire series to date has been to explore the repercussions of the Sino-Soviet conflict upon specific states within the Communist bloc as well as upon certain Communist parties in the non-Communist world. However, in the present study of Cuba, it is highly significant and appropriate that the vexatious Sino-Soviet relationship should constitute a relatively minor theme. To be sure, Mr. Suarez has no difficulty in demonstrating that Fidel Castro, like so many others in the vortex of international Communist politics, has sought to exploit Sino-Soviet differences for his own special purposes. But Mr. Suarez's book also makes clear, if mostly by implication, that the feud between Moscow and Peking has not been the only reason for Castro's success in dealing with the Communist world. This is because Castro has commanded other, more powerful resources, not the least of which have been his considerable self-confidence as a revolutionary leader in his own right and his consummate political skill in dealing with both his far better-organized Communist "comrades" inside Cuba and his much more powerful "fraternal allies" abroad.

Mr. Suarez is at his most persuasive when he unravels the multiple strands that have gone into the complex relationship among various forces in Cuban politics — the Fidelistas, the Cuban Communists, and the Soviet Union. Castro's sudden discovery of his "Marxist-Leninist" convictions, the author argues, was prompted by his decision to seek an irrevocable Soviet commitment to "socialist" Cuba. To be sure, Castro has not always enjoyed the measure of Soviet commitment to the Fidelista cause that he would have liked. But neither has Fidel's coversion to "Marxism-Leninism" committed Cuba to anything like unconditional support of Moscow's interests or causes. Even less has it implied any willingness to hand over the substance of political power inside the country to the old-line Cuban Communist functionaries, whose political record before Castro's triumph was not one to inspire his confidence and trust. Castro's temporizing on matters relating to the organization of a proper Leninist ruling party is illustrative of his talent of seeming to accede to Soviet desires while retaining tight personal control of domestic politics. Similarly, his repeated assertion of the primacy of Fidel-style revolution over Soviet notions of peaceful co-existence points up his unwillingness to accept the tutelage proffered by Moscow. Therein lies the source of recurrent Cuban-Soviet friction, which is once again unmistakably evident at the present time.

Unfortunately, Mr. Suarez is perhaps least convincing when he discusses matters of doctrine. One may well question his tendency to dismiss Fidel's inconclusive groping for a distinctive ideology ("Our Path") as proof of the ideological bankruptcy of Castroism. One may also challenge his conclusion that because Cuba is Castroite and not Communist, it is possible "to hope for" a basic change in the character of the regime. But is it not at least conceivable that precisely because the Cuban regime *is* Castroite — with authentic homegrown revolutionary traditions — it may be *less* susceptible to "basic change" than might be true of a regime forcibly imposed from the outside? Probably the most prudent guess that one can hazard is that the future of Castroism will depend first and foremost upon its highly individualistic leader, Fidel Castro. Although without him Cuba will doubtless be something different, his assessment of the requirements of *his* revolution, at home and abroad, is likely to have a profound influence on the future course and evolution of the Cuban regime.

Altogether, the fascinating questions to which Mr. Suarez addresses his study really merit a far more analytical treatment and a somewhat less dreary

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prose style than he has given us. In fact, the author has compiled what is essentially a chronological account of Cuban developments during the years 1959-64, prefaced by a chapter sketching the pre-1959 background and supplemented by a no less sketchy updating of developments to 1966. While his study is surer in its grasp of primary source materials and richer in its wealth of factual detail than almost all other accounts of Cuban affairs hitherto published, its very chronological approach has certain unavoidable shortcomings, not the least of which is the author's tendency to blur precisely those crucial issues that he himself would obviously prefer to highlight. It is, alas, a shortcoming of which the critical reader will be even the more acutely conscious by virtue of the provocatively analytical and eminently lucid foreword to Mr. Suarez's study provided by Ernst Halperin.

—Melvin Croan

Reviewers in this Issue

CARY O. FISHER—American student of East European and international affairs; formerly Associate Editor of this journal.

VIOLET CONOLLY—Former Fellow in Soviet Studies at the London School of Slavonic Studies; now a free-lance writer and reviewer. Author of *Beyond the Urals* (London, Oxford University Press, 1967), and other studies on Soviet nationalities.

VLADIMIR PETROV—On the staff of the Sino-Soviet Institute at the George Washington University; author of *Money and Conquest: Allied Occupation Currencies in World War II* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967).

RAYMOND GARTHOFF—Author of *Soviet Military Policy* (New York, Praeger, 1966) and a frequent contributor to this journal.

ALEXANDER DALLIN—Professor of International Relations at Columbia University (New York), author of numerous books on Soviet affairs, currently on leave of absence to write a book on international communism under the auspices of Stanford University (Stanford, Calif.).

MELVIN CROAN—Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin (Madison), now doing research in London; a frequent contributor to these pages as well as to other scholarly journals.

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Stalin and Stalinism

EDITORS' NOTE: The following documents—two out of literally hundreds of letters, petitions, journals, and even books that have been circulating clandestinely in the Soviet Union in recent months—fall into two distinct categories. The first is similar, both in substance and in form, to other protests against the Soviet regime's efforts to recast Joseph Stalin in an increasingly flattering and heroic mold. It was written by Piotr Yakir, son of Major-General Yona Yakir, who was executed in 1937 during Stalin's purges of the Red Army, and "rehabilitated" thirty years later, following the 20th CPSU Congress. A distinguished historian and a fearless—as well as remarkably astute—critic of Soviet totalitarianism, the young Yakir addressed his letter to the editors of the party's theoretical journal, Kommunist, *in response to a number of recent articles extolling Stalin's role in World War II.* Kommunist *declined to publish the letter, but a slightly abridged text of it appeared in* Le Monde *(Paris), on March 16-17, 1969.*

The second document deals not so much with Stalin as with his legacy. It covers, again, the same somber ground as many previous protest documents—police terror, violations of legality, political persecution. Yet it is also strikingly unique in that—unlike other similar protests—it is no longer merely an impassioned appeal either to Soviet authorities or to Communists outside the USSR, or even to "world public opinion," but, in the very real sense of the word, a legal brief presented by Soviet citizens requesting an international body to exercise its legal prerogatives in their behalf. The petition was addressed to the UN Commission on Human Rights in May 1969 but was held up in Moscow, only reaching the Commission a month later, after it had already appeared in various West European and US newspapers. It is also noteworthy that the signatories of the petition appear not as individuals but as a body calling itself "The Initiative Group for the Defense of Civil Rights in the USSR." The formation of this group may mark the beginning of a new phase in the development of Soviet dissent—the rise of an organized movement of political opposition.

1. Piotr Yakir Calls for a Posthumous Trial of J. V. Stalin

The Soviet Penal Code contains articles that make punishable the actions mentioned in the resolution of the 22nd CPSU Congress.

1. Abuse of power—in the broad sense (Art. 170—imprisonment for up to eight years), as well as [in the sense of] exceeding authority (Art. 171—imprisonment for up to ten years).

2. During the mass purges people were illegally imprisoned—an action punishable under Article 126 and Article 17 by imprisonment for up to three years (Art. 17 of the Penal Code of the RSFSR [deals with] collaboration). It is stated in the [latter] article: "Collaborators in crime, in addition to the perpetrators, are treated as organizers, instigators, and accomplices." Since it is not known in this instance, as in a number of other cases, whether Stalin himself committed one crime or another, we refer to Article 17 of the Penal Code of the RSFSR because Stalin's role as an organizer is obvious.

3. It is known that it was Stalin's proposal in 1937 that prompted the decision to employ physical methods in legal investigations. This led to beatings, privation of sleep for up to seven days, and other torments which the author of these lines (arrested in 1937 at age 14 as a member of a family branded an "enemy of the people") personally witnessed. These actions are punishable under Articles 113 and 17 by imprisonment for up to three years.

4. A large number of high-ranking officials took their own lives, some out of repugnance to taking part in the crimes committed, as proven in letters written before their deaths: [*e.g.*] S. Ordzhonikidze; I. Kossior; F. Furer; Pogrebinsky, head of the NKVD of the Gorky district, founder of our correctional communes; Litvin, head of the Leningrad NKVD; Korzelski, head of one of the NKVD bureaus in the Ukraine; Norin, head of the NKVD special service in Georgia; and many others. A

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number of persecuted persons took their own lives out of protest or fear of torture: Ya. Gamarnik; M. Tomsky; P. Liubchenko and his wife; V. Lominadze; A Cherviakov; Rabichev; Adamovich; Lakoba; Firin; and many others. Some who could not bear the tortures committed suicide in prison: N. Gololed; I Garkavy; Nosalevsky; Lapin; and many others. All this falls under Article 107 (instigation to suicide) and entails imprisonment for up to five years.

5. The mass repressions were accompanied by calumnies and slanders against the victims, their friends, and their relatives. Such attacks took place in the press, on the radio, in meetings and lectures. Actions of this kind fall under Article 130 (on "slander," with penalties up to five years) and Article 131 ("insults," punishable by forced labor up to one year.)

6. For not having denounced and having protected his accomplices (Yezhov, Frinovsky, Yagoda, Beria, Ulrich Vychinsky, and tens of thousands more), Stalin should be subjected to the terms of Articles 88-1 and 88-2, punishable by imprisonment for from three to five years.

7. Numerous persons who were victims of the purges were shot or killed outright, or died from injuries inflicted during the investigations. Among these were such eminent party members as Chubar, Kossior, Rudzutak, Postyshev, Eikhe, Voznensky, Kuznetsov, and also 110 of the 139 members of the CPSU Central Committee elected at the 17th Party Congress, plus tens of thousands of other decent men.

7 (a). On Stalin's orders, representatives of all opposition groups were in most cases arrested and killed. Many of them have not yet been rehabilitated although the accusations made against them were entirely fabricated.

7 (b). Stalin did not shrink from the annihilation of foreign Communists who had sought refuge in our country to escape the persecution of fascist, semi-fascist, and monarchical dictatorship: (victims included the Germans H. Remmele, Schubert, Heinz Neumann, Werner Hirsch; the Hungarians Bela Kun, Mesan, Gidas, Gabor Farkas, and others; the Bulgarians Stamoniakov, Tanev, and others; the Poles Dombal, Lesczynski, Prochniak, and others; the Estonians Kh. Pegelman and others; the Iranians Sultan-Zade and others; the Yugoslavs V. Copic, D. Serdic, and others; the Swiss F. Platten (who had covered V. I. Lenin with his own body during the first attempt against Lenin's life), and others.

7 (c). With Stalin's knowledge many leaders of our intelligence service were killed: Berzin, Artuzov, Trelisser, Boky, Uritsky, Borovich, Spiegelglass, Xenofontov, Peters, Latsis, Kedrov, and others. This seriously weakened our intelligence in the prewar period. Since there is no proof of a documentary nature concerning the crimes personally committed by Stalin, we are forced to accuse him under Article 17, and more specifically under Article 102-17 ("premeditated murder with aggravating circumstances," punishable by imprisonment for up to 15 years or by the death penalty) and under Article 66-17 ("the act of terrorism" involving "murder of a private citizen, a member of government, or other public official . . . with the aim of undermining or weakening Soviet power," punishable by imprisonment up to 15 years or by the death penalty).

8. Stalin was chief of state when, during and after the Great Patriotic War, various peoples of our country (Crimean Tatars, Kalmucks, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Koreans, Greeks, Turks, Germans, and others) were victims of forced and illegal deportations from their native lands.

These crimes fall under Article 74 ("violation of equality of nations and races," punishable by up to five years imprisonment).

9. In connection with the mass purges, administrators, scientists, and technicians from all branches of our economy and our agriculture were annihilated or imprisoned, seriously affecting our country's economy. As an example, in 1938, 10 percent less iron was extracted than had been in 1937 although the plan had anticipated increased extraction. The rapid turnover of qualified personnel impeded production: in 1940 for example, out of 153 foremen in the metal industry, 75 held their positions less than one year (*Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 2, 1964, pp. 73-74).

The greatest engineers and inventors in the field of military science were physically liquidated: G. Langimak (inventor of [the fieldpiece] that came to be known as "Katiusha"), Kurchevsky (inventor of the best recoilless gun), V. Bekauri (originator of the system of remote-controlled explosions), V. Zaslavsky (tank engineer), Smirnov (head of radar research), I. Kleimenov (head of the Scientific Institute for Research on Jet Engines), M. Leitenzon (founder of the interplanetary travel association under the auspices of the Zhukovsky Academy), etc. Among those imprisoned were: A. Tupolev, S. Korolev, A. Berg, V. Cluchko, B. Vannikov (People's Commissar for Weapons), to mention only a few. Brilliant scientists were annihilated: N. Vavilov, I. Krichevsky, Dogadkin, Tulaikov, Gerasimovich, Folag . . .

Such acts are defined under Article 69 as "sabotage"—"action or inaction designed to undermine industry, transportation, agriculture . . ." and are punishable by imprisonment for up to 15 years.

10. Tombs were desecrated (such acts are punishable under Article 22 by imprisonment for up to three years). The urn containing the ashes of S. S. Kamenev was removed from the Kremlin wall; the urn containing the ashes of Ya. Gamarnik was stolen; M. Tomsky's tomb was destroyed; the monument adorning the tomb of I. Yakir was knocked down, etc.

11. As is known from the confidential letter from the CC of the CPSU to the 20th Party Congress and from the novel recently published by Tchakovsky, Stalin went into hiding on the first day of the war; for several hours none of the state's leaders was able to locate the supreme commander. Such behavior, according to Article 247, amounts to "desertion," which carries the death penalty in wartime.

12. In 1939 a line of heavy fortifications was built (the "Ury"). After the incorporation of the Baltic Republics, Western Belorussia, the Western Ukraine, Bessarabia, and Northern Bukovina, the Soviet border was moved some 100 to 600 kilometers. A decision was made to fortify the new frontier. But without awaiting construction of the new "Ury," and in spite of the objections raised by the chief of the general staff, General B. Chapochnikov, Stalin ordered the dismantling of all the old "Ury" fortifications, which allowed the fascist invaders to move into our territory without hindrance. We consider this criminal negligence verging on treason.

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The annihilation of 80 per cent of our high-ranking and commanding officers, which deprived the army of leadership, constitutes open treason (according to Article 64, which prescribes the death penalty). For example, military leaders who had taken part in the Spanish War were arrested in the spring of 1941 and shot without trial in October. Among them were Smuchkevich, twice Hero of the Soviet Union (in whose memory a monument was erected in his homeland on February 26 of this year), as well as Heros of the Soviet Union P. Richagov, Stern, Chernykh, Ptukhin, Gussev, Proskurov, Pumpur, Arzhenukhin, and others.

Partisan bases on our territory were dissolved; tank formations were deactivated; certain types of automatic weapons that were essential to the army were not put into mass production. Millions died in the early stages of the Great Patriotic War as a result of a whole series of such crimes committed by Stalin.

13. In addition to all the foregoing, medieval atrocities were committed in our country—not without Stalin's knowledge but on his instructions. These crimes are not covered directly by the Penal Code, but they are crimes against humanity.

14. Wives of slain persons were arrested and often shot (as were the wives of Tukhachevsky, Uborevich, Postyshev, Kossior, Eikhe, Gamarnik, Kork, Chubar, Chelekhes, Agranov, Dybenko, Vareikis, and others). Going to the point of complete madness, Stalin arrested the wives of his [closest] disciples: Kalinin, Molotov, Poskrebyshev.

15. Young children of the purge victims were arrested and placed in camps and prisons, including those of Postyshev, Kossior, Lyubchenko, Medved, Kamenev, Garkavy, Bauman, Kadatsky, Tomsky, Sosnovsky, and Popov. Postyschev's eldest son, Valentin, as well as the sons of Evdokimov and Lakoba, were shot.

16. In some camps hundreds of prisoners were shot without trial or [even pretrial] investigation (*i.e.*, at the Garaninchtchina camp on the Kolyma).

17. On Stalin's orders, our government refused to participate in the efforts of the International Red Cross to assist war prisoners, because in our military system captivity is tantamount to treason. The fact that prisoners were thus deprived of material assistance and [international] supervision of their treatment contributed to the deaths of many decent people (on the whole they were taken prisoner while wounded, unconscious, and unarmed).

It is not our purpose to confront Stalin with all the accusations he deserves: but although our list is far from complete, his acts as set forth in this statement constitute a substantial body of crimes as defined by Articles 64, 68-17, 69, 74, 88-1, 88-2, 10-17, 107, 113-17, 126-17, 130, 131, 170, 171, 229, 130 and 247 of the Penal Code of the RSFSR. In studying Article 38 of the Penal Code ("extenuating circumstances"), one can find nothing that justifies mitigating the sentences in Stalin's case. . . .

On what grounds are the aforementioned authors of the *Kommunist* articles and the editorial staff of that magazine seeking to rehabilitate the greatest criminal our country has known in its recent history?

I challenge the authors of the articles in question to deny the foregoing facts, and to deny them by the only means acceptable to decent men: by publishing my statement and answering it. If my challenge is not accepted, I can only assume that the authors agree with the facts presented in my statement and with the conclusions drawn from these facts. This means that, in the absence of an answer to this statement, I would have the right to invite my colleagues [historians] taking part in this discussion collectively to request the authorities of the USSR to institute a criminal investigation of J. V. Stalin (Dzhugashvili), who stands accused of the foregoing crimes. I am convinced that posthumus conviction is possible and legal, just as posthumus rehabilitations are possible and legal.

[Signed] P. I. YAKIR

2. A Plea to the United Nations

To the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations:

We, the undersigned, deeply disturbed by the unending stream of political persecutions in the Soviet Union, which we see as a return to the Stalin era, when our entire country was in the grip of terror, appeal to the United Nations Committee on Human Rights to come to the defense of human rights that are being trampled upon in our country.

We appeal to the United Nations because our protests and complaints, addressed for a number of years to the highest state and judicial authorities in the Soviet Union, have elicited no response of any kind. The hope that our voices might be heard, that the authorities would put an end to the lawless acts to which we have repeatedly called their attention—this hope has proved to be in vain.

Therefore we appeal to the United Nations, believing that the defense of human rights is the sacred duty of this organization.

In this document we shall speak of the violation of one of the most fundamental rights of man—the right to have independent convictions and to propagate them by all legal means.

At political trials in the Soviet Union one can often hear the phrase: "You are not being tried for your convictions."

This is profoundly untrue. We are being tried expressly for our convictions.

The words, "You are not tried for your convictions," mean simply this: "You are entitled to your convictions, but if they contradict the official political doctrine, do not dare to disseminate them." And indeed, the arrests and trials, which are described below, occur precisely when people of opposing viewpoints begin to voice them in the open.

But propagation of convictions is a natural outgrowth of the convictions themselves. This is why Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "Each person has the right to freedom of convictions and freedom to express them; this right includes the freedom to uphold one's convictions without hindrance and to freely express, receive, and disseminate information and ideas by all means, regardless of state boundaries."

The formal reason, then, for persecution [in our coun-

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try] is propagation of convictions; in reality, people are tried for the convictions themselves.

The defendants are accused of undermining the Soviet state and social system (Article 70, RSFSR Criminal Code), or defaming the Soviet system (Article 190-1, RSFSR Criminal Code). None of the people condemned at political trials we know about either intended to slander the Soviet system or, what is more, acted with the purpose of undermining it. Thus, at all these political trials, people were censured under fictitious accusations.

We offer several examples, which have become the objects of wide publicity both in the Soviet Union and abroad.

The trial of Siniavsky and Daniel, who were condemned for publishing abroad artistic works critical of Soviet reality.

The trial of Ginzburg and Galanskov, condemned for publishing the literary journal *Phoenix-67* and the "White Book" about the trial of Siniavsky and Daniel.

The trial of Khaustov and Bukovsky, who organized a protest demonstration against the arrest of Ginzburg and Galanskov.

The trial of Litvinov, Larisa Daniel, and others for demonstrating against the dispatch of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia; an important point at these two latter trials was that the charges against the participants were based on the content of their slogans.

The trial of [Anatoli] Marchenko, formally accused of passport violation—a charge, incidentally, that was not proven at the trial—but who was in fact tried for his book *My Testament*, which describes conditions of prisoners in the post-Stalin years.

The trial of I. Belgorodskaia for the attempt to distribute letters defending Marchenko.

The trial of [Yuri] Gendler, [Lev] Kravchevsky, and others in Leningrad who were condemned for distributing foreign-published books.

The trials of persons defending national equality and the preservation of national culture.

In the Ukraine, the trial in Kiev in 1966, at which more than 10 persons were condemned; the trial of Chornovil in Lvov, sentenced for his book about political trials; and many others.

The trials of Crimean Tatars struggling for a return to their Crimean homeland. Over 100 of them have been sentenced in the more than 20 trials that have been held in recent years; as these lines are written, ten representatives of the Crimean Tatars are being tried in the latest and largest of all political trials, in Tashkent.

The trials in the Baltic Republics, in particular the trial of Kalninsh and others.

Trials of Soviet Jews demanding the right to depart for Israel; at the latest trial in Kiev, engineer B. Kochubievsky was condemned to three years.

Trials of believers demanding religious freedom.

All these political trials, given their essentially illegal nature, were conducted with gross violations of procedural norms, above all [that of] openness, as well as the impartial nature of the judicial inquiry.

We also wish to call your attention to an especially inhuman form of persecution: the confinement of normal persons in psychiatric hospitals because of their political convictions.

Recently there have been a number of new arrests. In late April 1969, the artist V. Kuznetsov, of Pushkino, Moscow *oblast*, was arrested and charged with distributing *samizdat*, that is, literature not published by Soviet publishing houses.

At the same time I. Yakimovich, former kolkhoz chairman in Latvia, was arrested in Riga, and charged with writing letters protesting political persecutions in the Soviet Union.

In early May, former Major General P. G. Grigorenko, one of the most notable participants in the movement for civil rights in the USSR, was arrested in Tashkent, where he was to appear, at the request of nearly 2000 Crimean Tatars, as public defender at the trial of 10 Crimean Tatars.

Finally, Ilia Gabai, teacher of Russian literature, was arrested on May 19 in Moscow, several days after a search during which documents containing protests of Soviet citizens against political repressions in the Soviet Union were seized. (In the spring of 1967, I. Gabai was confined for four months during an investigation into his participation in the protest demonstration organized by Khaustov and Bukovsky.)

These latest arrests lead us to believe that Soviet punitive organs have resolved once and for all to suppress the activity of persons protesting against arbitrariness in our country.

We believe that freedom to have convictions and to propagate them has been placed in the most serious jeopardy.

We hope that the information contained in our letter will provide the Commission on Human Rights with a basis for undertaking a review of the violation of fundamental civil rights in the Soviet Union.

[*Signed*] The Initiative Group for Defense of Civil Rights in the USSR: G. Altunian, engineer, Kharkov; V. Borisov, worker, Leningrad; T. Velikanova, mathematician; N. Gorbanevskaia, poetess; M. Dkhemilev, worker, Tashkent; S. Kovalev, biologist; V. Krasin, economist; A. Lavut, biologist; A. Levitin-Krasnov, church writer; Yu. Maltsev, translator; L. Pliushch, mathematician, Kiev; G. Podiapolsky, scientific associate; T. Khodorovich, linguist; P. P. Yakir, historian; A. Yakobson, translator.

Supporting the appeal are: Z. Asanova, doctor, Begovat, Uzbek SSR; T. Baieva, employee; S. Bernshtein, literary worker; L. Vasilev, jurist; Yu. Vishnevskaia, poetess; A. Volpin, mathematician; O. Vorobev, worker, Perm; G. Gabai, educator; E. Egaidikov, mathematician; V. Gershuni, mason; Z. M. Grigorenko, pensioner; A. Grigorenko, technician; R. Dzhemilev, worker, Krasnoiarsk krai; N. Yemelkina, employee; L. Ziugikov, worker; A. Kalinovsky, engineer, Kharkov; L. Kats, employee; Yu. Kim, teacher; Yu. Kiselov, artist; V. Kozharivov, worker; L. Kornilov, engineer; V. Lapin, literary worker; A. Levin, engineer, Kharkov; T. Levina, engineer, Kharkov; D. Lifshits, engineer, Kharkov; S. Mauge, biologist; V. Nedobora, engineer, Kharkov; L. Petrovsky, historian; S. Podolsky, engineer; Kharkov; V. Ponomarev, engineer, Kharkov; V. Rokitiansky, physicist; I. Rudakov; L. Terpovsky, doctor; Yu. Shtein, movie director; V. Chernovil, journalist, Lvov; I. Yakir, employee; S. Vintovsky, student.

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Are the Generals Taking Over?

By Thomas W. Wolfe

There has been widespread speculation in recent years, especially since the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, that the Soviet military leaders have acquired unprecedented influence in the policy councils of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. Some Western observers have even argued that there has been a major shift of political power to the Soviet marshals. Although the present writer is doubtful that the kinds of evidence available on pressure-group alignments and their relative influence within the Soviet system permit any sweeping conclusions on this matter, it may be useful to examine some of the evidence and to offer an appraisal of its significance.

For decades relations between the civilian party leadership and the professional military in the Soviet Union have been marked by recurrent tension. Stalin's purge of Marshal Tukhachevsky and most of the military high command in 1937, his later postwar demotion of Marshal Zhukov, and Khrushchev's controversies with various marshals—including Zhukov, whom he dismissed in 1957—are but some of the better-known symptoms of a rivalry between party and military leaders which historically has seen the latter put in their place.

Since the rise of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, political-military relations appear to have involved three broad categories of problems: (1) those related to maintaining political control over the armed forces in times of crisis and amidst the hazards of a nuclear-missile world; (2) those of meshing economic and military planning to cope most effectively with the resource-consuming appetite of modern weapon systems; and (3) those of balancing military influence on Soviet policy formulation against the increasing need of political authorities to call upon the professional expertise of the military leadership.

With regard to the first category of problems, during the past few years, a lively professional discussion has been carried on in the Soviet Union containing overtones of disagreement over existing arrangements for the command and control of the armed forces. Part of this discussion has dealt with the technical aspects of improving command and

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control under nuclear-age conditions.[1] But the question of the proper political-military relationship at top levels of decision also has entered the picture. A considerable amount of attention has been given, for example, to the need for creating in peacetime the "necessary politico-military organs" to insure coordinated leadership of the country in emergencies, taking cognizance of the fact that "modern weapons are such that the political leadership cannot let them escape its control."[2] The commentaries of Soviet military men on this subject have implied that while they do not question the ultimate authority of the political leaders, they do worry that the latter may be prone to indecision in emergencies. Thus, military men like Marshal Grechko have harked back to the mistakes committed by the top leadership prior to and in the initial stages of World War II to underscore the point that in the nuclear age the leadership's "correct and timely evaluation of the situation prior to a war, and the reaching of initial decisions" have taken on greatly increased significance.[3]

The second category of problems, arising from the recognized need for a more effective integration of military planning and procurement into general economic planning, has been frequently aired in recent years against the background of the civil-military competition for resources. Early in the Brezhnev-Kosygin period, the issue of economic-*vs.*-defense priorities was raised in the military press in a series of theoretical articles arguing that one-sided emphasis on war deterrence, as practiced under Khrushchev, could lead to neglect of the all-round strengthening of the armed forces and to doubt concerning "the need to spend large resources on them."[4] Later—after the top party leaders publicly declared that the "aggravation of the world situation" precluded "a substantial reduction in military expenditures"[5] and gave their sanction to increases in the defense budget—the professional military press began to devote an unusual amount of attention to the need for a coordinated "military-economic policy" to insure "correct and effective use of resources" and the "solution of all military-economic tasks."[6] In general, military spokesmen conceded the need for strict party control over the "complex tasks" of coordinating civilian and military production,[7] but they also expressed reservations about the wisdom of allowing economic criteria to outweigh military requirements. For example, one writer, taking note of concern about the increasing cost and complexity of modern weapon systems, observed that it was essential to make optimum use of resources; but he argued that in the last analysis the maintenance of technical-military superiority required that the quality—not the cost—of advanced weapon systems should be the governing consideration."[8]

Another indication that the issue of civil-military competition for resources was being contested within the regime came following the death of Marshal Malinovsky, the Defense Minister, in March 1967. At that time, there was a spate of rumors in Moscow that his successor might be Dmitri Ustinov, a party civilian with a long career in the management of defense industry, suggesting internal pressure for a restructuring of the traditional Defense Ministry organization along more civilian-oriented lines. Had Ustinov taken over the post customarily occupied by a military professional, with command prerogatives over the armed forces, it seems likely that rather sweeping organizational changes would have followed, perhaps with the effect of reducing the influence of professional military men on resource decisions. As it turned out, however, the regime shied away from such a radical step (if it had in fact seriously contemplated it), and after a brief delay Marshal Grechko was appointed Defense Minister, leaving the position of the military professionals in the defense hierarchy undisturbed.

With regard to the third category of issues in the relationship between civilian and military leaders —those pertaining to the "permissible" share of military participation in the highest policy-making

[1] See Colonel S. Tiushkevich, "The Modern Revolution in Military Affairs: Its Sources and Character," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (Moscow) No. 20, October 1966, pp. 22-23; N. Ia. Sushko and T. R. Kondratkov, eds., *Metodologicheskie problemy voennoi teorii i praktiki*, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1966, pp. 69, 243-65, 279.

[2] See Major General V. Zemskov, "For the Theoretical Seminar: An Important Factor for Victory in War," *Krasnaia zvezda* (Moscow), Jan. 5, 1967; Colonel I. Grudinin, "The Question of the Essence of War," *ibid.*, July 21, 1966.

[3] Marshal A. A. Grechko, "25 Years Ago," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 6, June 1966, pp. 10, 15.

[4] See, for example, Colonel I. Sidelnikov, "V. I. Lenin on the Class Approach to Defining the Character of War," *Krasnaia zvezda*, September 22, 1965.

[5] Kosygin speech at the 23rd CPSU Congress, *Pravda* (Moscow), April 6, 1966.

[6] Colonel A. Babin, "The Party—Leader of the USSR Armed Forces," *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 6, 1967; Colonel Ia. Vlasevich, "Modern War and the Economy," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 12, June 1967, pp. 27-33.

[7] Babin, in *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 6, 1967.

[8] Major General M. Cherednichenko, "Economics and Military-Technical Policy," *Kommunist Vooruzhennyskh Sil*, No. 15, August 1968, pp. 11-13.

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councils of the regime—there has been a wide variety of evidence to suggest both a more assertive bid by the military hierarchy for a larger voice in decisions affecting the country's security, and a counter-response from the political leadership aimed at reaffirming the principle of party dominance. This muted struggle has not been a simple two-sided tug-of-war between the political leadership and the military, but rather a complex affair in which the party has been able to summon advocates for its view from within the military establishment and the latter in turn has apparently found allies on the political side of the house. The manner in which this internal sparring over the respective roles of the party and the professional military has been carried out cannot be traced in detail, nor can its outcome be predicted.

Some of the evidence in question goes back to a thinly-disguised debate which arose in 1966-1967 between proponents of a larger military share in the formulation of military doctrine and strategy, and defenders of the principle of party supremacy in all aspects of military affairs. This had been a familiar issue in Khrushchev's day. The late Marshal Sokolovsky, an eminent spokesman during the Khrushchev era for more professional military influence upon the strategic planning process, was one of the men who again pressed this viewpoint. In conveying the point that strategic planning in the nuclear age demands a high level of military expertise, Sokolovsky used the United States as an example, claiming that "direct leadership" of the top strategic planning body, the National Security Council, was "exercised by a committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," even though its nominal head was the President.[9]

The other side of the argument was also emphatically restated. Following a Central Committee plenum which met in closed session in December 1966 to deal with the question, a series of forceful reminders of the party's supremacy in military affairs appeared in the Soviet press. Among the most trenchant of these was an article in January 1967 by Major General Zemskov, who stated that the solution of the complex tasks of modern war, involving great coalitions and the energies of whole societies, "falls completely within the competence of the political leadership." [10] Although the Zemskov article rebutted Sokolovsky's contention that military professionals should have greater access to the top level of strategic planning, it also stated that there was a need for the peacetime creation of a single "supreme military-political organ" through which the political leadership would exercise its role. This apparent admission that the Soviet Union lacked adequate institutional arrangements to effect top-level coordination between the political and military leadership was rather puzzling. In Khrushchev's day, the Higher Military Council—chaired by Khrushchev and seating the country's principal political and military leaders—had apparently performed this function.[11] Whether or not it was disbanded after Khrushchev's ouster is not known; if it was, the reason may have been because the collective leaders were wary of allowing any one man among them to wield the power which the chairmanship of such a body could bestow. In any event, the curious dialogue over the need for a "supreme military-political organ" seemed to suggest that the ques-

A second body of evidence on the position of the Soviet military leadership vis-à-vis the political leadership is somewhat less ambiguous. It stems from events and activities connected with the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. The course pursued by the Soviet leadership in seeking a resolution of its political dilemma in Czechoslovakia through military pressure —first in the form of field exercises and threatened intervention, and finally by actual invasion—raised new speculation about the degree of military influence upon high policy decisions in the Kremlin and upon their implementation.

There seems to be little ground for doubting that the Czech episode enhanced the prestige of the Soviet marshals and increased the party leadership's dependence on them. Not only did the military professionals play the major role in the well-executed military phase of the invasion, but—owing to the inept

[9] Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky and Major General M. Cherednichenko, "On Modern Military Strategy," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 7, April 1966, pp. 62-63. Needless to point out, Sokolovsky's polemical interpretation of the operation of the NSC was not accurate.

[10] Zemskov, *op. cit.*

[11] The Higher Military Council referred to here, sometimes described also as the Supreme or Main Military Council, was a body distinct from the system of Military Councils found *within* the country's military structure at various command levels. For background discussion of this institution, see Thomas W. Wolfe, *The Soviet Military Scene: Institutional and Defense Policy Considerations*, Santa Monica, Calif., the RAND Corporation, June 1966, pp. 11-12. See also Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1967, pp. 58-77, 124-43.

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handling of the political aspects of the intervention by Soviet political authorities—military men were thrust almost by default into a combined military-political role as the only effective representatives of Soviet power in Czechoslovakia during the early, confused post-invasion period. The subsequent military occupation, upon which enforcement of the Soviet writ in Czechoslovakia largely depended, also undoubtedly boosted the internal leverage of the Soviet marshals within the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. Furthermore, when anti-Soviet demonstrations broke out in Czechoslovakia in early 1969 (after a Czech ice-hockey victory over a Soviet team), the need to threaten new repressive measures again involved the military leaders in an active role as the executors of Moscow's East European policy. Marshal Grechko's peremptory visit to Czechoslovakia at this time as the Kremlin's chief trouble-shooter was widely regarded as proof of the new ascendancy of the Soviet military leadership, and many Western observers credited Grechko on this occasion with having succeeded where Soviet political leaders had failed—in forcing Dubcek out of office and returning pro-Moscow conservatives to power in Prague.

While the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime's debt to the Soviet military leadership clearly grew in connection with the Czechoslovak affair, this did not necessarily mean that the marshals had succeeded in translating their traditional advisory role and their enhanced instrumental role into fully potent political power within the Kremlin. Indeed, there was other evidence which seemed to point to a continuing internal controversy of sorts between elements of the political and military leadership, involving, on one hand, symbolic gestures to reduce the prestige of the military a notch or two, and on the other, implicit criticism of the political leadership over issues related to the country's military posture and its stance on strategic arms talks.

The 1969 May Day celebration in Red Square provided what appeared to be a symbolic reminder of the primacy of the political leadership. At the last moment, under circumstances which are still obscure, the traditional parade of military formations through Red Square was cancelled, while for the first time in Soviet history the Minister of Defense was denied the honor of making the speech of the day. However, an impressive cluster of Soviet marshals on the reveiwing stand, some paces from the front phalanx of Politburo dignitaries, also seemed to be a symbolic way of indicating that the military remained an important element in the structure of power.

Signs of military dissatisfaction with—and perhaps resistance to—the political leadership's attitude on matters of military policy and the strategic arms talks took several forms in the latter months of 1968 and early 1969. First, the military press subjected some government statements on arms control policy to editorial tampering, which had the effect of censoring out expressions of Soviet readiness to negotiate with the United States on strategic arms limitations.[12] A second line of sniping at the political leadership was pursued by several relatively junior military theorists, who may have enjoyed discreet encouragement from higher-placed sympathizers in both military and political circles.

Among these critics was Lt. Colonel V. Bondarenko, author of a highly polemical article published in December 1968 in the twice-monthly journal of the Main Political Administration of the Armed Forces. The article was notable not only for its forceful assertion of the thesis that the Soviet Union must pursue the race for military-technical superiority, which—according to Bondarenko—has "its own logic of development," but also for its blunt assertion that "political organizations and their leaders" might "fail to use the emerging possibilities" offered by the "revolution in military affairs."[13] Coming at a time when strategic arms talks with the United States were pending, this article appeared to put the Soviet political leadership (or at least some elements within it) on warning not to entertain agreements that the military deemed prejudicial to the defense of the country. In addition to the Bondarenko article, there were other thinly veiled warnings from military writers against utopian "illusions" that the danger of war could be eliminated and security achieved through disarmament agreements.[14]

A third line of approach was revealed in early 1969 in a series of articles devoted to Lenin's thinking on war and military affairs. These articles, most of which appeared in major military publications and some of which were authored by prominent military figures, uniformly stressed Lenin's teaching that "imperialism" would remain implacably hostile to the Soviet state

[12] See, for example, Matthew P. Gallagher, "Red Army's Arms Lobby," *The Washington Post*, Feb. 9, 1969.

[13] "The Contemporary Revolution in Military Affairs and the Combat Readiness of the Armed Forces," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 24, December 1968, especially pp. 24-29.

[14] See, for example, review article by Colonel E. Rybkin, "Critique of Bourgeois Conceptions of War and Peace," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 18, September 1968, pp. 89-90.

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and that the chances of a war to restore the capitalist system would continue to exist until the historical transition from capitalism to communism throughout the world was complete.[15] Given the insistence in these articles that the threat from imperialism permitted no slackening of priority for Soviet defenses, it could be surmised that their authors were taking part in a concerted campaign to defend maintenance of a high level of Soviet military preparation, and, by implication, to oppose reliance on arms control negotiations for Soviet security. Rather curiously, despite the heightened awareness of new friction with China growing out of the Ussuri River clashes in March 1969, none of these authors directly invoked the Chinese military threat as the rationale for strengthening Soviet military preparedness[16]—although it seems highly probable that Sino-Soviet discord has in fact become an increasingly important consideration in Soviet military planning.

The upshot of the various developments sketched above seems to be that the Soviet military leadership—as a pressure group operating within the Soviet ruling elite—has acquired greater prestige and influence during the Brezhnev-Kosygin tenure than it enjoyed under Khrushchev. It also seems clear that beneath the surface of relatively harmonious relations between civilian party authorities and the military there are various intractable issues which generate continuing internal controversy and tension. The likelihood that members of the political leadership do not themselves see eye to eye on some of the matters at issue—economic-*vs.*-military priorities, posture toward the United States, arms control negotiations, and so on—undoubtedly complicates the situation and probably produces opportunities for the military to make its weight felt in the inner politics of the Kremlin.

Beyond this, however, the evidence hardly supports the proposition that the Soviet marshals have successfully challenged the ultimate authority and policy-making prerogatives of the party leadership, or that they even aspire to do so. The fact that no military man has been taken into the Politburo since Zhukov—who was the only military professional in recent times to gain entry—seems to testify to the continuing formal subordination of the Soviet military. So far as the evidence permits one to judge at this time, the political leadership continues to enjoy the last word at the apex of power, as has been the case throughout the first half-century of Soviet history.

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[15] Among the authors were: Marshal A. A. Grechko, in *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 3, February 1969; General A. Yepishev, *ibid.*, No. 6, April 1969; Major General K. S. Bochkarev, in *Morskoi sbornik* (Moscow), No. 2, February 1969; Colonel M. Vetrov, in *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 3, March 1969; A. Galitsan, *ibid.*

[16] Subsequently, however, treatment of Chinese "provocations" as justification for a high level of Soviet military readiness began to appear in Soviet military publications. See, for example, Lt. General P. Tiurnev, "Always Combat Ready," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 9, May 1969, pp. 26-32; V. Yefremov, "Self-Exposure of the Peking Adventurers," *Soviet Military Review* (Moscow), No. 5, May 1969, pp. 54-56.

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Correspondence

EDITORS' NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC, 20547.*

Authors' Rejoinders

TO THE EDITORS: I have just read Professor Harold J. Noah's review of my book, *The School and State in the USSR*, which appeared in the January-February issue of your journal. I must admit that it left me puzzled and somewhat disturbed.

The fact that *Uchitelskaia gazeta* is referred to in the book only as a source for news stories and is not identified as a major "influence" on Soviet education need not be a source of wonder to Professor Noah. In spite of his belabored attempt at sarcasm, it truly is no more of a "triumph" not to mention the paper as he would want it mentioned than it would be to discuss *Pravda* as a major influence on the general populace. In the case of *Pravda*, the book addressed itself to the more fundamental question of the influence of the CPSU on the populace; that is to say, of an organization which uses its house organ *Pravda* as but one instrumentality of its pervasive influence on Soviet life. I view *Uchitelskaia gazeta* in the same light. Professor Noah fails to mention that one chapter is devoted to the trade union movement in the USSR, and in particular the trade union of educational and scientific workers, the organization which publishes this newspaper and which, in fact, uses it as *its* instrumentality of influence. . . .

I find it ironic indeed to be accused of perpetrating "hair-raising stylistic solecisms" by one whose review is filled with such solecisms as ". . . it is something of a triumph to write a book entitled *The School and State in the USSR* and not once mention the influence of *Uchitelskaia gazeta* . . ." or the feline-like ending paragraph which reads in part, "In a sea without fish, even a crab is a fish, and in an area of Soviet study where little else is available, this book must be welcomed, if only conditionally." If a solecism is defined as a breach of good manners, Professor Noah lives in the proverbial glass house.

Turning to a more fundamental issue —that of "incorrectly" giving the figure of 239 rubles for the average annual expenditure per pupil—a word of explanation is in order. On page 67 of my book I indicate that 13.8 billion rubles were spent in 1963 for public education, science and culture, and social-cultural measures. This figure was prepared for me by officials in the RSFSR Ministry of Education, which at that time (early 1964) coordinated Soviet education on a national as well as republican level. As I state throughout the book, anyone who has ever attempted to study seriously any aspect of the Soviet system knows how difficult it is to work with Soviet-supplied statistics. Categories are often lumped together one year, and separated the next, depending upon the exigencies prevailing at a given time. In this case (and as I indicate in the chapter questioned by Professor Noah) *prosveshchenie* is an all-inclusive term which refers to out-of-school as well as in-school expenditures. We have no way of knowing what portion of these 13.8 billion rubles was spent specifically on in-school activities. But, by the same token, we don't know this for the figures issued by republican or autonomous regional ministries of education either. The table on page 68 to which Professor Noah evidently refers was developed to show the inequities which appear among various levels of government in their support of *prosveshchenie*. In a footnote for that table, I clearly state how this figure was derived. I point out that this was an *estimate* derived from dividing the total enrollment in grades 1-11 for the year in question into the expenditures for what may be loosely translated as education. Surely an economist such as Professor Noah purports to be can understand this. What I was talking about was simply an index of expenditures that could be compared among various levels of government to illustrate the more fundamental concept of unequal support of education within a system that is centrally-controlled and hence more likely, theoretically, to have fewer differences of this sort within its system of education. I wish that we knew more about educational expenditures within Soviet education in terms of capital outlay as opposed to operating budgets. I wish I knew more about the percentages of the operating budget devoted to teachers' salaries, as compared to expenditures for instructional materials and the like. I readily confess to the fact that I have been unable to get solid figures from *Soviet* sources. But on the other hand so have other non-Soviet scholars. Now to say that I have given incorrect figures concerning Soviet expenditures is in itself an incorrect statement. If Professor Noah has derived different figures through different assumptions, we can see that our approaches have been different, but this is a far cry from the accusation that I am *wrong*.

Certainly every author who publishes his work is open to the close scrutiny of his peers, and I am no exception. This book has been reviewed by Australian, Canadian, British, Soviet and American scholars. It has not come off unscathed, and in some cases rightly so. I only object to off-handed comments which are incorrect or totally subjective. Unfortunately Professor Noah's review contains criticisms of this type.

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PROFESSOR NOAH REPLIES: Apparently Mr. Rudman and I differ on matters of interpretation (the role of *Uchitelskaia gazeta*), opinion (what is, and what is not, a stylistic solecism), and fact (the average expenditure per student in Soviet education). I have carefully reread his book, my review, and his reply to my review, and I am afraid that our differences are both serious and irreconcilable. I therefore stand on my review, leaving it to the readers of Mr. Rudman's book to judge for themselves the merits of each.

TO THE EDITORS: I must protest Mr. Tibor Szamuely's review of my *Fifty Years of Soviet Foreign Policy* in your May-June 1969 issue as misrepresenting my views. If one writes about the Soviet Union, one must, I suppose, expect lectures from ex-Communists about one's own imperfect anti-communism. Such lectures don't harm the addressee, and make the lecturer more secure in his new faith. But I don't care to have my views misstated in your widely read magazine.

Mr. Szamuely writes that I think the cold war, "to the extent it ever did exist, was due largely to misperceptions." In introducing the theme of misperception I wrote (page 4):

I do not mean to imply that the interests of the Soviet Union and those of its main opponents, particularly the United States, were largely compatible and that it was willful or doctrinaire failure to discern the opportunities for accommodation that made relations worse than they had to be. On the contrary, the Soviet expectation that the tide of human affairs was running against the capitalists and that it was their duty to augment the strength of that tide, when feasible and not too risky, predetermined hostility and tension. . . .

I do not mean to accept as valid the familiar and simplistic thesis that, were it not for some misunderstandings derived from ill-will and ignorance, Soviet-American relations would have been reasonably untroubled. Very often, in fact, high tension was the product of a clear-cut mutual understanding of the conflict of interest.

I can only conclude that Mr. Szamuely did not read my essay with even minimal attention, or that he chose to attack me for opinions I do not hold. In either case, he has been derelict as a reviewer and done your readers a disservice.

It would be tiresome to deal with Mr. Szamuely's other misrepresentations, which are of the same order. Those who might be interested in Mr. Szamuely's reliability can read the essay themselves.

HERBERT S. DINERSTEIN
The Washington Center of
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Washington, D.C.

MR. SZAMUELY REPLIES: Professor Herbert Dinerstein, in launching his virulent personal onslaught against me, is only following the old courtroom adage: if you've got a weak case, attack the prosecuting attorney. Obviously he has carried out some careful research into my background; had he briefed himself as thoroughly when writing his book, he would at least have left out some of the grosser factual errors—*e.g.*, misdating the 18th Party Congress (p. 13) or placing the Korean demarcation line on the 39th parallel (p. 30).

I suppose Professor Dinerstein has as much right as anybody else to indulge in reverse McCarthyism. However, I have no desire to follow his example. I know nothing about his political views or affiliations, past or present, nor am I interested in them. I criticized his book not because it was "pro-Communist" or "anti-Communist" but, quite simply, because I thought it was a bad book: pretentious, misinformed, ill-written, abounding in errors and even in fatuous judgments.

Prof. Dinerstein is particularly incensed by my statement that in his view the Cold War, "to the extent that it ever did exist, was due largely to 'misperceptions'". He attempts to refute this by quoting a long passage from the book, explaining that by "misperception" he does not mean "wilful or doctrinaire failure to discern the opportunities for accommodation". Of course not—but what has that to do with his thesis? (Interestingly, he omits the end of the second sentence, substituting dots for the words "as long as the United States believed that only its opposition could prevent Soviet success"!)

As Prof. Dinerstein impugns both my integrity and my reliability, I am constrained to substantiate my statement by several passages from his book, taken at random.

"Misperception has played an important role in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Three forms of misperception stand out: Without assessment of them, an understanding of the international relations of the Soviet Union is incomplete" (p. 5). There follow three pages of description of these "misperceptions".

"This contest [the Cold War] was perhaps more intense and longer in duration than it might have been because each party misperceived the intentions of the others" (p. 21). "Thus, Stalin's misconception of US dispositions led to a major conflict from which neither the Soviet Union nor the United States profited" (p. 22). "Far from understanding that Stalin was quaking with fear, the United States too had become the prisoner of its own misjudgments and assumed that the Korean attack was a feint in preparation for a Soviet onslaught in Europe. This misconception was shared by US allies in Europe, and on this foundation NATO was built" (p. 31). "During [Kennedy's] brief term of office mutual misperception and misunderstanding were supplanted by a short but significant period of improved mutual appreciation of the coincidence of interest" (p. 46). *But*—"by the end of the first year of the Kennedy administration a heavier fog of misperception had settled over Soviet-American relations than had existed earlier" (p. 51). During the Test Ban Treaty negotiations, "misperception of each other's intentions played a role, and the misperception was heightened by domestic political considerations on each side . . . Enough has been revealed to make clear that misperception of the other party's purpose played an important role" (pp. 63-64). And so on and so forth.

To paraphrase Professor Dinerstein, enough has been revealed to make it clear that "misperception" plays an important if not decisive role in his analysis of Soviet-American relations. As for what Prof. Dinerstein is pleased to call my "other misrepresentations," I have quoted chapter and verse for each of them in my review. I am not to blame for the things he has written in his book, and he hardly does himself much good by indulging in vulgar personal abuse.

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